Computational Verification of Security Requirements by Bibu, Gideon Dadik
        
University of Bath
PHD








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the
University of Bath
Department of Computer Science
September 2013
COPYRIGHT
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author.
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on the condition that anyone who
consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and
that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be
published without the prior written consent of the author.
This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library
and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consulta-
tion.
Signature of Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gideon Dadik Bibu
Abstract
One of the reasons for persistence of information security challenges in organisa-
tions is that security is usually seen as a technical problem. Hence the emphasis
on technical solutions in practice. However, security challenges can also arise
from people and processes. We therefore approach the problem of security in
organisations from a socio-technical perspective and reason that the design of
security requirements for organisations has to include procedures that would al-
low for the design time analysis of the system behaviour with respect to security
requirements.
In this thesis we present a computational approach to the verification and valida-
tion of elicited security requirements. This complements the existing approaches
of security requirements elicitation by providing a computational means for rea-
soning about security requirements at design time. Our methodology is centred
on a deontic logic inspired institutional framework which provides a mechanism to
monitor the permissions, empowerment, and obligations of actors and generates
violations when a security breach occurs.
We demonstrate the functionality of our approach by modelling a practical sce-
nario from health care domain to explore how the institutional framework can
be used to develop a model of a system of interacting actors using the action
language InstAL. Through the application of the semantics of answer set pro-
gramming (ASP), we demonstrate a way of carrying out verification of security
requirements such that it is possible to predict the effect of certain actions and the
causes of certain system states. To show that our approach works for a number
of security requirements, we also use other scenarios to demonstrate the analysis
of confidentiality and integrity requirements.
From human factor point of view compliance determines the effectiveness of se-
curity requirements. We demonstrate that our approach can be used for man-
agement of security requirements compliance. By verifying compliance and pre-
dicting non-compliance and its consequences at design time, requirements can be
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The mantra of any good security
engineer is: ‘Security is a not a
product, but a process.’ It’s more
than designing strong
cryptography into a system; it’s
designing the entire system such




The unrivalled developments in the computer systems in recent times have seen
both individuals and organisations become more dependent on computer based
technologies, especially the information system infrastructure, for their daily uses.
Organisations particularly now depend on information technology for their busi-
ness operations and processes. As a result, such organisations are faced with the
challenge of security vulnerabilities as more and more highly sensitive content is
processed and managed electronically.
Security can be viewed from different perspectives and as such definition of se-
curity is usually derived from the perspective in which it is viewed. Security has
meant different things to different people ranging from physical security of servers
and workstations from those who might try to steal them, security of data from
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viruses and worms and the means by which they may be kept from entering a
network, security of data from hackers and miscreants, to providing even comfort
that comes in knowing that you can restore files if a user accidentally deletes them
could also be seen as security (Pastore and Dulaney, 2006). However, regardless
of the context in which security is defined, the goals of any information system
security are;
• Prevention: This is the traditional core of computer or information secu-
rity. It is aimed at stopping security breaches from occurring.
• Detection: refers to identifying events when they occur. This can be
difficult in some situations since attack on a system may occur over a long
period before it is successful. Incident detection involves identifying the
assets under attack, how the incidence occurred, and who carried (or is
still carrying) it out. Detection should be an ongoing going activity in an
organisation.
• Response: refers to developing strategies and techniques to deal with an
attack or loss. This involves having some well thought-out and tested plans
to be used to respond, restore operations, and neutralise threats. It is
better to have these in hand than trying to create them when the attack
has already occurred.
These goals create the framework for developing and maintaining security for in-
formation systems. Security is generally seen as the ability of a system to protect
information and system resources with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA)(Olivier, 2002). Some researchers and security professionals
have also made a case for the inclusion of accountability as a security goal that
needs to be met but not covered by the CIA trio (Haley et al., 2006; Pastore
and Dulaney, 2006; Anderson, 2008). Each of these security sub goals presents
different challenges which define the security design goals of any organisation’s
information system. Also, it is worth noting that there is usually tension between
these security goals. For instance, between confidentiality and availability which
we are not going into in this thesis but would like to note that such a tension
makes the design of security requirements challenging.
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Security of information has remained a challenge in practice. Despite the adop-
tion and implementation of various security technologies, organisations still re-
main vulnerable to security incidents (Fry and Nystrom, 2009; DofBIS-UK, 2013).
According to the 2013 information security breach survey report commissioned
by the UK department of business innovation and skills (DofBIS-UK, 2013, pp.
2–3), organisations’ spending on security has increased from the previous years
due to the increase in awareness of security challenges and the need to invest more
on security. However, contrary to expectations, the number of security breaches
affecting UK businesses continues to increase rather than reduce. This rise in
security breach is most notable for small organisations who are now experiencing
incident levels previously associated only with larger organisations with affected
organisations experiencing roughly 50% more breaches on average than the pre-
vious year. These breaches are not without associated financial implications to
the organisations. The report confirms the rise in the cost of individual breaches
surveyed with several breaches costing more than £1m in the year under survey.
In total, this cost to the UK organisations is in the order of billions of pounds
per annum which is roughly tripled over the previous year.
Sources of the reported security breaches span from external attacks to internal
attacks, underlining the fact that attacks could be launched from both inside
and outside the organisation. External threats are usually addressed by creating
a “perimeter” around the organisation’s assets such as firewalls, which provide
defences against the perceived external attacks. This does not solve the insider
threat problem which is more subtle than the external threat problem, in the
sense that insider threat manifests itself in many ways, including through user
behaviours that violate security policies. These behaviours could either be mali-
cious or non-malicious, however, whatever the intention, these behaviours always
have negative impact on the organisation. A malicious insider is potentially more
dangerous than an outside attacker. This is because an insider has legitimate and
privileged access to information resources, practical knowledge of the organisation
and its processes, and knowledge of the location of valuable and critical assets.
An important step in mitigating the risks posed by insider attacks is to carefully
construct an enterprise-wide security policy that addresses usage and security
issues (Mike and Kemp, 2005; Colwill, 2009) in addition to the implementation
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of necessary security threat mitigation mechanisms.
Looking at the internal attacks which is the focus of this thesis, serious security
breaches were reported to have been due to the multiple internal sources includ-
ing failures in technology, processes, and people with staff playing key role in
many breaches. The report shows that 36% of the worst security breaches were
caused by unintentional human error with a further 10% by deliberate misuse
of systems by staff. Particularly in small organisations surveyed, 57% of them
suffered staff related security breaches which is 45% rise from a year ago. This
report is also supported by the Ponemon report (Institute, 2012) which empha-
sised that organizations “must address how employees factor into overall data
security”. All these go to point out the fact that organisations are struggling to
keep up with security threats despite increased attention given to security in IT
budget compared with previous years.
Remedies for security vulnerabilities and breaches tend to focus on technical
mechanisms, including firewalls and implementation of encryption, which are of-
ten designed and implemented with little consideration for the needs and charac-
teristics of the end users, including network administrators and managers. How-
ever, organisations are made up of human individuals who interact with each
other and with various organisational resources such as information and data as
they carry out their duties. As such, they have the tendency to exhibit behaviours
that circumvent the security efforts of such organisations. For instance, requiring
a user to use a complex password may result in the user writing a note with the
password attached to the computer screen.
The potential weakness of technical solutions and the danger of focusing solely on
technical solutions have been highlighted by security experts. Schneier (Schneier,
2000) for instance expressed this as follows:
Computer security is difficult (maybe even impossible), but imagine
for a moment that we’ve achieved it. Unfortunately, this still isn’t
enough. For this miraculous computer system to do anything useful,
it is going to have to interact with users in some way, at some time,
for some reason. And this interaction is the biggest security risk of
them all. People often represent the weakest link in the security chain
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and are chronically responsible for the failure of security systems.
A similar message is provided by Mitnick and Simon (Mitnick and Simon, 2002):
A company may have purchased the best security technologies that
money can buy, trained their people so well that they lock up all their
secrets before going home at night, and hired building guards from
the best security firm in the business. The company is still totally
vulnerable... the human factor is truly security’s weakest link.
These two quotes attribute the weakest security link to the human factor. The
lack of consideration for human factors may create situations where people have
to circumvent the security mechanisms and procedures in order to perform their
job efficiently. Also, if security processes “get in the way” of human activities or
impose tedious overheads, they are more likely to be circumvented. For instance,
a requirement for the user to perform a security scan on the system at login
may be circumvented by the user who needs to get some work done urgently.
Likewise security policies that are formed without sufficient consideration for
implementation issues may be difficult to implement by the users.
Therefore, technical controls in isolation are not enough to protect organisations
since with the appropriate motivation and time, human beings will find their
way around most technical controls (Colwill, 2009; Kraemer et al., 2009). It is
important to design security systems and processes that consider the structure
of the organization and the interactions of the various data users and handlers
within the organization, i.e. to adopt an approach based on the discipline of
organizational behaviour and human factor engineering. Such an approach can
help in understanding behaviours of end users and the factors that affect their
behaviours which will in turn influence the definition of appropriate security
requirements.
Another reason for the prevalence of security breaches is that security require-
ments are frequently not considered at system design time but rather added to
the system later in the software life-cycle. Consideration of security in the system
development life cycle is considered essential to implementing and integrating a
comprehensive strategy for managing security risks for all information technology
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assets in an organisation (Kissel et al., 2008). Therefore, identifying and analysing
security requirements should be an important element of the software engineering
process. This would lead to the early identification of security loopholes in the
system thereby helping in the provision of appropriate mitigations.
We therefore see a potential here in using the approach of monitoring events in or-
ganisations to address security problems that are not due to the insecurity of the
underlying system infrastructure, but security threats that are due to the vulner-
abilities that could not be elicited at system design time. These behaviour related
threats include information leakage, system failures, abuse of privileges, and vio-
lation of security policies. Our solution approach will involve taking into account
the social structure that exists in an organisation, the security policies and the
interactions between actors. We illustrate our approach using suitable scenarios
that capture the traditional security goals in the sections that follow.
Before we go further, we need to define what we mean by system in this the-
sis.
Definition 1.
We take the term System to include the software, hardware, and the people
who interact with these software and hardware by way of usage.
This definition is consistent with common usage within the requirements engineer-
ing community, of which security requirements are part. For example, “...we use
‘system’ only to refer to a general artefact that might have both manual and auto-
matic components, such as an ‘airline reservation system’.” - Zave and Jackson
(1997). Also, van Lamsweerde (2000) describes a target system as not just a piece
of software, but also comprising the environment that surrounds it. Therefore
as requirements engineering is aimed at providing detailed and relevant informa-
tion about the requirements that a system must satisfy, security requirements
engineering seeks to establish the adequate requirements that if respected, would
lead to satisfaction of system’s security goals.
We also use the term policy to refer to security policy. Policy has been used
in many ways to address security issues consisting of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. Policies can be sets of rules that define choices in behaviour
6
of participants in a system in terms of the conditions under which predefined
operations or actions can be invoked. Security policies provide the first step
in preventing insider abuse in organisations as expected security behaviours are
usually presented in the form of some high level security policies. However, the
problem with policies is that compliance cannot be guaranteed and hence the
likelihood for the security threats to persist, despite the existence of policies that
should have ensured proper behaviour by users. With this in mind, it is important
that security policy designers are able to verify that the policy is consistent with
the operations of the organisation so that everyday organisational processes do
not stand in the way of compliance. It is also necessary that security designers are
able to verify the effect of non-compliance to security policies on the state of the
organisation. This would help in refining the policy before it is deployed.
Many approaches have been proposed for the elicitation of security requirements
at system design time (e.g. Sindre and Opdahl (2005); Pauli and Xu (2005); Mc-
Dermott and Fox (1999); Liu et al. (2003); Mouratidis (2011); van Lamsweerde
(2004)). However, one missing thing is that they do not provide for a way of
formal reasoning about the requirements, as a result they are not able to say
anything about the effect of the constraints elicited on the system functionality.
The importance of eliciting the appropriate security requirements is non trivial.
Research in elicitation of security requirements has gone from the use of tra-
ditional requirements engineering approaches to multi-agent system (MAS) and
socio-technical systems (STS) approaches that aim at recognising the interac-
tion of heterogeneous actors in elicitation of security requirements. This thesis
is more aligned towards the MAS and STS approaches and we aim at enhancing
the process of elicitation of system security requirements through the provision of
a mechanism that allows for reasoning about the requirements elicited at design
time, taking note particularly, of the fact that the actors in the system could
behave in many different ways that could impact on the security of the system
at run time.
1.1 Security, Logic and Social Norms
Today, the implicit philosophy of computer and information security is largely
based on the notion of containment which is taken from the analogy of the kind of
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protection offered for physical things such as fences, gates, locks etc (Gasser, 1988;
Pieters, 2011). This implies that the assets to be protected need to be separated
from the environment. This separation is provided for by the use of security
boundaries such as firewalls which filter all inbound and outbound traffic on
an organisation’s network, hence providing protection from potentially harmful
transmissions. In this fortress-based approach to security, the fortress may be
robust against external threats but weak against those emanating from within
the security perimeter. The latter, though very potent threats in today’s world
of information security, has been largely left unexamined as much information
security endeavours have been devoted to the former.
In his work, Pieters (2011) further points out how unsatisfactory this implicit
philosophy is in the current age of increased connectivity. Therefore rather than
having security of information systems thought of as rational design choices only,
the alternative idea is to think of information security as a co-evolution of social
and technical mechanisms, hence the socio-technical perspective adopted in this
thesis. Central to this perspective is the idea that; i) information security is
not merely a design problem, as external forces also participate in shaping the
threats to and protection of information system ii) humans play a central role in
the security of information systems, both as attackers and defenders. Therefore
the notion of fortress-based security can no longer suffice because
i) there is an increasing demand to access organisation’s assets from outside the
organisation’s physical parameter as organisations undergo transformations
in order to keep up with today’s increasingly competitive environment. This
demand for external access is warranted by outsourcing of services and com-
puting resuources as occassioned by technologies enabled by cloud computing
(Armbrust et al., 2010; Mell and Grance, 2011; Colwill, 2009)
ii) there is the problem of insider threat. With respect to information access,
the insider is considered to be an individual who is currently or at one time
have been authorized to access an organization’s information system, data,
or network. Such authorization implies a degree of trust in the individual
as posited in the RAND report (Anderson and Brackney, 2004, p. xi) and
Bishop (Bishop, 2005; Bishop and Gates, 2008). The insider threat therefore
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refers to any act that trusted insiders might carry out in violation of security
policies such that it causes harm to the organization or benefits the individual
(Greitzer et al., 2008; Probst et al., 2007).
These have challenged the notion of fortress-based security, and solutions need
to be developed that include human behaviours.
The philosophy of security design is often an adversarial one in which one treats
the other as a potential enemy and this goes against our social and ethical predis-
positions. Organisational culture has social and ethical predispositions encoded
into it. Also a family of culture-related drivers such as the organisational ideol-
ogy, beliefs, rituals and myths; motivate and shape the organisational practices
(Pettigrew, 1979). Attackers’ awareness of these predispositions enables them to
exploit the resultant weaknesses by means of social engineering. For example,
since people do not regard Santa Claus as a malevolent symbol, they are not
likely to immediately associate it with malicious behaviour, hence, dressing up as
Santa Claus could work well for accessing restricted areas. From the perspective
of security policy compliance for instance, situations usually arise in which actors
face contradictory expectations on their behaviour, as expressed in organisational
or social norms.
Research in psychology has shown that norms motivate human action and peo-
ple tend to do what is socially approved as well as what is popular. Putting
this in perspective, a distinction has been made between two kinds of norms at
work place which could affect the security of the organisation in different ways:
injunctive norms which involves perceptions of which behaviours are typically
approved or disapproved, and descriptive norms which has to do with perception
of which behaviours are typically performed (Cialdini, 2003). Thus, people’s ac-
tions may be based on what they perceive to be an approved behaviour or what
they perceive to be a common behaviour in which case, there is no expectation of
approval. In security, both types of norms may improve or worsen security. For
instance, the perception that quick delivery of results will be approved, even if
security procedures are evaded can impact on security negatively. This happens
when people think that to get their job done quickly is important and perceive
that it will be an approved behaviour.
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An example of how norms impact on security in organisations is the data loss
incident at the UK’s HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) as analysed in the
Poynter report (Poynter, 2008). In this incident, two compact disks (CDs) con-
taining personal details of 25 million people were lost in transit between HM
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the National Audit office (NAO). The disks
contained personal records of families claiming child benefit, being financial aid
given to families with children in the UK. The data which was comprised also
of address and bank details of families under this system was being transferred
as part of the external audit of the cases managed under this benefit system.
Because child benefit is widely used by UK society, the event caused a serious
public reaction. This helped in bringing into sharp focus the issues related to
how citizens’ personal data are managed by organisations. The Poynter report
was commissioned in response to the data loss. The report detailed the events of
the incident which led to the loss of two CDs. In addition, the root cause analysis
of the issues that led to the incident was also presented in the report. A number
of issues revealed in this report related to security policy which include:
i) the difficulty in interpretation of sufficient authorisation to release the CDs,
ii) the inadequate definition of obligations under the policy,
iii) poor specification of security controls for data in transit, and
iv) the unenforceable nature of the policy regarding the method of CD transport.
In this report, two significant issues relating to culture were also identified:
i) staff below a certain grade prioritise operational requirements over security
requirements, and
ii) transfer of large amount of data between HMRC and other external govern-
ment bodies had become a routine organisational practice.
This example points out clearly the fact that organisational information security
cannot be contained only within technical specifications and solutions. It shows
that many aspects of compliance with security policies are dependent on cul-
tural interpretation of enforcement and on the interplay between explicit norms
(policies) and implicit norms. Also, the HMRC case indicates that rituals and
practices can conflict with the security norms. From a security perspective, an
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organisation consist of a cultural system and a socio-structural system. The cul-
tural system includes values, myths and ideologies that influence perceptions of
security and security practice. Whereas, the socio-structural system consist in
the institutional elements that are used to deploy security which include the func-
tions, the policies, the procedures and the processes (Pieters and Coles-Kemp,
2011). Therefore tools and methodologies that help to specify and analyse secu-
rity requirements that capture these aspects are a necessary addition to security
management processes. In our opinion, taking a normative perspective to this
problem would proffer helpful solution.
1.2 Security Goals
We have stated earlier that the general concerns about computer security com-
prise of confidentiality (secrecy), integrity, and availability. Confidentiality im-
plies that certain subjects1 of the system should not have access to certain in-
formation. This concerns the question of who has permission to know what
information. Integrity is bothered about the protection of certain information
from improper processing by some subjects such that its properties of useful-
ness and accessibility to other subjects are preserved. This can be viewed as a
requirement of obligation on certain subjects to know certain information, con-
sequently, the information must be protected before and during transmission to
those subjects. Availability is concerned with the ability to access information
when it is needed, that is while it is still useful. We can see that much security
is based on the notion of knowledge, either what a subject is permitted to know
or what a subject is obligated to know (Glasgow et al., 1992). For instance we
can intuitively describe confidentiality in terms of what information a subject
has permission to know. This therefore provides the opportunity to apply logic
as a vehicle for reasoning about security, since logic allows us to reason about
knowledge.
In contrast with the notion of confidentiality, integrity is concerned with the
maintenance of consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of data over its entire
1We use the term subject here loosely to mean various actors that interact with the system,
particularly with interest in the information available to the system. This will include human
and non-human actors.
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life cycle (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003). Data must not be changed in transit, and
steps must be taken to ensure that data cannot be altered by unauthorized people
(for instance, in a breach of confidentiality). For example, a company’s database
system requires high integrity. This means that for instance, every transaction
that got started has to be completed either with a commit transaction or a roll-
back transaction in the event that the transaction fails to complete. As a result,
accurate information can be accessed from the database at any point in time.
There is no notion of secrecy here, but rather the question of accuracy of, and
accessibility to, the stored information. Our understanding here therefore is that
much of what integrity involves can be expressed using the obligation to know
certain information or to perform certain actions. Integrity seems to involve some
notion of time which can be in terms of ticking of a clock, interval between events,
or deadlines. For example, using the database example, the begin transaction
event is obliged to trigger a commit transaction event when completed, otherwise
a roll-back event is triggered.
The third general security concern is that of availability. This can also be ex-
pressed in terms of obligation since it also involves a notion of time. Still using
the database illustration, it is expected that information is accessible from the
database when needed.
Following the discussions so far on the CIA security concerns, we approach the
reasoning about security requirements associated with these concerns in terms
of permissions and obligations. The formal reasoning tool that allows for the
inclusion of these notions is found in modal logic, particularly temporal logic
which has been applied to reasoning about computer security related issues such
as security policy specification (Glasgow et al., 1992; Minsky and Lockman, 1985;
Jones and Sergot, 1992) and security protocols verification (Burrows et al., 1990).
However our position differs from these works in the sense that we are looking
at security from a socio-technical perspective. In this case we are very much
concerned about the interactions that occur between the system actors and how
these interactions may affect the security of the system or the organisation. Hence
our adoption of the normative systems perspective which also provides for the
logic of actions, especially the notion of power in addition to the notions of
permission and obligation.
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In this work, we propose a computational approach to the verification and valida-
tion of elicited security requirements. The methodology is an institutional frame-
work (Cliffe, 2007) which provides a mechanism to capture and reason about
“correct” and “incorrect” behaviour within a certain context, which in this case
is security. Based on logic programming, but inspired by deontic logic, the frame-
work monitors the permissions, empowerment, and obligations of participants
and generates violations when a security breach occurs. Information on the ef-
fects of participants’ actions are stored in the state of the framework as facts. The
“little” facts collected about events/actions triggered by participants over time
may eventually lead to “big” facts that reveal vital information about a partici-
pant’s behaviour with respect to the preservation of the system security. Using
misuse case analysis for the initial elicitation of security requirements, our solu-
tion provides a means for rigorous testing of the security requirements elicited.
The combination of our approach with the well-established misuse case approach
provides a tool that can be used in determining the adequacy of a system’s se-
curity requirements at design time. Implementation is achieved using an action
language InstAL (Cliffe, 2007) which is based on the semantics of answer set
programming (ASP) (Baral, 2003).
1.3 Motivation and Scope
This research is motivated by the fact that the handling of organisational assets
– primarily information – and processes is not entirely technical but also “social”
in the sense that humans are intrinsically involved and interact in some social
form in order to achieve organisational goals. This fact is well captured by the
notion of socio-technical systems (STSs) which is largely credited to the action
research project undertaken by Trist and Bamforth of the Tavistock Institute of
Human Relations on British coal mines in which they assumed that organisations
consist of the relation between human systems and non-human systems (Trist
and Bamforth, 1951; Trist, 1981). Here the human and technical elements are
taken to interface with each other in a typical industrial production system. For
such a socio-technical system, the total system structure is composed of (Cooper
and Foster, 1971): (i) the total set of individuals, their activities, and their
interrelationships describing the social system of the factory; (ii) the total set of
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machines and their displacement which describes the plant layout of the factory;
and (iii) the total set of manufacturing processes and their interrelationships
describing the manufacturing system of the factory. The interaction of these
“social” and “technical” systems constitutes the socio-technical system.
Systems today are socio-technical in nature, for they consist of an interplay of
social actors (human and organisations) and technical components (software and
hardware) which interact with one another in order to achieve their objectives
and requirements (Dalpiaz et al., 2013). For example, healthcare systems, smart
cities, critical infrastructure protection systems, air traffic management control
systems, etc. These systems have participants who are autonomous, heteroge-
neous and weakly controllable. As a result, a number of security issues are raised
when these participants interact, especially when sensitive information exchange
is involved in their interaction (Paja et al., 2013). The socio-technical nature of
modern systems also makes it more vulnerable to the problem of social engineer-
ing (Winkler and Dealy, 1995; Thornburgh, 2004) which is the process of using
non-technical means, including social interactions, to obtain critical information
about a victim’s system. This process can range from i) impersonation whereby
an attacker pretends to be an authorised system user or official of an organisation
and places a phone call in order to get the information needed, to ii) scavenging
where the attacker goes through garbage from the target organisation (Thomp-
son, 2013; Mitnick and Simon, 2002; Slatalla and Quittner, 1995). These scenarios
describe the modern day security challenges in organisations.
It is not enough to consider technical mechanisms alone when dealing with the
security problem in socio-technical systems because social aspects are also a con-
cern. Today’s organisational settings witness more and more interaction between
human, technical and process components of the organisation as organisational
goals are pursued. Therefore as organisations are not only composed of tech-
nical components, so also the security challenges that they face are not only
technical but also include non-technical challenges made up of humans and pro-
cesses. The inter-relationship between humans and technology (hardware and
software) creates security vulnerabilities that could impact the organisation neg-
atively. Such vulnerabilities are usually not easily understood early in the course
of system design, since they are due to the “social” interaction between the ac-
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tors in the organisation. Where this type of security vulnerability is thought of,
the mitigation is usually specified in terms of high-level policy statements. The
elicitation and analysis of requirements to tackle these types of security vulner-
abilities is essential for ensuring that the security of information and processes
is maintained in organisations. The work presented in this thesis is motivated
by the need to provide methodologies and tools for the analysis of such security
requirements.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
In this thesis, we present a computational approach to security requirements
and compliance verification that is based on the application of formal reasoning
techniques. Existing security requirements elicitation techniques attempt analysis
by manual means. This is quite restricted due to the limitation of humans in being
able to reason through the many possibilities of the kind of events that could be
triggered by actors and the consequences of such actions on the security state
of organisational assets – particularly information. Also the existing methods
approach the problem of information security in organisations from a technical
perspective and use deductive reasoning techniques for security policy analysis.
These require complete specification of the system state in order to produce useful
results. We emphasise in this thesis that security challenges that organisations
face are not only technical but also social in the sense that user interactions and
behaviours pose security challenges in the organisation. We therefore focus on
the analysis of security requirements with this human factor in mind. Since the
effectiveness of a security mechanism is largely dependent on how effective the
elicitation of the system’s security requirements was, it is important to be able to
analyse the security requirement effectively before it is implemented. However,
most of the existing approaches do not model the system behaviour in such
a way as to support a priori analysis of requirements that are constraints on
the runtime state of the system. One approach that attempted this (Bandara
et al., 2003) used standard event calculus to model specifically authorisation and
management policies. We propose a formalism that uses an action language to
model processes/workflows and security requirements based on an institutional
framework inspired by deontic logic. The reasoning mechanism is realised by
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using answer set semantics.
The main contribution of this thesis is a computational approach for the analysis
of security requirements using the institutional framework inspired by deontic
logic and realised using Answer Set Programming. Further more:
• We demonstrate that the institutional framework can be used to develop a
design time model of a business process in order to be able to reason about
security requirements at design-time.
• We complement the misuse case approach for eliciting security requirements
by providing a methodology for static analysis of the elicited security re-
quirements.
• We review the challenge of managing information security requirements
compliance and demonstrate how a business process can be analysed for
compliance with such requirements.
• We develop a tool for generating specifications of a model in the action
language instAL from UML-based models, thereby extending the original
instAL development process. We also extend the query translation tool to
allow for queries to be expressed in a more natural language manner.
1.5 Related Publications
In this section we present all the publications by the author which are related to
this thesis, in accordance with Regulation 16.5 subsection k(ii) of the University
of Bath Regulations for Students 2013/2014.
(Bibu, 2011) Bibu, G.D. Security in the context of multi-agent systems. In
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems – Volume 3, AAMAS ’11, pages 1339-1340, Richland, SC, 2011.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
This paper (an extended abstract) presents our initial exploration of the
problem space and thoughts on our solution approach.
(Bibu and Padget, 2011) Bibu, G. and Padget J. Security engineering for
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multi-agent systems: A normative approach (Poster). In The 10th Interna-
tional Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems AAMAS
’11, Taipei International Covention Center (TICC) in Taipei, Taiwan, May
2011. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems.
This poster presented the overview of the problem of security as including
people, processes, and technology. We presented our solution framework
which includes the integration of the institutional (normative) framework.
(Bibu et al., 2012b) Bibu, G.D., Yoshioka, N., and Padget, J. A. Security
requirements analysis and validation using misuse case and institutional
framework. Technical Report No. GRACE-TR 2012-2. GRACE Center
of National Institute of Informatics, 2012. Tokyo, Japan. http://grace-
center.jp/rsc tr-html?lang=en.
This is the report of our work on analysing security requirements with
misuse cases and the institutional framework.
(Bibu et al., 2012a) Bibu, G., Yoshioka, N., and Padget, J. System security
requirements analysis with answer set programming. In Requirements Engi-
neering for Systems, Services and Systems-of-Systems (RES4), 2012 IEEE
Second Workshop on, pages 10-13, 2012.
In this paper we presented the implementation of our solution approach
with results showing the analysis of security requirements.
1.6 Thesis Outline
Following this introduction, the remaining of the thesis is presented in Seven
Chapters as follows:
In Chapter 2 (page 20) we present the review of the security requirements land-
scape as it relates to this thesis. We look at the traditional approaches to
security requirements elicitation and analysis. We look at misuse cases
and mal-activity diagrams as approaches for elicitation of security require-
ments and observe that these approaches do not present any computational
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means of analysing elicited security requirements. We review and present
use cases and scenarios in analysis of security requirements. Multi-agent
system approaches to security requirements analysis are also presented. We
present the various strengths and weaknesses in these approaches. We also
introduce the concept of socio-technical systems and relate it to organisa-
tional information security in which the research presented in this thesis is
situated.
Chapter 3 (page 33) then presents the approaches for modelling organisations
with electronic institutions. This is to further lay the foundations on which
the research is based. We review the existing approaches based on the two
categories presented in literature namely: Organisational approaches and
Institutional approaches. This review helps us to identify the suitability
and the background of the approach we are adopting for the work presented
in this thesis. We then proceed to introduce the Institutional Framework
approach. We present the various aspects of the framework that are relevant
to this thesis. We also present the formal definition of the Institutional
Framework. This forms the basis for the next chapter which deals with the
computational part of this work.
Chapter 4 (page 63) presents approaches for reasoning in computational logic.
We start by introducing the Answer Set Programming (ASP) paradigm
and its underlying logical formalism AnsProlog. We explain its syntax and
semantics and compared ASP with other reasoning approaches. We then
proceed to discuss the translation of the Institutional Framework into ASP,
describing the translation of each component of the Institutional Frame-
work. Finally we introduce the action language InstAL and describe how
institutions can be specified in InstAL.
In Chapter 5 (page 107) we introduce the computational verification frame-
work (CVF) for security requirements. We present an overview of the frame-
work and we use a case study from the medical domain to show how the
concept works. In generalising our approach we identify and present issues
that concern the usability, completeness, and validation of the framework.
Chapter 6 (page 130) presents the tools developed and extended in order to
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accomplish the research goals presented in this thesis. These include the
XML2InstAL translator which translates UML-based activity diagrams into
InstAL equivalent specifications. We present a formalisation for UML Ac-
tivity Diagram semantics which guide the translation of our UML-based
models to equivalent InstAL specification. We also present some guidelines
on reasoning with our framework through querying. The introduction of
these tools also extends the original InstAL reasoning framework in ways
that makes its use easier. The use of these tools are presented with the
results of analysis for which they were used.
In Chapter 7 (page 164) we present the analysis of verification of properties.
Using appropriate scenarios for each of the security properties illustrated,
we show how security properties may be analysis by querying the answer
sets produced from the computational models of the scenarios in which
the security property applies. We also present the verification of security
requirements compliance. The results of the analysis are presented and
discussed.
Chapter 8 (page 184) presents the summary of the thesis contribution and the
future work that can follow from the work presented in this thesis. We also
highlight some of the limitations of our approach in Section 8.3 on page 187.
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Chapter 2
Security Requirements Engineering: The
Landscape
2.1 Introduction
The development of modern Information Systems (IS) is faced with the chal-
lenge of security among other challenges such as performance and usability of
such systems. This has drawn the attention of researchers to the topic of Se-
curity Engineering (SE). Security Engineering is defined as a discipline which
explores how to build systems which are reliable in the face of malice, errors or
mischief (Mouratidis et al., 2004). This encompasses a set of methods, techniques
and tools responsible for eliciting, specifying, and analysing the requirements for
protecting the resources of an IS to ensure that the security goals of informa-
tion availability, confidentiality, and integrity are preserved. Security of IS has
therefore progressively become a broad field of research.
A security requirement is a requirement which describes that part of a system
shall be secure, or a property which, if violated may threaten the security of a
system. Such requirements are derived from the traditional security goals of con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability. For example, an integrity security require-
ment can be stated as “The system shall prevent the unauthorized modification
of data collected from customers”.
The requirements engineering community has distinguished between two kinds of
requirements: Functional requirements and non-functional requirements. There
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is a broad consensus on the definition of functional requirements. Here, the
emphasis is on functions, hence functional requirements are regarded as system
requirements that specify functions that a system must be able to perform, what
a system should do, and what the products must do (IEEE, 1990; Robertson
and Robertson, 2006). Wiegers and Jacobson et al. presented more coherent
definitions as follows: “A statement of a piece of required functionality or a be-
haviour that a system will exhibit under specific conditions.” (Wiegers, 2003); “A
requirement that specifies an action that a system must be able to perform, with-
out considering physical constraints; a requirement that specifies input/output
behaviour of a system.” (Jacobson et al., 1999).
However, there is no harmonised definition for non-functional requirements. Glinz
(2007) presents a summary of some of the definitions available in the community
and it is noted that all definitions build on the terms which include property,
attribute, quality, constraint, and performance. Non-functional requirements ex-
press constraints or conditions that need to be satisfied by functional require-
ments and design solutions. In other words, they define the overall qualities or
attributes of the resulting system which are not related to the functionality of
the system. It is common today to find non-functional requirements described
as Quality of Service requirements, performance constraints, or “ilities” (reliabil-
ity, extensibility, usability, availability etc). Therefore in contrast to functional
requirements, which define what the system must do in terms of transforming in-
puts into outputs, non-functional requirements define non-behavioural attributes
of a system which constrain the way in which the system must behave (Mirakhorli
and Cleland-Huang, 2012).
Security requirements are generally considered non-functional requirements since
they mostly concern what must not happen. They are therefore seen as restric-
tions or constraints on system services (Kotonya and Sommerville, 1998; Rushby,
2001; Mouratidis et al., 2003). Firesmith (2003) presents security requirement
as a quality requirement specifying a required amount of security in terms of a
minimum level system-specific criterion that is necessary to meet one or more
security policies. This appears also as a form of constraint on the system.
In a security context a threat is seen as the potential for abuse of assets. A threat
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is characterised in terms of an attacker, a presumed attack method, any vulnera-
bilities that are exploited by the attack, and the asset under attack. An attack is a
sequence of events resulting in a threatening phenomenon. An attacker is consid-
ered a malicious actor, not necessarily a human, causing an attack. The Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (commonly called Com-
mon Criteria) (Criteria, 2012) defines a vulnerability as the condition of a system
which can be exploited by an attacker to cause a security violation.
In Figure 2-1 we present an overview of security requirements in relation to the
other stakeholders in the security of a system. Central to any security endeavour
in an organisation is the preservation of assets that are considered valuable to
the organisation. These are the targets of any attacker, whether from within
the organisation or from outside through the violation of security mechanisms
implemented to protect the assets. For instance in a healthcare system, patients’
medical record would be an asset that ought to be protected. These assets deter-
mine the security goals that the organisation’s security efforts would be targeted
at. Traditionally, security goals for information systems are classified into (i) con-
fidentiality goals which are concerned with the protection of information assets
against unauthorised access; (ii) integrity goals are bothered with the protec-
tion of assets from unauthorised alteration and corruption, and (iii) availability
goals which are focused on the prevention of unauthorised degradation of the
accessibility of assets. Still using the patients’ medical records example, the
security goal for a patient’s health records would be primarily that of confiden-
tiality. The determination of the security goals leads to the elicitation of the
security requirements (constraints) which would mitigate the vulnerabilities in
the system towards the security goal. A Security requirement is often considered
a constraint on a functional requirement which ensures that a particular security
violation cannot happen (Moffett and Nuseibeh, 2003). Therefore information se-
curity is achieved by introducing and implementing such constraints that satisfy
a system’s security requirements and providing protection to the organisation’s
information system and assets by inhibiting the attacker.
A number of approaches for security requirements have been proposed by re-
searchers. We do not intend to present an exhaustive survey of these approaches























Figure 2-1: How Security Requirements relate to assets, attacker and security mechanisms
our work in terms of modelling language (formal or informal), perspective (or-
ganisational, Attacker oriented, System oriented), automated analysis tool, and
socio-technical perspective.
2.2 Security Requirements Engineering - Traditional Ap-
proaches
As more information systems get connected and organisations’ dependence on
these systems increases, security threats that compromise these technologies are
also growing. This is because the system witnesses more interactions between
the actors in the system, thereby increasing the amount of information that
flows within the system. Organisations are now more vulnerable to security
problems than ever (Mitnick and Simon, 2002; PWC, 2012). Recent surveys on
security breaches in organisations reveal that risky behaviours of users, including
senior management employees, pose significant threats to information security
in organisations (Friedberg, 2013; Green, 2014; Hawes, 2014). The challenge of
managing employees’ security behaviour has been echoed by security experts in
organisations such as the Dow Chemical security manager Theresa Jones who
was quoted in Johnson and Goetz (2007): “My biggest challenge is changing
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behaviour. If I could change the behaviour of our Dow workforce, then I would
think I had solved the problem”.
Companies, in an effort to address security problems, spend millions of dollars on
technical security solutions such as firewalls, encryption and secure access devices.
These fail to provide the desired security because none of these measures address
one of the weaker links in the security chain – humans and their behaviours
(Poulsen, 2000; Beautement et al., 2008). The implication of this perspective on
security is that the traditional approach to addressing security as only a technical
problem would only yield security solutions that would not address the security
challenges posed by the behaviours of humans. Many techniques and approaches
have been proposed to specify security requirements and the Requirements En-
gineering community has acknowledged the importance of considering security
since the early stages of software development (Lee et al., 2002; Pauli and Xu,
2005). We review some of the approaches used in the requirements engineering
community for capturing and expressing requirements as follows;
2.2.1 Use Cases and Scenarios
A use case is the set of interactions that a user or other system component
has with a system in order to achieve a goal. The term Actor describes the
person or system associated with a goal, implying that actors are driven by
goals. Use cases (Cockburn, 2001; Rumbaugh, 1994) are popular for determining,
communicating, specifying, and documenting requirements. They are used to
describe interactions involving systems, actors and their environments. Each use
case specifies a sequence of actions that a system can perform, including variants,
interacting with actors of the system. Ever since the adoption of use cases by
software development approaches such as the Unified Process (Jacobson et al.,
1999), use cases have become one of the favourite approaches for requirements
capture. Several use cases are usually needed to completely describe a system’s
requirements. In terms of UML syntax and semantics, relationships between use
cases and between actors and use cases are represented in a use case diagram.
Typical relationships between use cases in the UML are include and extend
relationships.
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Some of the problems identified with use-case-based approaches to requirements
engineering include such things as over-simplification of assumptions about the
problem domain and premature design decisions (Arlow, 1998; Lilly, 1999). While
use cases are suitable for most functional requirements, they may lead to neglect
of extra-functional requirements, such as security requirements (Alexander, 2003).
As a result of these, we do not find use cases too useful for the purpose of this the-
sis. We rather focus on the use of scenarios which describe interactions between
systems and actors in a sequence that lead to the desired goal. A scenario may
be defined as a sequence of triggers, system reactions, waiting delays, guard real-
izations and assertions. Triggers are operations from actors in the environment,
while system reactions are operations of the system. A waiting delay specifies a
point in a scenario where a certain amount of time passes without any trigger
or system reaction. A guard realization is a condition set to hold at a certain
point in time. The following example illustrates how a use case differs from a
scenario:
Use Case: User authenticates with ID and password
Possible Scenarios:
1. ID is recognized, password is correct.
2. ID is recognized, password is incorrect.
3. ID is not recognized.
Scenarios present possible ways to use a system to accomplish some desired func-
tion, they are therefore use-oriented. Scenario-based approaches have attracted
increasing interest among requirements engineers and the literature abounds on
scenario methods, models, and notations (Carroll (1995); Alexander and Maiden
(2004); Dzida and Freitag (1998); Hertzum (2003)). Scenarios have also become
popular in other fields, notably human-computer interaction and strategic plan-
ning.
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2.2.2 Misuse Case and Mal(icious)-activity Diagrams
Misuse Case
Techniques used for modelling functional security requirements at the early stage
of system development cycle include the misuse cases and mal-activity diagrams.
Early consideration of security requirements allows system designers to equip
their systems with security mechanisms built within system design rather than
relying on external defensive mechanisms. A misuse case is a sequence of actions
and interactions between actors (system and/or users) such that if allowed to
complete would cause harm to some stakeholder. The user in this case is called a
misuser who initiates the misuse case intentionally or inadvertently. In a model-
driven engineering process, misuse cases are expected to drive the construction
of mal-activity diagrams.
Misuse case modelling emerged from the more popular UML use case functional
requirement specification technique and has become a promising technique in the
past decade for the elicitation and modelling of functional security requirements
(Sindre and Opdahl, 2005; Alexander, 2003; Pauli and Xu, 2005). A misuse case
is a use case from the point of view of a hostile actor. Hence structurally, a misuse
case diagram can simply be said to be an ordinary use case diagram annotated
with misuse cases and misusers. However functionally, use cases define the in-
tended usage scenarios of a system by its intended entities whereas misuse cases
define improper usage scenarios of a system by misuser1 entities that may lead
to harmful consequences irrespective of whether these scenarios were performed
intentionally or unintentionally (El-Attar, 2012a). Figure 2-2 shows a simple il-
lustration of use case (2-2a) and misuse case (2-2b) diagrams. The misuser and
the misuse cases are shown in inverted colour and the interactions between the
misuse cases and use cases are denoted with <<threatens>> and <<mitigates>>
depending on the kind of effect they have on each other. The rule governing the
description of the interaction between any use case and misuse case is presented
in Table 2.1 on the next page.
Misuse case are described using natural language so stakeholders are able to
1We use the term Misuser in this thesis in a generic sense to mean any unintended user or
unauthorised user
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(a) A Use Case (b) A Misuse Case
Figure 2-2: Illustration of Use Case and Misuse Case Diagrams of a Simple Scenario
Target case type
Use Misuse
Source case Use Includes Mitigates
type Misuse Threatens Includes
Table 2.1: The Rules for Interaction between use and misuse cases
understand it easily and give feedback since misuse case modelling by nature
inherits key features from use case modelling (El-Attar, 2012a). Also, misuse
cases describe security requirements as scenarios, that is a set of operational ac-
tion sequences. In an industrial survey presented in Weidenhaupt et al. (1998)
which spanned from small applications to large application, scenarios have been
shown to be an effective technique for determining and validating requirements.
Finally, since misuse case modelling is performed during the requirements engi-
neering phase, security concerns are in turn considered prior to the initial ar-
chitectural design of a system. With misuse cases, focus can be put on security
by describing security threats and then requirements, without going into design.
However misuse cases just like use cases have their weaknesses that make them
unsuitable for analysis of security requirements. First a sequence of actions and
actors (misusers) cannot be identified from misuse case. As such identifiable se-
quence of actions cannot be exploited for analysis. Secondly the lack of unified
formal semantics is a problem for automatic translation and analysis of misuse
case models. Misuse cases are best for capturing threats and attacks just at the
system boundary (whether that boundary delineates a fully automated system
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or a human organisation). They are less suitable for capturing attacks that take
place either inside or outside the system (Sindre, 2007). Take for instance an in-
sider who performs fraudulent actions within an organisation. Assume the fraud
requires the collusion of several insiders in the organisation who may perform
their actions at different times and probably as part of several normal use cases.
Misuse cases would not be useful in capturing such an attack since misuse cases
would only give an overview of the normal functions wanted in a system, as well
as the threats posed by attackers, and in part which threats are related to which
normal function. They are not able to show sequences of activities hence not
able to show where a certain malicious activity might fit into the organisational
business process. This implies that if only misuse cases are produced, there will
remain a large gap between the analysis and design phases with respect to devel-
oping the necessary security mechanisms. Misuse case models therefore provide
an excellent starting point to model security requirements, but they are insuffi-
cient on their own. The limitations of misuse cases are overcome by mal-activity
diagrams (Sindre, 2007).
Mal-activity Diagrams
Just as misuse case diagrams are inspired by use cases, mal-activity diagrams
are inspire by UML activity diagrams. Mal-activity diagrams complement activ-
ity diagrams by adding malicious users/actors and their activities in a scenario.
Therefore similar to the relation between misuse cases and use cases, mal-activity
diagrams use the same syntax and semantics as UML activity diagrams. Mali-
cious activities are depicted as normal activity icons but with inverted colours,
malicious actors as misusers but with white text on a black background with
malicious actors (misusers) having designated swim lanes. Where there are ma-
licious decisions, these are depicted as ordinary decision diamonds but with the
black filling. Mal-activity diagrams model security requirements more precisely
while providing initial guidance towards a detailed system design. In effect, mal-
activity diagrams help bridging the gap between the analysis and design phases
with respect to developing the necessary security mechanisms.
In our work we make use of activity diagrams to capture scenarios since we are
interested in identifying actors and their actions in a defined business process.
28
Our activity diagrams are then translated into an InstAL model based on the
Institutional Framework translation described in Section 4.5 on page 88.
2.2.3 Abuse Cases and Anti-models
The Abuse Case (McDermott and Fox, 1999) is an adaptation of the use case
modelling technique (Firesmith, 1999) which characterises the way a system is
expected to be used. While a use case is a specification of a kind of complete in-
teraction between a system and one or more actors, an abuse case specifies a type
of interaction between a system and one or more actors, where the results of the
interactions are negative/harmful. It includes a range of security concerns that
might be abused, as well as a description of the harm that might be caused.
Anti-models were proposed in van Lamsweerde (2004) to deal with security en-
gineering at the application layer. The anti-model, which is built to capture
attackers, includes vulnerabilities and capabilities needed to achieve the anti-
goals (the attacker’s goal) of the security goals that are endangered. Anti-models
are designed to lead to the generation of more subtle threats and the deriva-
tion of more robust security requirements as anticipated countermeasures to such
threats. Anti-goals are refined in threat trees, whose leaf nodes represent either
vulnerabilities observable by the attacker or anti-requirements implementable by
the attacker. This approach does not focus on the social interaction among actors.
It is therefore not suitable for our approach.
A goal-oriented methodology based on i* modelling language (Yu et al., 2011)
was presented in Liu et al. (2003) to deal with security and privacy requirements.
Security dimensions are modelled as soft-goals, and security requirements analysis
is performed to verify whether the system is secure. Analysis identifies potential
system attackers/abusers, vulnerabilities (propagated along dependency links),
thereby suggesting countermeasures. Their solution falls short when considering
security issues through the later phases of the development process.
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2.3 Security Requirements Engineering: Multi-agent Sys-
tem Approaches
2.3.1 Secure i*
This modelling framework extends and refines the i* modelling language (Yu
et al., 2011) for software requirements engineering. Proposed for the design of
socio-technical systems, the framework consist of primitives for capturing organi-
sational security aspects. These primitives include actor, goal, task, resource, and
social dependencies between actors. The framework is enhanced with the notions
of permission, delegation, trust, and supervision which are at the centre of its se-
curity concerns. Delegation is used to model the transfer of rights between actors
while trust is used to model the expectation of an actor about the behaviour of
other actors (Zannone, 2009). Si* employs a number of modelling activities to
express the design of secure STSs, each producing a diagram representing a view
of the requirements model. These include; An actor diagram which describes do-
main stakeholders and system’s actors. Concrete actors are explicitly modelled
as agents. These could refer to human as well as software agents and organ-
isations. Abstract characterisation of the behaviour of the social actor within
some defined context is modelled as a role. An agent is therefore said to play
a role. The concept of role hierarchies is also implemented using the concept
of specialisation. Actors are described in terms of their objectives, entitlements,
and capabilities. Objectives could be goals intended to be achieved, tasks to be
executed, or resources to be acquired by the actor. Entitlements consist of goals,
tasks, and resources that the actor has the permission to achieve, execute, and
furnish respectively. Capabilities are the actor’s ability to achieve, execute, or
furnish goals, tasks, or resources respectively.
The social relations among the stakeholders and system’s actors are described
in terms of the organisational structure and expectations about the behaviour of
other actors. These social relations are modelled as social diagram. The concepts
of supervision, trust of permission, and trust of execution are used together with
the concepts of agent and role to build organisational hierarchies. Trust of exe-
cution is used to model the expectations one actor has on the competence and
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dependability of another actor. In general, by trusting in execution, an actor
is sure that the other actor will achieve the goal, perform the task, or furnish
the resource. Trust of permission is used to model the expectations of one actor
that another actor does not misuse a goal, a task, or a resource. By trusting in
permission, an actor is sure that the (possibly) granted permission is properly
used.
Interesting to us in this work is the way the notion of permission is used. It is
used in the sense of actors granting each other authorisations. However, we use
the notion of permissions to determine actions that would not be considered as
violations of rules, hence would not cause a breach of security in the system.
2.3.2 Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos is an extension of Tropos, which is an information system develop-
ment methodology, tailored to describe both the organisational environment of
a system and the system itself. Although Tropos incorporates the i* modelling
framework (Yu et al., 2011), it does not handle security issues for the system
under consideration. Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2011) extends Tropos by in-
troducing concepts such as security constraint and secure dependency among
others, in order to provide a systematic process that will guide the developer in
considering security requirements throughout the phases of system development.
Security requirements are expressed as security constraints, which should be sat-
isfied together with the functional requirements. Potential threats and attacks
are considered as well, to analyse and find the best way to overcome possible
vulnerabilities. Analysis of security is done through a graphical representation
where nodes represent the actors and the link between nodes represent the de-
pendencies between the nodes. The major problem for us with this approach is
the imposition of security constraints on dependencies which means that agents
are constrained to act in particular predetermined ways. This leaves no room
for autonomy of the agents in terms of behaviours. Humans have the ability to
think and behave rationally, that is, to chose actions that maximises their ex-
pected utility and this demands autonomy (Wooldridge, 2000; Deci and Ryan,
1987). Imposition of constraints also means that violations are not expected,
hence there would be nothing for us to analyse.
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2.4 Summary of Chapter
Today, security can be broadly classified into internal threats and external threats.
Most organisations appear to invest much in security technologies in readiness
against external threats such as virus threats, hacker attacks, and infrastructure
failures such as fires, terror attacks, distributed denial of service attacks, fraud
attacks and Spam. The Ernst & Young’s 2012 information security survey (ey1,
2012) shows that organisations have improved greatly on their information secu-
rity capabilities. However, they are still behind in ensuring information security
within their organisations, thereby creating an information security gap that
grows ever larger. A lot of the challenges faced by the organisations are there-
fore due to the other category of security - internal threat. These are security
threats that arise as a result of accidental or intentional security breaches done
by employees through negligence, non-conformance to organisational information
security policies, or misconduct on systems among several other possible misbe-
haviours. The human factor challenge in information security therefore starts
with intentional or involuntary employee misconduct. This challenge is due to
the fact that most often the perpetrators use unsophisticated methods to gain ac-
cess to systems; Something as simple as an employee sharing his/her passwords
or writing a hard-to-remember password and sticking it on the work desk, an
employee leaving a confidential document openly on the desk, or a disgruntled
employee having access to the emails even after leaving the organisation. All
these could cause a security breach, and the possibilities are many (Surendran,
2005). Therefore, modelling and analysing the organisational environment (actors
and processes) where the system will act is crucial for building secure systems.
This allows designers to identify security mechanisms that can best protect the
system, and their impacts on the system, since security breaches often occur at
an organisational level, rather than a technical one (Anderson, 1993). In this
thesis, we argue that organisational security of information systems can be en-
hanced by analysing the behaviour of the actors within the organisation. The
analysis will help in the development and implementation of the appropriate se-
curity mechanisms that will mitigate some of the security vulnerabilities. This,
we claim can be achieved by using agent-oriented modelling approach to model
the organisation as a set of institutions.
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Chapter 3
Modelling Organisations with Electronic
Institutions
3.1 Introduction
The notion of institution is used in different contexts in everyday language. For
example a given hospital is described as a “health care institution”, or we talk
about “marriage institution”. These everyday uses and many other forms of in-
stitution have been studied and formalised by legal theorists, political scientists,
economists, and philosophers (see Powell and DiMaggio (1991); Aoki (2001)).
Some of the features presented in these conventional understandings include a
distinction between institutional facts, for example x owns y, and brute facts
for example x has-possession-of y, and the assumption that institutions in-
volve regulations, norms, and conventions in which some approaches presented
by North (1990) and Ostrom (1986) take institutions to be the conventions them-
selves, thereby drawing a clear distinction between institutions and organisations.
Others take institutions to be organisations consisting of rules or norms, institu-
tional objects and due processes or procedures, but still keep individuals out of
the institution. As a result of these understandings and their formalisations, the
agents community has used the notion of institutions to model and implement a
variety of socio-technical systems serving the same purpose as conventional in-
stitutions. The aim is to enable and regulate the interaction among autonomous
participants towards achieving some collective goals. In this case, interactions
in the agent institution must comply with some conventions, rules, and norms
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that apply to every participating agent. Regulations control interactions and are
applicable to individual agents on the basis of what they do (i.e roles they adopt)
rather than on the basis of who they are (Fornara et al., 2013).
The concept of institutions has its root in social sciences (North, 1990) and are re-
garded as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, thereby
reducing uncertainty as they provide structure to everyday interactions among
humans. These institutions can be formal constraints such as rules and regula-
tions formulated by humans, or informal constraints such as conventions, norms,
and codes of behaviour (North, 1990). Institutions are regarded as the frame-
work within which human interactions take place. They consist of constraints
such as prohibitions and conditions under which certain actions are permitted by
certain actors. However, in human interactions, it is a known fact that norms,
whether formal rules or informal codes, are usually violated either deliberately
or unintentionally. An essential part of an institution therefore is the detection
of violations and its effect on the society.
In this work, the focus is not on human society in general but what we consider a
subset of the society, an organisation which is defined as a social unit (or human
grouping) constructed deliberately to pursue specific goals (Esteva et al., 2001).
In addition to this we also consider an organisation as a unit which consist of a
system of interacting human and technical actors constructed for specific goals.
In this domain, there are constraints analogous to the institutions in a human
society as discussed earlier, which specify what actions are acceptable and by what
actors. There are also constraints that specify conditions under which certain
actions can take place. These are known as information security policies (ISPs)
which organisations provide with the aim of controlling behaviours by providing
employees (actors) with guidelines on how to ensure information security while
they utilize information systems in the course of performing their jobs (Whitman
et al., 2001; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
However, these actors are autonomous, heterogeneous, independent, unreliable,
and liable. In the light of socio-technical systems, human actors have their own
minds and would tend to behave in ways which are divergent from the expected
pattern of behaviour. Also, things could go wrong with technical systems, such as
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hardware failures and software bugs, causing them to exhibit behaviours which are
inconsistent with the expected behaviours. These divergent human behaviours
and failures in the technical components of a system could make the system
vulnerable to security attacks which would not have been determined at system
requirement and design time.
3.2 Organisations and Institutions
According to North (1990), institutions provide a structure for everyday life which
guide human interactions. Institutions are the framework within which human
interact as they define prohibitions, permissions and other conditions such as
obligations for participants. In our opinion, the notions of institution and or-
ganisation are closely related. The essential distinction is that the institution
is focused on what can be done, while organisations focus on who does it. The
increased complexity of real-world applications, which is exacerbated by the in-
ternet has called for the need to incorporate organisational abstractions into
computing systems. This would enable the connection between the cyber and
the physical due to the potential for conceptual alignment thereby easing the
design, development, and maintenance of computing systems. This calls for the
use of electronic institutions which provide a computational analogue of human
organisations in which agents (representing humans) play different organisational
roles and interact with each other and possibly humans to accomplish individual
and organisational goals (Sierra et al., 2004). There are several research groups
that see collections of heterogeneous agents as agent societies, and thus try to
bring solutions from human societies into distributed application scenarios with
heterogeneous actors. In these approaches the aim is to model a given society
or organisation by defining some kind of (social) structure that establishes the
(accepted) relations among agents or roles. This is important for the specification
and balance of autonomy and control. There are two main approaches (ALIVE,
2010):
1. organisational approaches which construct the social structure by means
of defining roles stating the restrictions to be followed by the agents that
enact such roles.
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2. Institutional approaches which create the social structure by an accurate
definition of the norms to be fulfilled by a given agent and the relations of
deontic influence between agents.
3.3 Organisational Approaches
In human organisations, human beings define various forms of constraints that
help guide behaviours and interactions in that organisation. These are seen as
institutions (Sierra et al., 2004) which generally represent the rules of the game
in a society, defining what individuals are forbidden and permitted to do and
under what conditions. Human organisations and individuals must conform to
the rules of institutions in order to receive legitimacy and support. Therefore,
an organisation can be seen as a set of entities and their interactions, which are
regulated by mechanisms of social order (institutions) and created by more or
less autonomous actors to achieve common goals. According to Dignum (2004),
organisations, as social systems, comprise a factual and a procedural dimension.
The factual dimension consists of the observable behaviour of the organisation,
that is, high level goals, inputs and outputs. The procedural dimension has to
do with how this behaviour is obtained, that is, the division of labour into roles,
the determination of authority lines and the establishment of communication
links. Organisations are created to provide the means for coordination in order
to achieve desired goals. The structuring of an organisation facilitates the flow of
information within the organisation in order to reduce the uncertainty of decision
making. The structure also should facilitate the integration of organisational
behaviour across the different parts of the organisation for easy coordination
(Brazier et al., 2012). This concept of organisation form the basis of our approach
towards security requirements analysis for socio-technical systems. We would like
to be able to determine the events and actors that are crucial to maintaining the
security status of the organisation.
Organisational approaches aim at constructing social structures by means of
roles and the relations and the restrictions over the agents that enact these
roles. The literature abound on organisational approaches. We review some
selected approaches which include OperA (Dignum, 2004; Quillinan et al., 2009),
OMNI(Dignum et al., 2004), AGR (Ferber et al., 2003), Moise+ (Hannoun et al.,
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2000; Hu¨bner et al., 2002, 2007), and O-Mase (Garc´ıa-Ojeda et al., 2007).
3.3.1 OperA Framework
In OperA framework (Dignum, 2004), agents are seen as autonomous commu-
nicative entities that will enact societal role(s) as a means to realize their own
goals according to their own internal aims and architecture. Interaction between
agents is represented in such a way that: it is independent of the internal design
of the agents; distinguishes organisational characteristics from agents’ own goals;
creates dynamic links between organisational design and agent populations; and
allows for the adaptation of interaction patterns to the characteristics of specific
populations. That is, the OperA model enables the specification of organisational
policies, such as objectives and norms and at the same time allowing participants
to have the freedom to act according to their own capabilities and demands. It
assumes organisations as being open systems, as such, it does not include con-
structs for the specification of the actual agents, treating them as “black boxes”
that commit to a specific (negotiable) interpretation of the organisational roles
(ALIVE, 2010). OperA therefore meets the following requirements (adapted from
Dignum (2004)):
• Internal autonomy requirement: The internal behaviour of the participat-
ing agents should be represented independently from the behaviour of the
society.
• External autonomy requirement: The external behaviour of the participat-
ing agents (i.e., interaction with other agents or the environment) should be
specified without completely fixing the interaction possibilities in advance.
The OperA agent society framework is presented in terms of three interrelated
models viz;
i.) Organisational Model (OM)- which represents the organisational structure
of the society, consisting of roles and interactions, as intended by the organ-
isational stakeholders;
ii.) Social Model (SM)- in which the enactment of roles by agents is fixed in so-
cial contracts that describe the capabilities and responsibilities of the agent
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within the society, that is the agreed way the agent will fulfil its role(s); and
iii.) Interaction Model (IM) - which describes the possible interaction between
agents in a given agent population.
Although OperA is formally founded in deontic logic, it is not executable without
an implementation language since it does not specify the internal behaviour of
agents and only specifies the “what” and not the “how”. An agent-based imple-
mentation language such as Brahms (Clancey et al., 1998) is needed to define the
“how”.
Okouya and Dignum (2008) presents OperettA as a graphical tool that supports
the design, verification and simulation of OperA models. It ensures consistency
between different design parts, provides a formal specification of the organisation
model, and is prepared to generate a simulation of the application domain. The
OperettA prototype is implemented using Meta-Edit+, a generic customizable
model driven software development environment suitable for prototyping. The
prototype incorporates Racer DL reasoning system (Haarslev and Mu¨ller, 2001),
SWI-prolog interpreter (Wielemaker et al., 2012), MCMAS model checker (Lo-
muscio and Raimondi, 2006) and BRAHMS (Clancey et al., 1998) as a possible
simulation environment.
3.3.2 OMNI
The organisational Model for Normative Institutions (OMNI) (Dignum et al.,
2004) integrates the normative concepts of HarmonIA (Va´zquez-Salceda, 2003)
with the organisational concepts of OperA (Dignum, 2004). OMNI is an inte-
grated framework that can be used to model a whole range of MAS, from closed
systems with fixed participants and interaction protocols, to open, flexible sys-
tems that allow and adapt to the participation of heterogeneous agents with
different agendas. This is because:
• It specifies global goals of the system independently from those of the spe-
cific agents that populate the system.
• Both the norms that regulate interaction between agents, as well as the
contextual meaning of those interactions are modelled.
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OMNI is composed of three dimensions that describe different characterizations
of the environment:
• Normative dimension, which models all normative and regulatory aspects
of the agent organisation.
• organisational dimension, which models the social structure, the roles, the
intended interactions and the role enactment by agents.
• Ontological dimension, which defines the ontologies for communication and
also the ontologies of the concepts appearing in both the normative and
organisational dimensions.
The framework is further organized into three levels of abstraction:
• The Abstract Level: where the statutes of the organisation to be modelled
are defined in a high level of abstraction. This step is similar to a first step
in the requirement analysis. It also contains the definition of terms that
are generic for any organisation (that is, that are in contextual) and the
ontology of the model itself.
• The Concrete Level: where all the analysis and design process is carried
on, starting from the abstract values defined in the previous level, refining
their meaning in terms of norms and rules, roles, landmarks and concrete
ontological concepts. In order to check norms and act on possible viola-
tions of the norms by the agents within an organisation, on the normative
dimension, abstract norms have to be translated into actions and concepts
that can be handled within such organisation. The organisational dimen-
sion specifies the means to achieve the objectives identified in the abstract
level as an organisational Model. The content aspects of communication, or
domain knowledge, are specified by Domain Ontologies and Generic Com-
munication Acts define the interactions languages used in the organisational
Model.
• The Implementation Level: where the design in the Normative and or-
ganisational dimensions is implemented in a given multi-agent architec-
ture. Describes the implementation of the design in a given multi-agent
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architecture, including the mechanisms for role enactment and for norm
enforcement. The normative dimension provides both the low-level proto-
cols and the related rules that enable agents to comply with organisational
norms. OMNI assumes that individual agents are designed independently
from the society to model goals and capabilities of a given entity. Agent
populations of the organisational model are described in the Social Model
in terms of commitments regulating the enactment of roles by individual
agents. Depending of the specific agents that will join the organisation,
several populations are possible for each organisational model.
The modular structure of OMNI facilitates the adaptation of the framework to
different types of domains. In those domains with none or small normative com-
ponents, design is guided by the organisational Dimension, while in highly regu-
lated domains the Normative Dimension is more prominent and therefore guides
the design. However, there is no known tool yet for the implementation of this
framework.
3.3.3 MOISE+
Adopting a different perspective, Hubner et al. (see Hannoun et al. (2000);
Hu¨bner et al. (2002, 2007)) presented Moise+ which is designed as an organisa-
tional model that explicitly distinguishes three dimensions in the modelling of an
organisation namely structural, functional and deontic dimensions:
1. The structural dimension defines the agent’s relationship through the no-
tions of roles, groups and links by specifying three levels thus:
i. the behaviours that an agent is responsible for when it adopts a role
(individual level),
ii. the acquaintance, communication, and authority links between roles
(social level), and
iii. the aggregation of roles in groups (collective level).
In Moise+ model, the adoption of roles is constrained by a compatibility
relation between roles. An agent can play two or more roles only if they
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are compatible.
2. The functional dimension describes how a multi-agent system usually achieve
its global (organisational) goals stating how these goals are decomposed (by
plans) and distributed to the agents (by missions - a set of coherent goals
that an agent can achieve).
3. The deontic dimension addresses the autonomy of the agents by stating
explicitly what is permitted and obligated in the organisation. The corre-
sponding specification describes the roles’ permissions and obligations for
missions. A permission permission(ρ,m) states that an agent playing the
role ρ is allowed to commit to the mission m. Furthermore, an obligation
obligation(ρ,m) states that an agent playing ρ ought to commit to m.
The Moise+ organisational model is an attempt to join these three dimensions
into an unified model where the first two dimensions can be specified almost inde-
pendently of each other and afterwards properly linked by the deontic dimension.
This linkage allows the MAS to change structure without changing the function-
ing, and vice versa, the system only needs to adjust its deontic relation (Hu¨bner
et al., 2005). Moise+ has been extended with a J-Moise+ agent implementa-
tion level which is an extension of the AgentSpeak Jason features (Bordini et al.,
2007). Additionally, S-Moise+ is an organisational middleware that connects the
organisational model to the implementation level. It provides agents with the
current state of the organisation and allows agents to change the organisation
entity (OE) and specification (Hu¨bner et al., 2005). S-Moise+ is an open source
implementation of an organisational middleware that follows the Moise+ model.
This middleware is the interface between the agents and the overall system, pro-
viding access to the communication layer , information about the current state
of the organisation (created groups, schemes, roles assignments, etc.), and al-
lowing the agents to change the organisation entity and specification. Of course
these changes are constrained to ensure that the agents respect the organisational
specification. S-Moise+ has two main components: an OrgBox API that agents
use to access the organisational layer and a special agent called OrgManager.
This agent has the current state of the OE and maintains it consistently. The
OrgManager receives messages from the agents’ OrgBox asking for changes in
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the OE state (e.g. role adoption, group creation, mission commitment). This
OrgManager changes the OE only if it does not violate an organisational con-
straint. For example, if an agent wants to adopt a role ρ1 but it already has
a role ρ2 and these two roles are not compatible, the adoption of ρ1 must be
denied.
3.3.4 AGR
Ferber et al. (2003) noted that except in very small organisations, organisations
are structured as aggregates of several partitions, sometimes called groups or
communities, contexts, departments, services, etc. and each partition may itself
be decomposed into sub-partitions. They therefore proposed the AGR (agent/-
group/role) model, based on three primitive concepts, Agent, Group and Role
that are structurally connected in an organisation and cannot be defined by other
primitives. An Agent is seen as an active, communicating entity playing roles
within groups. An agent may hold multiple roles, and may be member of several
groups. An important characteristic of the AGR model, is that no constraints are
placed upon the architecture of an agent or about its mental capabilities. Thus,
an agent may be as reactive as an ant, or as clever as a human. A group is a
set of agents sharing some common characteristics. A group is used as a context
for a pattern of activities, and is used for partitioning organisations. Two agents
may communicate if and only if they belong to the same group, but an agent
may belong to several groups. This feature allows the definition of organisational
structures. The Role is the abstract representation of a functional position of an
agent in a group. An agent must play a role in a group, but an agent may play
several roles. Roles are local to groups, and a role must be requested by an agent.
A role may be played by several agents.
3.3.5 O-MaSE
Garc´ıa-Ojeda et al. (2007) attributed the lack of widespread industrial accep-
tance of the many processes for developing MAS to the lack of Computer Aided
Software Engineering (CASE) tools that support the process of software design.
They therefore presented the organisation-based Multi-agent System Engineer-
ing (O-MaSE) Process Framework, based on the Multi-agent System Engineering
42
(MaSE) methodology (DeLoach et al., 2001) with the goal of allowing process
engineers to construct custom agent-oriented processes using a set of method
fragments based on a common meta-model. The O-MaSE meta-model is based
on an organisational approach which is composed of five entities: Goals, Roles,
Agents, Domain Model, and Policies. A Goal defines the overall function of the
organisation, while a Role defines a position within an organisation, whose be-
haviour is expected to achieve a particular goal or set of goals. Agents are human
or artificial (hardware or software) entities that perceive their environment and
can perform actions upon it. In order to perceive and to act in an environment,
agents possess Capabilities, which define the percepts/actions the agents have at
their disposal. Capabilities can be soft (i.e., algorithms or plans) or hard (i.e.,
hardware related actions). Plans capture algorithms that agents use to carry
out specific tasks, while Actions allows agents to perceive or sense objects in
the environment. This environment is modelled using the Domain Model, which
defines the types of objects in the environment and the relations between them.
Each organisation is governed by rules, which are formally captured as Policies.
A Policy describes how an organisation may or not may behave in a particular
situation.
3.4 Institutional approaches
All human societies use social constraints to regulate the relations among its
members. These social constraints are some sort of conventions and rules which
govern human societies by defining the interactions between members of the so-
ciety. The conventions and rules either originate from the normal practice in the
society or from laws that were developed by the society. They are either informal
(for instance customs and traditions) or formally defined (for instance laws and
regulations). The constraints of a society influence the actions of its members
who adopt them, thereby creating patterns of expected behaviour. A collection
of these social constraints are referred to as institutions (North, 1990). The in-
tegration of institutional constraints in a society allows every participant to act
according to the norms or rules of the institution.
We present a review of relevant frameworks which have been proposed for the
specification of organisations as multi-agent systems in the context of institu-
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tions. These are the E-Institutions (Esteva et al., 2002; Sierra et al., 2004; Es-
teva et al., 2004) and HarmonIA (Va´zquez-Salceda and Dignum, 2003; Va´zquez-
Salceda, 2003).
3.4.1 E-Institutions
This is a framework for electronic institutions that was first presented in Esteva
et al. (2000). The framework consists of a formal specification of the institution,
a tool for editing the specification called ISLANDER, and a middleware called
AMELI for executing the system based on the specifications (Esteva et al., 2002,
2004). The concept of e-institutions include formal semantics for the core notions
of the framework. The core notions of interest to us include agents and roles,
scenes, and normative rules.
Agents are defined as the players in the electronic institution while roles are taken
to be standardised pattern of behaviour. Agents are required to adopt some roles
and agents are allowed to perform actions associated with the adopted roles. This
is similar to our framework in which roles, actors, and actions are defined and
actions are associated with actors adopting roles. Scenes describe the articulation
of agent interaction through well defined communication protocols. This could
be seen as the possible dialogue agents could have. The a priori definition of the
interaction protocol makes e-institutions unsuitable for our work. This is because
the careful definition of the protocols means that agents cannot interact outside
the defined protocols. We are looking at a situation where our actors can freely
interact in which case, some of the interactions, such as violations, could lead
to vulnerabilities to the system. Normative rules are presented in the context of
limitations which are placed on agents as a result of consequences of the agent’s
previous actions. This is expressed using the deontic notion of obligation. The
schema of the norms are therefore built around the notion of obligation.
Drawbacks of e-institutions include the fact that most of the norms that define
the workings of the institution are flattened and incorporated into the scene and
inter-scene structure, without any explicit representation. Also, the implementa-
tion has the problem that the governors restrict the agents to the protocol that
was defined on forehand, thus severely limiting the autonomy of the agents partic-
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ipating. This decreases the flexibility and robustness of the system overall.
3.4.2 HarmonIA Framework
The HarmonIA framework is first introduced in Va´zquez-Salceda and Dignum
(2003) as a framework that defines a multilevel structure, from the most abstract
level of a normative system to the final implementation of the organisation. It is
composed of four levels of abstraction:
1. The Abstract Level: where the statutes of the organisation are defined in
a high level of abstraction along with the first abstract norms.
2. The Concrete Level: where abstract norms are iteratively concretised into
more concrete norms, and the policies of the organisation are also defined.
3. The Rule Level: where concrete norms and policies are fully refined, linking
the norms with the ways to ensure them.
4. The Procedure Level: where all rules and policies are translated in a com-
putationally efficient implementation easy to be used by agents.
The division of the system into these four levels aims to ease the transition from
the very abstract statutes, norms and regulations to the very concrete protocols
and procedures implemented in the system. It is specially suited for those com-
plex, highly regulated domains where the behaviour of a real organisation or an
e-organisation has to follow regulations that define restrictions at different levels
of abstraction (Va´zquez-Salceda, 2003).
In an attempt to solve part of the restrictive nature of the ISLANDER formalism,
HarmonIA proposed the use of so-called Police Agents, that will be responsible
for the enforcement of the norms. Such an implementation would allow the safety
of the norms, while still allowing the agents (enough) autonomy to perform their
tasks in manners that were not thought of at design, thus enabling them to handle
unforeseen situations and adding a level of robustness to the system (ALIVE,
2010).
The ideas of Vazquez (Va´zquez-Salceda, 2003) were further extended by Aldew-
ereld (Aldewereld, 2009) who applied parts of the methodology to highly-regulated
environments (environments governed by lots of complex norms). He identified
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four important aspects of institutional implementations: 1) an ontology to allow
communications between agents, and to express the meaning of the concepts used
in the norms; 2) an (explicit) normative description of the domain, specifying the
allowed interactions in the institution, presented in a format readable by (norm-
aware) agents; 3) a set of protocols (conventions) that agents that are incapable
of normative reasoning can use to perform their assigned task; and 4) an active
norm enforcement mechanism to see to it that the norms specified for the do-
main are adhered to and that order and safety is guaranteed in the system. These
four elements are combined into a methodology that gives the relations between
laws and electronic institutions. Moreover, (formal) methods are specified for the
implementation of norm enforcement and the (automatic) creation of protocols
(based on constraints specified by the norms).
3.5 Summary of models
In summary, from the above survey, it is clear that a number of these models
are complementary, since each focuses its strength on aspects of the organisa-
tion the authors deemed more important and some of them are covered in other
models, although given different terminologies. For instance, it is clear that the
AGR model corresponds to the structural dimension of the MOISE+ model. Also
while MOISE+ places emphasis on the structural and functional dimensions of
an organisation, it does not consider the interactive dimension. HARMONIA
mainly focuses on the normative aspect of an organisation which is also consid-
ered in OperA. However, in a more recent model OMNI (organisational model for
normative institutions), Dignum et al. (2004) present an integrated framework
modelling multi-agent organisations based on the two earlier models OperA and
HARMONIA. This model tends to complement the strengths of each of the earlier
models, therefore covering relatively well the various dimensions of an organisa-
tion. Also comparing the ISLANDER language with AGR and MOISE+, aside
from the change in terminology from organisation to institution, ISLANDER
focus on institutional aspect of organisations which is further expressed in nor-
mative aspects (norms that enforce behaviour) and dialogical aspects (dialogic
interactions), while AGR and MOISE+ model structural and functional aspects
of an organisation (Coutinho et al., 2005). O-MaSE relied strongly on struc-
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Modelling Dimension
Model Structural Dialogical Functional Normative
AGR ++ + - -
MOISE+ +++ - +++ +
O-MaSE ++ - ++ +
HARMONIA ++ +++ + +++
OperA ++ - + +++
ISLANDER + +++ - ++
OMNI ++ +++ + +++
Table 3.1: The relative expressiveness of some organisational Models (adapted from Coutinho
et al. (2005))
tural and functional dimensions of an organisation. Table 3.1 summarises these
relative strengths and weaknesses.
3.6 Institutional Frameworks
In the previous sections, Section1.3 on page 13 in particular, we have pointed out
the focus of this thesis which is the analysis of security requirements that arise
from the interaction of various system actors. This is to say that our view is that
actions performed by agents in the system could lead to either direct security
breaches or create security vulnerabilities. Such actions can vary greatly so that
the analysis could be very difficult using the existing approaches we have reviewed.
The question here now is that since the early consideration of security in system
design is greatly advocated for, how can one possibly analyse the behaviour of
agents in the system-to-be at design time? This section presents the institutional
framework which this thesis is heavily based upon. This is a formalisation which
enables the analysis of actions based on the specified rules of engagement between
actors. Based on this formalisation, we shall be expressing the actions and rules
that the actors are expected to fulfil in order for us to analyse the consequences
of the actions in the light of the security of the system.
This work is in part motivated by the desire to assist the secure system design
process, by making it possible a priori to determine whether or not a given system
specification complies with, or violates the designer’s expectations. In order to
do this it becomes necessary to define both the means for modelling the system
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specifications and a practical reasoning framework through which properties of
the specifications may be verified.
We utilise the notion of institutional framework put forward in Cliffe (2007),
where an electronic institution serves to describe the rules governing agent be-
haviour in a multi-agent system. The idea is to provide an explicit, machine
processable representation of the norms, rules or regulations which may be used
to bring about a set of expected behaviours for agents interacting in a social
context. It is assumed here that the norms and their expectations about the
behaviour of participating agents are explicit and can be written down in a form
which is machine processable. The formalisations components of the institu-
tional framework relevant to this thesis are largely reproduced from Cliffe (2007)
where the formalisations were originally presented in order to make this thesis
self-contained.
Before we go into details, we would start by defining our usage of the institutional
framework terminology.
Definition 2. In this thesis we use the term Institutional Framework to describe
a set of rules or regulations and the operational semantics which specify and reg-
ulate specific interaction aspects of an organisation. An institutional framework
may consist of different types of rules: (a) constitutive rules create the possibility
for certain activities to take place. They regulate the creation of institutional facts
and the modification of the institution. They define how events are interpreted
in the institution. (b) Regulatory rules regulate antecedent activities by defin-
ing what is accepted as correct and incorrect behaviour in terms of obligations,
permissions, and prohibitions (Searle, 1995). Institutional frameworks also de-
fine the scope of the rules they contain in terms of when (in time), under which
conditions, and to which participants and actions they apply (Balke, 2011).
Principles of Deontic Logic and Normative Positions:
The approach for formalisation presented in this thesis is based on the
application of deontic logic. In this section we are presenting the principles
behind this logic which we shall be using in the later chapters and sections.
Deontic logic (von Wright, 1951; Hilpinen, 1971) is the branch of symbolic
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logic which concerns itself with the investigations of normative concepts,
systems of norms, and normative reasoning. Normative concepts include
the concepts of obligation (that which we ought to do), permission (that
which we are allowed to do), and the forbidden (that which we must not
do) and related notions including the concept of right. It has its origin in
philosophical logic, applied modal logic, and ethical and legal theory.
Formalisation of legal reasoning in classical logics date back to 1926 (Mally,
1926) with the first formal logic for reasoning with deontic (the study of
duties and obligations) properties proposed by Mally (Lokhorst, 2008). This
proposed approach has led to an entire field of study as it is been refined
and extended in a number of ways yielding various classical logic definitions.
One of such definitions is standard deontic logic (SDL), originally accredited
to von Wright whose system was first published in von Wright (1951). SDL
is a modal logic with operators for permission, obligation, and prohibition.
For instance O(X) expresses the modality obligation or ought which may
be read as it ought to be the case that X is true, or it is obligatory that
X is true. This has been used in analysing normative law and normative
reasoning in law as illustrated in Jones and Sergot (1996) and Sergot et al.
(1986) because it provides a means of analysing and identifying ambiguities
in set of legal rules.
3.6.1 Aspects of Institutional Specification
An institution (North, 1990) is modelled as a reactive process which is created,
evolves over time through the interpretation of events in some external context
(the world), and may be dissolved. Within this process the institution creates
states interpretations of effects of changes in the world on the institution, which
may in turn affect how the institution changes in the future. We continue by
describing how institutional frameworks relate to the real world and how both
evolve with time.
Our view of the institutional framework and the real world are presented in Fig-
ure 3-1. Both views are represented in terms of system states at various points in









Figure 3-1: Institutional Framework and Real World Transitions
able events that take place in the system. On the other hand, the institutional
framework view is concerned only with the events that are relevant in the in-
stitution. It is important to note that these two views are not interdependent
but rather, they are logically linked. This can best be illustrated by an example:
take marriage for an example. Marriage involves a social union or legal contract
between two people (real world event). Whether such a union is considered to
be marriage or not is a fact that may only be established by the institution of
marriage (institutional framework).
Another thing to note from Figure 3-1 is the evolution of the two views over time.
Both views start from an initial states which correspond to when the system is
initialised. These states subsequently change as a result of events taking place
at various points in time. We refer to the states of the institutional framework
view as institutional states (istatei) and the real world states as statei. The
transitions of these states as described in Figure 3-1 are brought about as events
take place either in the institutional framework (ieventi) or in the real world
(eventi) respectively.
A number of questions arise from the presentation of these views. These include:
how the logical link between these two views is specified and the emergence of
the institutional framework events, how to determine which real world events are
relevant for the institutional framework and which events could be neglected and
how to distinguish between the two, and finally, how the transition from states
could be described (Balke, 2011).
Most relevant for answering these questions is the work of Searle (Searle, 1995)
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in which he distinguished between constitutive and regulatory aspects of an in-
stitution. Searle discusses constitutive rules as rules which regulate the creation
of institutional facts and the modification of the institution. They define how
events are interpreted in the institution. He also introduced the concepts of brute
facts and institutional facts in which brute facts are described as facts that follow
from a common-sense understanding of the real world whereas institutional facts
are those facts that are only valid within a certain context and depend on hu-
man opinions and interpretation. From Figure 3-1, brute facts correspond to real
world facts (states), while institutional facts are equivalent to the institutional
framework facts (states). These human opinions, according to Searle are shaped
by the institutional setting with which the humans interact. This sets the context
for the institutional facts and consequently defines whether they are valid and to
what extent. In essence, he specifies constitutive rules as rules describing what
action executed in one context, counts-as performing another action in a second
context. One can therefore explain the creation of institutional facts if one takes
the physical world as the first context and the institutional framework as the
second context and defines when the execution of certain actions or the presence
of certain events lead to actions in the second context.
3.6.1.1 Constitutive Aspects of Institutions
In addition to Searle’s account of how institutional facts come into being in which
he relates the institutional facts and brute facts with the notion of count as, Gold-
man (1976) presents an extensive analysis of actions and events in the real world
generating actions and events in a second context (institutional framework in this
case). Goldman described four cases where action in one context may be consid-
ered to generate actions in another context. These are causal generation, simple
generation, conventional generation and augmentation generation. Of these four,
the conventional generation has been considered the most relevant as it applies
to the institutional framework and the count as principle from which this thesis
draws its inspiration (Cliffe, 2007).
With respect to conventional generation, Figure 3-2 gives an illustration of how
this may happen between the real world and the institutional framework. We note












Figure 3-2: Creation of Institutional Events and States through Conventional Generation
notion of real world events and (ii) institutional events that only have meaning
within a given context.
Institutional events are not observable, but are created through conventional
generation, whereby an event in one context counts as (Jones and Sergot, 1996)
the occurrence of another event in a second context. Taking the real world as
the first context and by defining conditions in terms of states, certain real world
events may then count as institutional events. Thus, the institutional framework
functions as a kind of filter on real world events, selecting only those events that
are of relevance for the institutional model and then applying the institutional
rules to determine how the institutional state shall evolve over time subject to
the occurrence of events. An institutional state is a set of institutional facts that
are considered true at some instant. This is illustrated in Figure 3-2 where the
Oeventi stand for observable events, event2 for an unobservable event, and the
dotted arrow lines indicate the generation of institutional events. The observable
events are events that can be perceived by relevant system participants who
would be able to establish the relevance of such an event in the institutional
framework. For example, using marriage instance as before, marriage involves
the exchange of vows between two people, however, this event has to be observed
by say a clergy who has the legal power to establish the institutional fact that
these two people are indeed married, and hence change their state of of their social
status as married. If the clergy does not observe the event of exchange of vows,
and consequently does not bring about the change of state in the institutional
framework, the event does not count as marriage and therefore does not have any
institutional effect.
52
Figure 3-2 also illustrates the fact that one observed event in the real world can
generate an institutional event that will result in more than one institutional fact
(state) in the institutional framework. Taking a football match for example, if
one player kicks another player, this can result in both the award of a foul as
well as a card. Therefore the observation of a real world event could result in the
generation of several states1 in the institutional framework. Transition from one
institutional state to the next state based on the institutional events generated
is determined by the constitutive rules. These specify which institutional facts
result from which institutional events in which context. They therefore specify
the generation, initiation and termination of institutional states.
Event Generation:
The conventional generation of institutional events, where an event within
the institution is considered to have been generated as a result of the inter-
pretation of the rules defining the institution, implies two types of events
can be generated:
i) those that are generated as a result of the interpretation of events orig-
inating from a context external to the institutional framework, such
as the environment (in the case of this thesis, the real world organisa-
tion where actors interact with information systems and information
system security need to be preserved). Within the context of security,
we can consider possible origins of such events to include time related
events such as time-outs, system logins, and transfer of files from one
medium to another
ii) those events that are generated as a result of the interpretation of
events within the context of the institution. The internal events could
be institutional events which cause a transition in the institutional
state, or they could be violation events that indicate the occurrence of
violations.
Violation events could be generated as a result of non fulfilment of an
obligation or out-rightly from the occurrence of non-permitted event.
1In this thesis, the terms states and facts are used synonymously with respect to the de-
scriptions of the institutional framework and conventional generation.
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3.6.1.2 Regulative Aspects of Institutions
In the preceding section, we presented the different aspects of constitutive rules
which are associated with the semantics of the institution. With this, participants
in an institutional framework can observe sequence of events which have occurred
in a context external to the institution and then make interpretations based on
the institutional events which should be considered to have occurred. However,
constitutive rules alone cannot allow for the determination of which events are
considered to be bad or good within the institutional framework. Hence there is
a need for a framework which will account for what is perceived as institutionally
correct and incorrect behaviour. Regulative aspects of the institution which make
this possible consist of obligations, permissions and prohibitions.
Permission and Prohibition
Permissions, as regulatory aspect of institution, indicate that some actions and
state of affairs within an institution are considered acceptable or desirable. Pro-
hibitions, on the other hand, can be seen as the dual or counterpart indicating
actions which are not permitted. Hence if an action is not permitted, it is con-
sidered prohibited or forbidden. This view of expressing one in terms of the
other is taken in both legal theory and formal logic (Vranes, 2006; Prisacariu and
Schneider, 2007). We therefore observe this view in this thesis as we explicitly
represent only permissions and the absence of permission is defined implicitly to
be prohibition. With this, we can easily separate which actions and situations
are good or bad since an action that is not permitted is simply prohibited.
Now that a way has been determined in which a distinction can be made between
good and bad actions and situations in institution specifications, the question that
need to be addressed is what subject(s) does this operator (permission) apply to?
Two foci are presented in Cliffe (2007) for the application of permission:
i. permissions on the state of the institution which may take the form “it is
[not] permitted for state s to come about”, and
ii. permission on institution actions and events which may take the form “it is
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[not] permitted for action α to be performed”
Following these, the focus in this thesis is going to be on actions and events.
The reason for this is that we would like to be able to reason not only about the
presence or absence of violations, but importantly about how the violations came
about. This is important for us in this thesis as we typically wish to consider the
occurrence of certain states of violations and examine the actions that led to such
states of violation on one hand and the consequences of such states on the system
on the other hand. The implication of choosing a single operator from the view
point of reasoning about models is that a closed world is assumed. That is in this
case, it is assumed that all cases in which an action is permitted must be known
in order to infer that an action is prohibited by the absence of permission. This
is sufficient for us for the purpose of analysis and verification of our institutional
models since we are dealing with complete models.
Obligations and Violations
In the previous section, we established permissions and prohibitions as means of
asserting about which events are allowed or not allowed at a specific point in time.
However, we are also interested in being able to express the situation where an
action/event is required to be triggered at certain points in time. This is achieved
through the notion of obligations which can be expressed as immediate obligation,
prioritised obligation, and obligation with deadlines (Dignum et al., 1996).
Which ever way obligations may be expressed, it is important as with permissions
and prohibitions to identify the subject(s) of obligations. This may be either
institutional states that a participant ought or ought not to bring about at a given
time, or actions that ought to be performed by a participant before another action
or deadline takes place. Reasoning in the same way as in the case of permissions
and obligations, the choice here is for an event/action approach for association
of obligations.
The choice of event/action as the focus for obligations brings to the front the
question of how obligations may be associated with events. Two possibilities
come to mind: i) Association of obligations with a particular actor in the system
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which may take the form “actor A ought to do action α”. This is seen as a di-
rected obligation since a particular actor is expected to perform a certain action.
This looks intuitive and the right kind of obligation association but it is not con-
venient to express when a group of actors are involved. This will mean expressing
the obligation in terms of each actor in the group which will be cumbersome and
problematic from modelling perspective. ii) Association of obligations with par-
ticular action2 which may take the form “it ought to be the case that action
α is performed”. In this case obligation is associated with an action which in
turn will be associated to an actor as may be defined by the constitutive rule
of the institution. This undirected approach solves the problem identified in the
directed approach. From these, we focus on the association of obligations with
events which in turn may be performed by any actor.
Closely related to the notions of permission/prohibition and obligation is the
notion of violation. This is a case where an actor performs an action that is not
permitted or fail to fulfil the required obligation. This usually attract some form
of penalty such as sanctions as a means of deterrence and compliance. Compliance
may be enforced either privately, that is indirectly as a result of changes in actors’
behaviour, or publicly, that is directly by the application of a sanction within the
context of the institution. In the case of public enforcement, the imposition of
the sanction may either be optional in which case the violation only opens the
possibility for the sanctioning actor to bring about the sanction, or mandatory
in which case it is obligatory for the sanctioning agent bring about the sanction.
Both of these cases may be expressed as normative rules (either a permission
or an obligation to perform the sanction), which simply follow as consequences.
This way sanctions can be naturally expressed in the language of the norms which
they enforce.
Institutional Power and Permission
The notions of power and permission can be understood from Searle’s notion of
counts as and the corresponding notion of conventional generation by Goldman
which formally account for the relationship between brute fact and institutional
2The terms event and action are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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fact as discussed in sub Section 3.6.1.1. In formalising these notions, Jones and
Sergot (1996) identified the variations in which institutionalised power can be
seen and argued for the necessity of distinguishing between. These are:
i) legal power (also referred to as normative or institutional power in the insti-
tutional framework context)
ii) physical power - the physical capability to carry out the acts in the physical
environment, and
iii) the permission to carry out those acts.
Applying these concepts to the principles of conventional generation and counts-
as, it can be established that legal power specifies who has the legal capability to
bring about action in the institutional context, therefore acting as a constraint
on conventional generation of actions. For instance, in the real world we may
be concerned with our capability to directly bring about some state of affairs
physically, however in the legal world the concern is about when the creation
of certain states is considered valid. This is also the concern in the context of
institutional framework. While, the notion of power is dependent on the capabil-
ity of an agent to carry out an action and the interpretation of such an action,
permission is independent of capability. An agent may be empowered to perform
an action but may not be permitted to perform the action at certain points in
time. For example a user may be empowered to login to a system but may not
be permitted to do that outside the official working hours.
Jones and Sergot (1996) formalised this notion of institutionalised power as a
means for modelling conventional generation using the logic of consequence of
action expressed as ExA⇒s EyF , where⇒s designates the notion of consequence
(count-as) with respect to the institution s. This expression accounts for the
notion of agency in the sense that it allows for the association of an agent (x )
with a real world action Ex which brings about a change in the state of affairs in
the real world to a state A. From the expression, it also means that within the
institution s, this action might also bring about a change in state of the institution
to state F. The agent y can be the institution itself or can be same as agent x.
For example, using the the case of marriage, the priest may play the role of x
who physically performs the marriage ceremony, but the normative/institutional
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relation of being married created by the church establishes the marriage as a
fact.
3.6.1.3 Institutional Framework Initiation and Termination
An institution may only be considered to be in force only for a given time in-
terval. This is a temporal scope marked by the initiation and termination of
the institution. Within the specification of an institution, it is important to de-
fine when the institution has an effect and when it does not. This can be done
by specifying when, how and possibly with which parameters an institution is
created and when and how it is destroyed.
Creation of an institution is defined as a transition from a point in time when
no rules defined within the institution have any effect, to a subsequent point in
time when those rules have an effect. Also, the destruction an institution is the
transition from a point at which the institutional rules may have an effect to a
point at which they may no longer have any effect. The institution is therefore
considered to be in force between those two points in time.
3.6.1.4 Time
Following from the last subsection, an important aspect that must be considered
when designing a system that models action and change such as the institutional
framework is the handling of the problem of time representation. A number
of ways have been found useful as pointed out in Allen (1991) which include
methods based on explicit dating, intervals, and temporal logics. In this thesis,
since the focus is on events and states of the institution, no assumption is made
about the real time interval between events, but rather, time is treated as a
set of ordered instances denoting the points in which real world events occur.
The ability to express and model the notion of time in this way allows for a
chronological analysis of event and chains of events. This is particularly relevant
as we apply the framework to the security domain in which the interval between
events is considered important (Beres et al., 2009).
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3.6.2 Formal Definition of Institutional Framework
This section presents the formal definition of the components of the institutional
framework relevant to this thesis. The full formalisations are presented in Cliffe
(2007).
Definition 3. An institutional framework is defined as a 5-tuple I :=
〈E ,F , C,G,∆〉 where E is a set of events, F a set of fluents, C a set of causal
rules, G a set of generation rules and an initial state ∆.
The institution defines the interplay between these components as the institution
evolves over time due to the interaction of its participants. We further define
each of these components as follows:
Events E:
A set of event symbols e ∈ E are defined in the framework, each denoting a type
of action that may occur which may fall into either of the disjoint subsets: Eex
consisting of exogenous events and Einst consisting of institutional events with
E = Einst ∪ Eex and Einst ∩ Eex = ∅.
Exogenous events Eex:
These are events that take place outside the scope or context of the insti-
tution but whose occurrence trigger institutional events in accordance with
the counts-as principle discussed earlier. These may include actors commu-
nicating with actors such as reveal(x,y,password), actors interaction with
a system such as login(x,system), and other externally defined events such
as time-outs. Another term used to refer to exogenous events is observed
events due to the fact that any event that would have an effect in the insti-
tution must be observable and considered relevant in the institution. This
thesis uses the terms exogenous events and observed events synonymously.
Additionally, exogenous events also consist of a set of creation events E+ ⊆
Eex which account for the creation of an institution.
Institutional events Einst:
59
These contains the events that are generated in the institutional framework
as a result of occurrence of exogenous events. Einst is further classified into
institutional actions Eact ⊆ Einst that capture changes in institutional state,
and violation events Eviol ⊆ Einst, that signal the occurrence of violations
which could come about as a result of explicit occurrence of prohibited
events or from the failure to fulfil obligations as discussed earlier. In the
framework, the set of violation events is defined such that there exists at
least one violation event corresponding to each institutional action and
each exogenous event as follows: ∀e ∈ Eact ∪ Eex ∃viol(e) ∈ Eviol. Therefore
institutional events Einst = Eact ∪ Eviol and Eact ∩ Eviol = ∅.
As with exogenous events, institutional events also consist of a set of disso-
lution events E− ⊆ Eact which account for the termination of an institution.
Fluents F :
A fluent is a property of the institution that holds after it is initiated and ceases
to hold when terminated. Two types of fluents are distinguished for the insti-
tutional framework: institutional fluents which denote normative properties of
the institutional state such as permissions, powers and obligations, and domain
fluents which correspond to properties which are specific to the institutional
framework itself. In both cases, fluents are modelled as propositions which may
be true or false in a given institutional state. The set of normative fluents is
broken down into sets of fluents for powers W , permissions P and obligations O
as follows:
• Power W : Consists of institutional power fluents of the form pow(e) : e ∈
Eact. This denotes the capability of some action e to be brought about in
the institutional framework.
• Permission P : This is composed of a set of event permission fluents of the
form perm(e) : e ∈ Eact ∪ Eex. This permits the action e to be brought
about. A forbidden event is simply treated as the absence of permission for
that event to be brought about.
• Obligation O: Obligations fluents of the form obl(e, d, v) with e ∈ E , d ∈
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E , v ∈ Eviol denotes that event e should occur before event d else violation
v will be generated.
Domain fluents D is defined to include all properties of the institutional state
that are specific to the institution which may be true.
The set of all institutional fluents F which may hold true in a given institutional
state is defined as follows: F = W ∪ P ∪ O ∪ D where W ∩ P ∩ O ∩ D = ∅.
These are the fluents which may be created within the context of the institution.
However, considering the life-cycle of the institution, it is necessary to define
another fluent live which accounts for the creation of the institution. This fluent
is treated differently from the institutional fluents described earlier in the sense
that its definition is not within the semantics of the institution itself. Therefore
the set F∗ of all institutional fluents including the external fluents is defined as
F∗ = F ∪ {live}.
States
Having defined the set of all institutional fluents, it is now possible to define the
possible states of the institution that could hold as Σ = 2F
∗
. However, due to
the effect that institutional rules may have on multiple institutional states, not
all of these states may be reachable. This effect of the institutional rules over a
specific set of states is hereby accounted for by defining the set of state formulae
X over a given set of institutional fluent properties F which may be true while
the institution is active as X = 2F∪¬F . F ∪ ¬F specifies all the set of literals
including negations over F .
Consequence and Generation Rules
Here, we present the formalisation of the consequence relation which describes
the initiation and termination of fluents as a result of the performance of a given
action in a state matching some expression. This is defined by a function which
is expressed as C : X × E → 2F × 2F . Given an event e ∈ E , the first set in the
range of the function represents the fluents that are initiated by the event. This
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is denoted by C↑(φ, e) for the event e in a state matching φ. The second set in
the range of the function describes the fluents that are terminated by the event
and denoted C↓(φ, e).
Similarly, an event generation function G : X × E → 2Einst is also defined by each
institution to describe the count-as notion explained earlier. This describes when
the occurrence of one event generates another.
3.7 Summary of Chapter
In this chapter we presented the approaches for modelling organisations with
institutions. We introduced the concept of institutions and discussed how it
is related with organisation. Institutions shape organisations by providing a
normative context within which organisations seek their ends. Organisations
on the other hand reproduce institutions by conforming to their norms and from
time to time seek to change institutions. Institutions provide a normative context
both limiting and facilitating social change (Bouma, 1998). We then reviewed
the existing approaches for modelling institutions and summarised them in terms
of their strengths and weaknesses.
We introduced the institutional framework upon which our work is based. The
institutional framework is inspired by deontic logic, that is the logic of power,
permissions and obligations. In Chapter 1 we established the connection between
security goals of confidentiality, integrity and availability (especially the first
two) with the notions of permissions (and prohibitions) and obligations. Since
the institutional framework is inspired by these concepts it becomes the choice
approach for this work. The institutional framework consist of two layers of
abstraction: the institutional layer and the real world layer. Based on the count-
as principle, institutional events are generated by the observed events in the
real world layer resulting in the change of the institutional state. We discussed
the various aspects of the institutional specification relevant to our work and
presented the formal definition of the institutional framework.
In the next chapter we present the realisation of the institutional framework as
a computational model which will provide us with the information needed for
modelling and analysing our security requirements scenarios.
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Chapter 4
Computational Logic Reasoning Approaches
4.1 Introduction
The goal of this thesis is the presentation of a computational approach to the
verification of security requirements and properties. Since we are approaching the
problem of information security primarily from the human factor point of view,
the previous chapters have presented the notions of institutions and organisations
which are both concerned with the structures that guide human interaction. We
have also presented the institutional framework which allows us to monitor be-
haviours for “correct” and “incorrect” behaviours. This chapter presents the
computational logic approaches that would make it possible to reason about our
security requirements thereby enabling us to perform verification tasks on elicited
security requirements computationally.
4.2 Answer Set Programming
Answer set programming (ASP) (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988; Marek and Truszczyn´ski,
1991; Baral, 2003) is a declarative logic programming paradigm that allows rea-
soning about possible real world views in the absence of complete information.
ASP allows a programmer to specify “what” needs to be done without specifying
“how” it needs to be achieved. Thanks to its formal semantics called the answer
set semantics (Baral, 2003), and the existence of efficient heuristic solvers (such
as smodels (Niemela¨ and Simons, 1997), dlv (Eiter et al., 1999; Leone et al.,
2002) and clingo (Gebser et al., 2008)), answer set programming provides an
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excellent basis from which derived models may be queried, hence an approach
for solving search problems (Lifschitz, 2008; East and Truszczyn´ski, 2006). To
solve a given search problem in ASP, one designs a logic theory whose models
represent solutions to the problem. Therefore the primary computational task
is the problem of finding models (answer sets in ASP terminology) rather than
proofs.
One of the advantages of using ASP is that its rigorous and formal semantics
allow for reasoning in formal ways about the semantics of programs. An answer
set program can be seen as a formalisation of the underlying reasoning problem
in its own right, with the advantage of being able to execute this formalisation
directly through the use of answer set solvers.
ASP is particularly suited to model-based reasoning by allowing domain and
problem-specific knowledge, including incomplete knowledge, defaults, and pref-
erences to be represented in an intuitive and natural way (Brewka et al., 2011).
It is an intuitive non-monotonic programming language suitable for modelling,
reasoning and verification tasks. An answer set programming problem typically
starts with the definition of a domain or class of problem about which we wish
to reason. Such definitions (written as answer-set programs) are constructed in
such a way that each possible model in the domain corresponds to an answer set
of the program. Queries may then be constructed over this domain in order to
determine if particular models are valid according to the definition by extending
the program to limit the answer sets produced to those which match the models
we are interested in.
Processing answer set programs involves the use of tools which support several
basic reasoning tasks ranging from computing a single answer set, determination
of non existence of answer sets, to computing all possible answer sets. Most tools
also support the task of cautious reasoning which has to do with deciding whether
an atom is true in every answer set.
ASP is typically processed in two stages as shown in Figure 4-1; first is the re-
placement of the predicate program with an equivalent propositional program
through the process of variable replacement, also known as grounding. Ground-









Figure 4-1: ASP System Architecture (Gebser et al., 2008)
containing no variables. The ground program is then solved by a propositional
ASP solver which gives answer sets for the program. We use a ASP solver called
clingo in this thesis. Clingo is a combination of the clasp solver and gringo which
is a state of the art grounder that has a rich set of features that make writing
logic programs more efficient (Gebser et al., 2008).
4.2.1 How ASP compares with similar formalisms
There are many other formalisms for solving search problems using logic reasoning
procedures beside ASP. In this subsection, we discuss how ASP compares with
some of the related and relevant formalisms for declarative problem solving.
4.2.1.1 ASP and SATISFIABILITY (SAT) solving:
Both SAT solving (Ee´n and So¨rensson, 2004) and core ASP apply in principle to
the same problems, however they are different in a number of ways. First is how
problem specifications and data are handled. ASP because of its support for vari-
ables that range over finite domains, enables uniform and compact specification
of problems independently of data. Grounded instances of the problem specifi-
cations are produced for ASP solvers based on the problem specification and the
data input. This separation of problem specifications from data has several ad-
vantages including facilitation of debugging and testing, support for optimization
and development of reusable problem modules. In SAT however, such separation
of problem specification and data is not available, rather the two are integrated
into programs that generate satisfiability instances to be solved. This makes de-
velopment of software engineering techniques for SAT more difficult. Secondly,
although any problem that can be modelled in SAT can be modelled equally
well in ASP, problems such as reachability in graphs are easier to cast in ASP
than in SAT solving since their representation for SAT solving results in larger
instances that slow down solving. Also the ASP language offers support through
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ASP solvers for constructs such as minimized disjunction, aggregates and priori-
ties that are useful in practical applications. In SAT solving, specialised ad-hoc
treatments are required for these constructs and concise representations are not
even possible for some of them (Brewka et al., 2011).
4.2.1.2 ASP and Prolog:
Although Prolog is the most widely known logic programming language it has a
number of limitations both in concept and design which makes it unsuitable for
many knowledge representation real world reasoning tasks. ASP and Prolog are
similar in syntax with semantic connections too, for instance, if Prolog returns
“yes” (or “no”) to a ground query for a program Π, then the query belongs (or
does not belong) to the answer set of the program. In spite of these connections,
ASP and Prolog are actually quite different when compared in terms of suitability
and ease of expression in a problem domain. It is worth noting also that Prolog
was actually designed as a general purpose, Turing-complete programming lan-
guage. It is more procedural in nature than declarative, using function symbols
for nested terms to build potentially infinite data structures. Prolog solutions are
computed by query answering and thus proof finding. In contrast, ASP was not
conceived for such generality but works over a finite domain of data and solutions
are encoded in models (that is answer sets). Therefore where Prolog is concerned
with proof finding, ASP is concerned with model finding.
Logic programming languages, Prolog inclusive, have to deal with the problem
of negation in some ways. Existing notions of negation are negation as failure
(NAF), that is not p is true if p cannot be proved, and classical negation ¬p that
is every proposition can either be true or false and not both. With these, the most
common approach to handling negation is to compute negation as failure, that is
not p is true if p can be proved using the current program; and to characterise
this as classical negation. When using Prolog to model real world reasoning, it
is essentially assumed that every knowledge about the world is contained in the
program. This creates a problem referred to as the closed world assumption. By
characterising NAF as classical negation anything that cannot be proven to be
true is known to be false.
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ASP semantics naturally allows negation to be treated in two different forms:
negation as failure and constraint-based negation. Negation as failure, (i.e. p
cannot be proven to be true) is characterised as epistemic negation, (i.e. p is not
known to be true). Constraint-based negation on the other hand prevents certain
combinations of atoms from being simultaneously true in any answer set by in-
troducing constraints. This is characterised as classical negation as it is possible
to prevent p and ¬p from being simultaneously true. This makes reasoning about
incomplete information possible, and is supported by the intuition that “I do not
know that P is true” (auto-epistemic negation) and “I know that P is not true”
(classical negation) are fundamentally different.
Another area where ASP is different is in reasoning about multiple world views.
The semantics of ASP naturally give rise to multiple possible world views in
which the program is consistent thereby making it possible reason in terms of the
world views as expressed in the program. This type of reasoning is only indirectly
possible in Prolog using the cut operator, however due to the procedural nature
of Prolog rules, this can lead to confusion as the multiple possible views may
manifest themselves differently depending on the query asked. For instance, in
ASP terms Prolog would answer a query on a as true if there is at least one
answer set in which a is true. However because there is no way of knowing in
which answer set this is true, a subsequent query on b might also return true. It
would not be possible to infer if a and b could be simultaneously true without
another query.
Finally, similar to the point regarding SAT solving, there is a strong link between
the Prolog language used for querying a knowledge base and the language in
which the knowledge base is represented. Knowledge is essentially stored in a
form that for example, to answer a question about c we must answer questions
about b and c, notated as c :− a, b. In contrast, ASP strongly distinguishes
between the program and the query language. The program itself generates
answer sets which the query language then constrains to result only in those
that are consistent with the query. This separation helps clarify the conceptual
difference between representing or manipulating data and querying it. It also




AnsProlog, a short form for “Programming in logic with Answer sets” (Baral,
2003, p. 3), is a declarative programming language mainly used for knowledge
representation which allows for an intuitive rather than algorithmic description
of a problem and the requirements to be fulfilled by the solution to the prob-
lem. The corresponding solutions to the problem are called the answer sets of
the AnsProlog program describing the the problem. These are defined through
(a variant or extension of) the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz,
1988) and computed using a set of tools referred to as answer set solvers. Avail-
able solvers include clingo (Gebser et al., 2008), SMODELS first introduced by
Niemela¨ and Simons (Niemela¨ and Simons, 1997), the DV L system (Leone et al.,
2002), ASSAT (Lin and Zhao, 2004), and CModels (Lierler and Maratea, 2004;
Lierler, 2005). AnsProlog is non-monotonic, that is conclusions drawn on the
basis of given knowledge can be retracted when new knowledge is available. This
is because the set of conclusions reached on the basis of a given knowledge base,
does not necessarily increase (rather, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge
base itself. This contrasts with the standard monotonic logic frameworks such as
classical first-order logic, whose inferences, being deductively valid, remains valid
in the presence of new information (Antonelli, 2012).
AnsProlog has the advantage that it allows for the specification of both the
problem as well as the query for the answer set as an executable program resulting
in a more straightforward verification and validation task. This contrasts with
related approaches such as event calculus and C+ which create a gap between
specification and verification language. The next subsection presents the syntax
of AnsProlog.
4.2.2.1 ASP Syntax
In this section we present the syntax of AnsProlog - the underlying logical lan-
guage for ASP if interpreted using the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifs-
chitz, 1988). There are a number of syntactic variants of ASP in existence among
which is a broad notion known as AnsProlog∗ as described in Baral (2003). Out
of the many subgroups of AnsProlog∗, this thesis is limited only to AnsProlog⊥
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and we will describe its syntax and functions in this section.
The language of an ASP program (AnsProlog) consists of;
• a set variables: sequence of letters starting with an upper case letterX, Y, Z, ...
• a set of constants: sequence of characters starting with a lower-case letter
a, b, c, ...
• a set of n-ary function symbols: sequence of characters starting with a lower-
case letter f, g, h, .. followed by a bracketed list of one or more arguments
such as terms.
• a set of n-ary predicate symbols: sequence of characters (the predicate
name) starting with a lower-case letter p, q, ... followed by a bracketed list
of zero or more arguments. Brackets are omitted where there are zero
arguments.
The above alphabet forms the basis for an ASP program. This alphabet is used to
the define terms, atoms, literals, and rules which make up a program as described
below:
• A term: This can be a variable, a constant, or a function f(t1, . . . , tn)
where f is an n-ary function symbol and tis are terms
• An atom: This takes the form pn(t1, . . . , tn) such that tis are terms and
pn is a predicate with n arguments. If n is zero, p0 is also an atom. This
can be assigned a truth value of either true or false and can also appear
in negated forms.
• A literal: in AnsProlog∗, this can be an atom p(t1, . . . , tn) or its classical
negation ¬p(t1, . . . , tn) (meaning that p(t1, . . . , tn) can be shown not to
be true). Negated literals are omitted in AnsProlog⊥, hence all literals we
shall be using in this thesis are positive literals.
• A naf − literal: This is an extended literal in AnsProlog⊥ which is ex-
pressed as the literal p(t1, . . . , tn) or its negation-as-failure not p(t1, . . . , tn)
which means that p(t1, . . . , tn) cannot be proven to be true. Negation-as-
failure denoted not is therefore different from classical negation denoted
¬ where falsity needs to be proven.
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• ground terms (atoms, literals) : These are terms (atoms, literals respec-
tively) without variables.
• rule: AnsProlog⊥ program is made up of rules of the form
L.
or
H ← L0, . . . , Lm,not Lm+1, . . . ,not Ln.
where H is a literal or ⊥ and L, Li’s, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are negation-as-failure
literals .
A rule r consist of a head and a body. The body of a rule r can be divided
into the set of non negated atoms B+(r) and the set of atoms that appear
negated B−(r). From the interpretation of negation-as-failure, a rule in an
AnsProlog program can be read the following way: “if we know B+(r) and
we do not know B−(r), then the head of the rule can be assumed.”
From the description of a rule above, H is the head of the rule denoted by
Head(r) and {L0, . . . , Ln} is the body of the rule denoted by Body(r). If
the head of the rule is empty, such a rule is referred to as a constraint. The
head is either expressed using ⊥ or simply eliminated. The rule can simply
be written as: ← L0, . . . , Lm,not Lm+1, . . . ,not Ln. For the AnsProlog
program to be true, the constraints of this program need to be not true.
On another hand, a rule can have an empty body. Such a rule is called a
fact. This is written without the “←” sign as: L. The truth value of a fact
must be true.
If all literals in the body and head of the rule are ground, the rule is said
to be grounded.
Definition 4. For a program Π, the set of all ground terms which can be formed
with constants and function symbols in Π is called the Herbrand Universe of Π
denoted as UΠ.
For example: Consider a program Π consisting of variables X, Y ; constants a, b;
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function symbol f of arity 1; and predicate symbol p of arity 1:
UΠ = {a, b, f(a), f(b), f(f(a)), f(f(b)), f(f(f(a))), f(f(f(b))), . . .}.
Definition 5. The Herbrand Base of a program Π denoted BΠ is the set of all
ground atoms which can be formed by applying elements of UΠ to the arguments
of the predicate symbols in Π.
BΠ = {p(a), p(b), p(f(a)), p(f(b)), p(f(f(a))), p(f(f(b))),
p(f(f(f(a)))), p(f(f(f(b)))), . . .}.
Definition 6. A program Π is said to be grounded when each possible ground
term in UΠ is applied to each variable in each rule of Π.







The Herbrand Universe UΠ of program Π includes the terms bob and alice which
are used to expand the variable X in the third rule. The Herbrand Base BΠ
of program Π can also be derived to include the atoms login(bob), login(alice),
has access(bob) and has access(alice).
With the UΠ and BΠ computed, replacing each variable symbol by one of the
terms in UΠ gives a set of ground instances of a rule. In the case where an atom
contains multiple variables then each permutation of the possible values for each
variable is included. The ground version of a program Π, written as ground(Π),
is the set of all ground instances of all the rules in the original program. Example
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As illustrated in Definitions 4 and 5, an unground program containing function
symbols will result in infinite Herbrand Universe and Herbrand Base. This will
lead to an infinite number of grounded rules, a case which is undesirable. Current
ASP solvers operate only on ground programs with finite sets of rules we therefore
constrain our programs to those with finite set of rules. To do this, two constraints
- range restriction and domain restriction properties - are introduced on the
structure of rules and programs. These are defined as follows:
Definition 7. An unground rule is range restricted, if each variable in the rule
appears in at least one positive atom (not negated by negation as failure) in the
body of the rule. A program Π is range restricted if all of its rules are range
restricted.
The range restriction property requires each variable to be associated with one
or more predicates in the body of the rule.
The second property, domain restriction, applies to the whole program and de-
fined as follows;
Definition 8.
i) A rule is domain restricted if every variable which appears in the rule
also appears in a positive domain predicate in the body of the rule.
ii) A program Π is domain restricted if all rules of the program are domain
restricted.
iii) A predicate is a domain predicate if a ground atom derived from that
predicate appears in the head of at least one rule with an empty body
(as a fact) and the predicate does not appear in the head of any rules
with non-empty bodies.
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For example, the program:
q(a).
q(f(X)) :− q(X).
is range restricted. However, it is not domain restricted because the predicate q
appears in the head of both a domain restricted rule and a non-domain restricted
rule.
Having presented some of the syntactic issues of ASP relevant to us, we note that
while variables allow a great deal of flexibility and syntactic clarity of programs,
grounding process may generate a number of rules that may be exponentially
larger than the original program. Since the goal of an AnsProlog program is to
find the answer sets to the program, we would now turn to look at the semantics
of ASP which would make this possible.
4.2.2.2 Semantics of AnsProlog⊥ Programs
As noted earlier, an answer set program consists of a set of statements, called
rules where each rule H ← B consists of two parts: a head literal H and the
body B made up of a set of literals. Intuitively, this means that: “if all the
elements of B are true, so is the head H” or “H is supported if all elements of B
are considered to be true”. This form of reasoning is referred to as the minimal
model semantics.
In order to define models of a program, the Herbrand interpretation of anAnsProlog⊥
program Π is defined as any subset I ⊆ BΠ of its Herbrand base. Models of the
program Π are defined as follows:
Definition 9. Given a ground program consisting of rules of the form: h ←
B ∈ Π (which defines a constraint when h is ⊥), where B is the set of (non-
negated) literals in the body of the rule and h is a literal (if not ⊥); A Herbrand
interpretation I ⊂ BΠ of the program Π is a model of the program Π iff for each
73
rule of the program the following is true:
l← B ∈ Π
if l ≡⊥ and B * Iif l 6≡⊥ and B ⊆ I =⇒ h ∈ I
A model M is a minimal model of Π if, given the set of all models of Π:
{M1, . . . ,Mn},@j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n |Mj ⊂M .
Definition 9 does not take negation-as-failure into account. This means that
the rules of the program Π may contain negated literals which must not be in
the interpretation of the program for the rules to be supported. A reduct or
transformation is therefore necessary in order to find the minimal models for
programs containing negation-as-failure. This transformation is referred to as
the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988) and defined
as follows:
Definition 10. Let Π be a ground AnsProlog⊥ program. The Gelfond-Lifschitz
transformation of Π with respect to an interpretation I where I ⊆ BΠ, is the
program ΠI containing rules l ← B such that for all rules of the form l ←
B,not C ∈ Π, C ∩ I = ∅ and B and C being sets of literals.
The reduced program includes all rules of the original program which do not
contain negated literals in the interpretation.
With the concepts of minimal model and reduced program defined the answer set
of the program is defined as:
Definition 11. Let Π be a ground AnsProlog⊥ program. A set of ground atoms
I ⊆ BΠ is an answer set of Π iff I is a minimal model of ΠI .
The strength of answer set programming lies in the nondeterministic nature of
negation-as-failure, in which a program could result in several answer sets which
are all acceptable solutions to the problem that has been modelled. The set of
answer sets for a program Π is referred to as AΠ.
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The concepts introduced and explained here are better illustrated with an exam-
ple:






The Herbrand base BΠ of this program which is the set of all atoms used in rules
in Π consists of the atoms in {x, y, z}.
The Herbrand interpretation of the program Π yields the following:
{{}, {x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y}, {x, z}, {y, z}, {x, y, z}}
We can now use these computed information to determine the models of the
program as follows:




The interpretation R is a model of Π, since the atoms in R are supported by
both rules. This interpretation is also a minimal model with respect to ΠR as it
includes only atoms supported by the program.
In contrast, consider the interpretation Q = {y} and the transformation:
ΠQ =
x← .y← x.
Here, the transformation Q does not include the atom x which is supported by
ΠQ, therefore the transformation Q is not a model of ΠQ.
Lastly, an interpretation could be a model but not necessarily a minimal model
of the transformation. This example illustrates this:
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Consider the interpretation S = {x, y, z} and the transformation ΠS:
x← .
Here, since the interpretation S includes x, it is a model of ΠS but it is not a
minimal model because it includes the atoms {y, z} which are not supported by
the transformation ΠS. This is also true for the empty set {}.
Therefore for the above program Π, the set of its answer setsAΠ = {{x, y}, {x, z}}.
4.2.3 Computational Complexity of ASP
In this section we discuss some aspects of computational complexity of ASP in
which we consider the following issues:
i) Computation of answer sets (models) of a given program Π
ii) What search problems are expressible in ASP?
From classical complexity theory, issue (i) is basically a decision problem -
do there exist models of a program? In the propositional case, Marek and
Truszczyn´ski (1991) showed that the problem of deciding whether a finite propo-
sitional logic program (which allows negation in the rule bodies but no disjunction
in the rule heads) has answer set is NP -complete. Furthermore, allowing disjunc-
tions in the rule heads, ASP can express the problem in the complexity class
∑P
2
hence deciding if a disjunctive logic program has an answer set is
∑P
2 -complete.
Hence compared with propositional satisfiability (SAT) which is NP -complete
(Garey and Johnson, 1990), ASP is more powerful since problems which cannot
be translated to SAT can be solved in polynomial time, unless P = NP (Dantsin
et al., 2001).
Regarding search problems, ASP can express all NP -search problems, that is,
those solvable using a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, in
such a way that the answer sets encode the solutions. In fact, each such problem
(for example, finding some Hamiltonian cycle) is expressible by a fixed predicate
program to which logical facts encoding a given problem instance (for exam-
ple, a graph) are added. Again, additional constructs like disjunctive rules may
increase the expressibility (Brewka et al., 2011). Detailed discussion of the com-
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plexity classes relating to AnsProlog and its subclasses can be found in Baral
(2003)
4.3 Reasoning about Specifications in ASP
Traces define the models (answer sets) that may be generated from an institu-
tion. In this section we are describing the trace program and the traces that
the program may generate from our institutional specification. Also, we shall be
describing how a query program may be used to constrain the traces such that
we get the answer sets which satisfies our intended queries.
4.3.1 The Trace Program
The AnsProlog program Π
base(n)
I produced from the translation of an institution
I does very little in the sense that it produces a single answer set which contains
only the event facts provided in the program. For more useful results, information
on occurrences of exogenous events need to be added and also provision of time
line for the institution is required. This is achieved by defining a trace program.
This provides sequences of exogenous events that are in turn interpreted by the
base program to give a model. The types of trace programs we are presenting
here are those that generate single traces and those that generate all possible
traces of events up to length n.
When we only wish to determine the model of I over a single finite trace of a
known length, we define a single trace program. For instance when we already
know the events that have occurred and the order in which they occurred, single
traces can be used to find the sequence of institutional events and states over
that trace. The single trace program is defined as follows;
Definition 12. Π
one(n)
I is an AnsProlog single trace program of length n for an
institution I = 〈E ,F , C,G,∆〉 made up of rules of the form:
observed(ei, ti) 0 ≤ i < n, ei ∈ Eex
such that only one rule is defined for each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n.
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Following from Definition 12, we shall use the notation Π
base(n)
I,tr to denote the
single trace program corresponding to an ordered trace tr.
We assert that we can obtain a model of an institution by combining the trace
information from the single trace program with the state transitions information
encoded in Π
base(n)
I . This will mean that the union of a single program trace
and Π
base(n)
I results in a stratified program in which three distinct strata may
be recognised for a given instant ti thus; i.) fluents that are true at instant
ti, ii.) exogenous events that occur and institutional events that are generated
between instants ti and ti+1, and iii.) the effects of those events.
Definition 13. A partition pi0, . . . , pik of the set of all predicate symbols of an
AnsProlog program Π is a stratification of Π, if for any rule of the type A0 ←
A1, . . . , Am,not Am+1, . . . ,not An, and for any p ∈ pis, 0 ≤ s ≤ k if A0 ∈
atoms(p), then:
(a) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m there is q and j ≤ s such that q ∈ pij and Ai ∈ atoms(q),
and
(b) for every m + 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is q and j < s such that q ∈ pij and Ai ∈
atoms(q).
A program is called stratified if it has a stratification.
In order to perform analysis and verification, a single trace is not sufficient we
therefore need to define a trace program that will generate all the traces of length
n for a given institution I. This is defined as follows;
Definition 14. A trace program Π
all(n)
I of length n for an institution I =
〈E ,F , C,G,∆〉 is an AnsProlog program made up of the rules:
{observed(eex, ti)}. 0 ≤ i < n, eex ∈ Eex (14.1)
ev(ti)← observed(eex, ti) 0 ≤ i < n, eex ∈ Eex (14.2)
← not ev(ti) 0 ≤ i < n (14.3)
Rule 14.1 allows for any exogenous event eex ∈ Eex to be non-deterministically
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chosen as an observed event at any time instant. Also, the rules 14.2 and 14.3
ensures that at each instant an exogenous event must be observed and that at all
instants at least one exogenous event must be observed. Therefore a trace pro-
gram Π
all(n)
I generates as its answer set all possible combinations of n exogenous
events together with the instant and ev facts provided. These are referred to as
traces since they are time bound.
The generation of all traces is necessary for adequately handling reasoning prob-
lems since all the possible models of an institution are defined for a given period
of time. However, in analysis and verification cases, we may for instance wish to
simply find only traces which answer a particular question. Also, we may wish to
determine the existence or non existence of answer sets for a particular question.
To achieve this we need to constrain the traces generated by the trace program
in combination with the base program. This is done by a query program defined
as follows:





I of an institution I, a program Πqry(n)I is a query program iff:
Head(Π
qry(n)
I ) ∩ Lit(Πbase(n)I ) = ∅ (15.1)
Head(Π
qry(n)
I ) ∩ Lit(Πall(n)I ) = ∅ (15.2)
that is to say that for both trace and base programs, all atoms which appear in
the body of rules are disjoint with all atoms obtainable from the rules in a query




When a trace program Π
all(n)
I is combined with the base program Π
base(n)
I for the
institution I and a query program Πqry(n)I , i.e Πall(n)I ∪Πbase(n)I ∪Πqry(n)I , we obtain
an answer set which represents all possible traces and models of the institution
I which are consistent with the query program Πqry(n)I .
Our translated programs can also be used for reasoning tasks in the absence of
complete information about the occurrence of events in a trace. This case would
mean limiting answer sets to only those which are consistent with the partial
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ordering of these events. We illustrate this with an example in which we assume
knowledge of exactly which events have occurred and that events with same
signature1 only occur once. This is captured in the definition that follows;
Definition 16. For a given set of exogenous events E ⊆ EIex and a partial order-
ing R ⊆ E × E of these events with ei ≺ ej ∈ R, ei 6= ej and n = |E|, we define
the query program Π
(n)
I by the following rules;
before(I1, I2) ← next(I1, I2), instant(I1), instant(I2).
before(I1, I3) ← before(I1, I2), before(I2, I3),
instant(I1), instant(I2), instant(I3).
The rules in Definition 16 define a transitive ordering over instants such that
for each pair of instants ti, tj where 0 ≤ i < j < n an atom before(ti, tj)
applies.
For each event ordering ei ≺ ej ∈ R a constraint rule in Π(n)I of the form
← observed(ei, I1), observed(ej, I2), before(I2, I1), instant(I1), instant(I2).




I ∪ Πall(n)I ∪ Πbase(n)I will produce answer sets that only
include models of traces where the ordered relation specified by R holds. The ap-
plication of these types of trace are found in the case of agent reasoning, where an
agent has partial knowledge about the events that have occurred or the ordering
of events in the world.
4.4 Other Reasoning Approaches
A number of formal methods exist on how to represent and analyse the dynamics
of a given complex domain in terms of the actions which are possible in that
domain and their effects. These methods attempt to capture different aspects,
1An AnsProlog program is a pair {σ,Π} where σ is signature and Π is a finite set of state-
ments (rules) about σ (Gelfond, 2008).
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such as goals, actors and actions, responsibilities and constraints. A complete
study of this field is far beyond the scope of this thesis, however we summarise
two approaches based on first order logic (the Situation Calculus and the Event
Calculus), and contrast these with a number of approaches based in propositional
logic.
4.4.1 Situation Calculus
One of the earliest attempts at formalising a model for change and action for use
in artificial intelligence is the situation calculus first proposed by McCarthy in
McCarthy (1963) and formalized in Levesque et al. (1998) and Reiter (2001). It is
primarily a first-order logic language aimed at representing dynamically changing
worlds, in which actions performed by agents are responsible for all changes. A
first-order term, known as a situation represents a possible world history which
is a sequence of actions. The situation calculus therefore revolves around the
definition of a set of fluents, which describe both the corresponding (hypothetical)
state of world and the effects of the performance of actions upon that state. Hence
situation fluents in the situation calculus are relative to particular situations and
treated as propositions. For instance, the fluent in(Bob, Building, σ) states that
in situation σ, bob is in the building. Also a function of the form Poss(α, σ)
can be used to express that the action α is possible or executable in situation
σ. Likewise the function Holds(ρ, σ) indicates that fluent ρ is true in situation
σ.
Change in the situation calculus is expressed through a successor function which
takes some action and situation and produces a new situation. A successor func-
tion is denoted by a binary function do(α, σ). It implies that a new situation is
brought about by the execution of action α in situation σ. Relations and func-
tions whose truth values vary from situation to situation are called relational
and functional fluents, respectively. The main ingredients of the situation calcu-
lus formalism that provide a complete treatment of reasoning about action are
situations, actions, and fluents.
For better understanding, we illustrate the situation calculus reasoning with a
simple example:
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Consider an action Travel(Bob, Y) denoting that Bob has travelled from location
Y, and a Boolean fluent At(Bob, Y, σ) denoting that Bob is at location Y in situation
σ, the semantics of this action will be defined as follows:
Poss(Travel(Bob, Y), σ) ← At(Bob, Y, σ) (16.1)
¬At(Bob, Y, σ′) ← σ′ = do(Travel(Bob, Y), σ) (16.2)
The first axiom (16.1) states that it is only possible for Bob to travel from location
Y in situation σ, if Bob is at location Y in situation σ. The second axiom (16.2)
states that if Bob does travel from Y in situation σ then Bob is not considered to
be at location Y in the situation σ′ which immediately follows σ.
A number of deficiencies were observed in this approach, notably the frame prob-
lem (McCarthy and Hayes, 1968) which stems from the fact that situation calcu-
lus operates on partial description of the world. The significance of this problem
has led to several approaches which aim at solving the problem. These include
the event calculus approach we discuss in the next section.
4.4.2 Event Calculus
The event calculus originally proposed by Kowalski and Sergot (1986) is an-
other logic-based framework for representing and reasoning about actions that
has attracted much attention as a solution to the frame problem of the situation
calculus. The event calculus and situation calculus are similar in the sense that
they can both be formalized by means of Horn clauses augmented with negation
by failure. However, they differ in that while situation calculus deals with global
states, event calculus deals with local events and time periods. The event calculus
is able to express both how events (also called actions) may change the valua-
tions of fluents, and how, based on the occurrence of events at an earlier time,
the valuations of fluents may be determined. Time-points are used to axiomatise
expressions in such a way that fluents are true if they have been initiated by an
event occurrence at some earlier time-point. A central feature of the event cal-
culus, called a narrative, is a possibly incomplete specification of a set of actual
event occurrences. By tackling the frame problem using circumscription (Mc-
Carthy, 1980) and narrative, event calculus is capable of representing a variety of
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Clipped(t1, f, t2)
def≡ ∃a, t(Happens(a, t) ∧ t1 ≤ t < t2 (EC1)
∧Terminates(a, f, t)).
Declipped(t1, f, t2)
def≡ ∃a, t(Happens(a, t) ∧ t1 ≤ t < t2 (EC2)
∧Terminates(a, f, t)).
HoldsAt(f, t1)← [Happens(a, t1) ∧ Initiates(a, f, t1) ∧ t1 < t2 (EC3)
∧¬Clipped(t1, f, t2)].
¬HoldsAt(f, t1)← [Happens(a, t1) ∧ Terminates(a, f, t1) ∧ t1 < t2 (EC4)
∧¬Declipped(t1, f, t2)].
HoldsAt(f, t2)← [HoldsAt(f, t1) ∧ t1 < t2 (EC5)
∧¬Clipped(t1, f, t2)].
¬HoldsAt(f, t2)← [HoldsAt(f, t1) ∧ t1 < t2 (EC6)
∧¬Declipped(t1, f, t2)].
Figure 4-2: Some axioms of Event Calculus
phenomena more naturally and also to perform non-monotonic reasoning, as de-
scribed in many works, such as Mueller (2008); Shanahan (1999). Event calculus
attempts to solve the frame problem by reifying when fluents hold in particular
time points as seen in Figure 4-2 which presents axiomatised summary of the
commonly used simplified event calculus as found in Shanahan (1999); Miller
and Shanahan (2002). The predicates involved in these axioms are explained in
Table 4.1.
Predicate Meaning
Clipped(t1, f, t2) causes a fluent f to start holding between time-points t1 and t2
Declipped(t1, f, t2) causes a fluent f to cease holding between time-points t1 and t2
Happens(a, t) event a happens at time-point t
HoldsAt(f, t) fluent f holds at time point t
Initiates(a, f, t) event a causes fluent f to start at time-point t
Terminates(a, f, t) event a causes fluent f to stop at time-point t
Table 4.1: Commonly used Event Calculus Predicates
In addition to the event calculus domain independent axioms presented in Figure
4-2, the theory of event calculus also demands the definition of domain dependent
axioms which specify the creation of the Initiates and Terminates fluents with
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respect to given events. For example let us take the theory "Depressing the
switch button turns on the light, releasing the switch button turns
off the light". Representing the depressing and releasing of the switch button
with the events Depress and Release and when the light is turned on with the
fluent On, the stated theory could be expressed as:
Initiates(a, f, t)
def≡ [a = Depress, f = On,¬HoldsAt(On, t)]
Terminates(a, f, t)
def≡ [a = Release, f = On,HoldsAt(On, t)]
It is worth noting that event calculus assumes and enforces the common-sense
law of inertia which implies that the truth value of a fluent is preserved from its
initial time-point until it is terminated by some other event. When a fluent is not
subject to the common-sense law of inertia its truth value is allowed to fluctuate
in an arbitrary fashion and therefore may or may not be the same. A number of
tools exist for reasoning using descriptions based on the logic. These range from
the use of abduction (Denecker et al., 1992), theorem proving (Shanahan, 1997) to
a model-based reasoning technique based on SAT-solvers (Mueller, 2004).
4.4.3 Action Languages
A number of approaches have been proposed for reasoning about actions (see Gel-
fond and Lifschitz (1993); Baral (2010); Strass and Thielscher (2012)). Common
approaches that model actions are based on the notion of state change. Actions
are generally considered instantaneous and defined as functions from one state to
another by means of predefined conditions. Reasoning about actions is desirable
in many ways; i.) it helps us to predict if a sequence of actions is indeed going to
achieve some desired goal; ii.) it allows us to plan or come up with a sequence of
actions that would achieve a particular goal and maintain particular trajectories;
iii.) it allows us to explain observations in terms of what actions may have taken
place; and iv.) it allows us to diagnose faults in a system in terms of finding
what actions may have taken place to result in the faults. When actions have
non-deterministic effects reasoning about actions is needed to verify policies and
come up with policies to achieve goals and maintain desired trajectories. Thus,
reasoning about actions is an important topic in Computer Science in general
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and in AI in particular. It has also served as a benchmark domain for evaluating
knowledge representation languages (Baral, 2010).
The situation calculus and event calculus, being first and second order logic
formalisms respectively provide expressive means for modelling change and time
in dynamic systems. However these systems come at a computational cost, and
tools for reasoning with both of these systems make a broad class of reasoning
problems intractable presently. These have led to researchers proposing a number
of proposition logic-based approaches including the action language A (Gelfond
and Lifschitz, 1993).
The semantics of the action languages are based on the causal theories in Mc-
Cain and Turner (1997), which distinguish between the claim that a formula is
true and the stronger claim that there is a cause for it to be true. Based on
this, the first high-level action language A was developed. This language only
supports expressions of the form “α causes β if γ” where α is an action name,
β a literal and γ a conjunction of literals (possibly empty). The action language
C (Giunchiglia and Lifschitz, 1998) extends the language A by providing addi-
tional language expressions, besides direct effects of actions, such as dependencies
between fluents.
The language C+ proposed by Giunchiglia, Lee and Lifschitz in Giunchiglia et al.
(2001) is an extension to the languages C andA with the inclusion of dynamic laws
and multi-valued fluents. In this sense, when determining the value of fluents,
C+ permits the definition of a class of fluents called dynamic fluents. In any
given state, the value of these fluents is based on an expression evaluated over
the other fluents in the current state. This is unlike in A where the value of a
fluent is dependent only on the previous state and actions which have occurred.
This addition makes the representation of a number of properties in the language
simple and more succinct. Also in contrast with the Boolean fluents in A which
may only be true or false in a given state, multi-valued fluents may take on a
number of values.
In terms of model size, given a state property which may take on exactly one
of N values, the multi-valued fluents in C reduces the number of possible state-
fluents to exactly N leading to a corresponding decrease in model size. This
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contrasts with A where each of the N values must be represented as a Boolean
fluent leading to 2N possible combinations of the fluent values. Another contrast
also deals with the underlying semantics. A has semantics based on answer set
programs while the semantics for C+ is based on the logic of causal theories
which defines the circumstances under which the valuation of a formula can be










Figure 4-3: An Overview of the Model Checking Approach
In formal logic, model checking designates the problem of determining whether a
formula φ evaluates to true or false in an interpretationM, writtenM |= φ. For
example,Mmight represent a knowledge base or a system and φ could be a query
of which we wish to determine if it is implied by the knowledge in the base or a
formula representing the correctness of the system being verified. We are then
interested in finding efficient algorithms for determining whether M |= φ holds
(Merz, 2008). As described in Figure 4-3, the inputs of the model checking tool
consist of the system description and the property to be verified. The tool either
outputs a Y es if the system description (model) satisfies the system property,
otherwise a counter − example is presented to the user.
Model checking uses an algorithmic technique to formally verify properties of a
finite state system. It combines temporal logic formula which is used to express
the property to be verified and state transition system which captures the model
to be checked. The states of the system and actions or events that cause the
system to change states are represented by the nodes and edges respectively of
the state transition system. The model checking procedure aims at satisfying the
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expression (M, s |= φ), whereM denotes the model, s the initial state and φ the
property being checked. Informally, this can be stated as, given a model M and
an initial state s it is possible to prove the property φ.
Typically the correctness properties for model checking are expressed either in
computational tree logic (CTL) or linear time logic (LTL). Model checking tools
such as SPIN (Holzmann, 1997) for LTL and NuSMV (Cimatti et al., 1999) for
CTL have been developed and used for verifying systems containing large number
of states. These tools verify a given property by means of state exploration and
symbolic model checking. They take the user specified model, initial state and the
property to be verified and attempt to check if the model satisfies the property
and responding with either a “yes” or a counter-example which is a sequence
of event/action transitions through the state model that cause the property to
be false. This shows situations where the system behaves in such a way that
the property is violated, and the absence of counterexamples indicates that the
modelled system satisfies the property (Bandara et al., 2003).
Although model checking can be applied to much larger state spaces than those
which can be studied using ASP, queries are limited to those which can be ex-
pressed in the temporal logic used by the underlying model checker. In the case
of CTL for instance we are limited to formulae which are quantified over all fu-
ture paths making some queries impossible to specify. As such temporal logic
model checking may be seen as a complementary method for checking properties
that require the full investigation of the state space, but not do not require the
expressive power of ASP.
Another type of automated model checking is the bounded temporal logic model
checking (Biere et al., 2003). Here, the correctness properties that can be in-
vestigated are limited to those which can be detected in a finite trace of the
system. Unlike symbolic model checking, bounded model checking may be con-
ducted using more expressive logics such as CTL* (Visser and Barringer, 2000),
relaxing the expressiveness constraints of logics such as CTL and LTL. Typically,
bounded logic model checking systems are comparable to ASP in their approach
to modelling investigations.
While model checking has found great applications especially in hardware verifi-
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cation (Burch et al., 1990) and recently software verification (Be´rard et al., 2010),
in the context of security requirements analysis, model checking has a number of
significant disadvantages. These include the inability to deal with partial speci-
fication of initial states and to check static properties of the system.
Verification in model checking approaches as presented by SPIN and NuSMV
are concerned with the problem of reachability of states and the satisfiability of
constraints. ASP on the other hand is concerned with the problem of finding
stable models of specified rules. This means that with ASP, models which satisfy
specified constraints can be generated.
4.5 Institutional framework to ASP Translation
As we have pointed out in Section 3.6 on page 47, the institutional framework
allow us to express the specifications of an organisational “workflow” and the
elicited security requirements. We also presented the computational framework
which allows us to formalise and reason about these specifications for the purpose
of analysis which is the objective of our work. The idea lies in the fact that if an
institution I = 〈E ,F ,G,∆〉 is represented as an AnsProlog program Π, then the
answer sets to this program corresponds to the traces of the institution.
For us to achieve this goal of representing our institutional specifications in
AnsProlog, it is necessary to map our institutional framework definition I =
〈E ,F ,G,∆〉 and all its components into answer set programs such that the an-
swer set programs described by this translation model the semantics of the target
institution. By expressing verification problems as queries over these programs,
it becomes possible to determine the presence or absence of desirable properties
of the original institution specification, through the presence or absence of answer
sets to queries over the institutional program. We shall proceed to explain this
translation as presented in Cliffe et al. (2007).
For a given institution I, the mapping follows a definition of three components
which together result in the AnsProlog program ΠI . These components are: time
component Πn, base component Πbase, and an institution specific component Π∗I .
Together, these three components generate the answer set program Π
base(n)
I which
is capable of providing all the ordered traces of length n for the institution I.
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We shall be explaining the mapping of the institutional specifications with ASP
through these components.
4.5.1 Translation Based on Components
In doing the mapping of the institution I = 〈E ,F ,G,∆〉 to AnsProlog, the atoms
presented in Table 4.2are used. We now explain the role and usage of these atoms
Atom Meaning
ifluent(P) identify fluents
nifluent(P) identify non-inertial fluents
evtype(E,T) describe the type of an event
event(E) denote events
instant(I) denote time instants
final(I) last time instant
next(I1,I2) time ordering, I1 comes before I2
occurred(E,I) the event E happened at time instant I
observed(E,I) the event E was observed at time instant I
holdsat(P,I) the institutional fluent P holds at time instant I
initiated(P,I) fluent P initiated at time instant I
terminated(P,I) fluent P terminated at time instant I
Table 4.2: Atoms used for mapping institutions to AnsProlog
in the translation starting with the time component Πn.
Time component Πn
This defines the predicates for time instants of length n such that ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n
and is responsible for generating a single observed event at every time instant.
We noted in Section 3.6.1.2 that the general notion of time in an institutional
framework is based on assumption that time consists of a number of ordered
time instants, without any particular regard for the actual duration between two
of these instants. Time instants are therefore taken to represent the state of an
institution at a given time such that each time instant corresponds to one possible
institutional state. Events are considered to occur between the time instants so
that event occurring at time ti is considered to occur in the real world between
the time instants ti and ti+1. AnsProlog definition of time is given by the
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following facts:
0 < k < n : instant(ik). (16.3)
0 < k < n− 1 : next(ik, ik+1). (16.4)
final(ik). (16.5)
where (16.3) defines all time instants available in the institution while (16.4)
specifies the ordering of times between two instants as necessary for transition
from one state to another. The fact in (16.5) represents the final state since it is
not possible to have an observable event occurring at the final time instant.
Base component Πbase
Following the presentation of time interpretation, we now present the Πbase com-
ponent which consist of general rules that hold for any institution. These rules
are responsible for the occurrence of observed events, handling of fluent inertia
(i.e. the transition of the states) and dealing with the generation of violation
events which could be due to prohibited events (i.e not permitted events) or un-
satisfied obligations. The translation rules for the institution base program are
shown in Figure 4-4.
The first rule (16.6) has to do with exogenous events Eex and ensures that each
observed exogenous event E is marked as occurred, given that all observable
events are valid events (due to the autonomy of the actors in the institutional
framework, any exogenous event can occur since they are not controllable by
the institution). Rules (16.7) deals with standard inertia and uses negation
as failure. The rule ensures that any fluent which is valid at an instant I1
(holdsat(I1)) not terminated in this state (not terminated(P,I1)) still re-
mains valid in the next state (holdsat(P,I2)). The atoms next(I1,I2) and
instant(I1,I2) handle the generation of the next time instant (state) and its
grounding. Focusing on initiation rules, rule (16.8) makes sure that fluents which
are initiated at an instant (initiated(P,I1)) become valid in the next state
(holdsat(P,I2)). Events that are not permitted are expected to generate a
violation. This is handled by rule (16.9) which ensures that violations are gen-
erated (occurred(viol(E),I)) whenever an event happens (occurred(E,I))
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occurred(E, I) :− observed(E, I). (16.6)
holdsat(P, I2) :− holdsat(P, I1), (16.7)
not terminated(P, I1),
next(I1, I2), instant(I1, I2),
ifluent(P).
holdsat(P, I2) :− initiated(P, I1), next(I1, I2), (16.8)
instant(I1, I2), ifluent(P).




occurred(V, I) :− holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I), (16.10)
occurred(D, I), event(E, D, V),
instant(I).
terminated(obl(E, D, V), I) :− occurred(E, I), (16.11)
holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I),
event(E, D, V), instant(I).
terminated(obl(E, D, V), I) :− occurred(D, I), (16.12)
holdsat(obl(E, D, V), I),
event(E, D, V), instant(I).
Figure 4-4: The Rules for Πbase Translation
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{observable(E, I)} :− evtype(E, obs), event(E), (16.13)
instant(I), not final(I).
ev(E, I) :− observed(E, I), event(E), (16.14)
instant(I).
:− not ev(I), instant(I), (16.15)
not final(I).
:− observed(E1, I), observed(E2, I), (16.16)
E1! = E2, instant(I), event(E1), event(E2).
Figure 4-5: The Rules for handling Observable Traces
in a state for which no permission exists (not holdsat(perm(E),I)) for that
event. Obligation issues are handled by rules (16.10) - (16.12). Rule (16.10)
handles the need for a violation to be raised (occurred(V,I)) whenever the
deadline D for an obligation expires (occurred(D,I)) at the same instant that
the obligation is still valid holdsat(obl (E,D,V),I). An obligation can be ter-
minated (terminated(obl(E,D,V),I)) by the occurrence (occurred(E,I)) of
the obliged event. This is ensured by rule (16.11). Also the occurrence of the
deadline event (occurred(D,I)) associated to an obligation can cause the ter-
mination of the obligation.
The semantics of the institutional framework is described as change of states
brought about by occurrence of institutional events Einst triggered by a sequence
of exogenous (real world) events Eex taking place. Each of the sequence of ex-
ogenous events in the institution represents a single possible model for the in-
terpretation of the institution in AnsProlog. Therefore, in our specification of
the computational model of an institution we are particularly interested only in
models that have had any exogenous event Eex occurring. This means that we are
only interested in models that have traces containing observable events. Because
of this, there is a need to constrain the answer sets or models by adding a set
of rules to the Πbase rules that would ensure we get the kind of models we are
interested in. The rules in Figure 4-5 are therefore added to the base rules in
Figure 4-4.
Here, the generation of observed(E,I) atoms is handled by rule (16.13) which en-
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EX(x1 ∧ x2 ∧ . . . ∧ xn, ti) def≡ EX(x1, ti), EX(x2, ti), . . . , EX(xn, ti) (16.17)
EX(¬f, ti) def≡ not EX(f, ti) (16.18)
EX(f, ti)
def≡ holdsat(f, ti) (16.19)
Figure 4-6: Translation of the Condition Statement
sures that for each combination of observable (evtype(E,obs)) event (event(E))
that is non-final (not final(I)) at time instant instant(I), an {observed(E,I)}
choice is generated. This indicates that it is possible to either use the observed(E,I)
atom or not. For each choice, rule (16.14) generates an event ev(E,I) which is
the used by rule (16.15) to restrict the answer sets to only those that have at least
one observable event (Eex) at each time step. In the same way also, rule (16.16)
ensures that each answer set has at most one Eex at every time instant.
Institution specific component Π∗I
This component specifies all the components that are specific to the institution
being modelled.
In order to account for the effect of institutional rules over a specific set of states,
in Section 3.6.2 we defined X as the set of state formulae over a given set of
institutional fluent properties F which may be true while the institution is active.
With this, an auxiliary function EX such that given an expression φ ∈ X at
time instant ti, φ can be translated into ASP atoms using the term EX(φ, ti) as
presented in Figure 4-6.
For example, the condition ¬x, y at time instant ti would be translated into the
following sequence of extended AnsProlog literals:
not holdsat(x, ti), holdsat(y, ti).
With these rules in place, the rules for translating Π∗I becomes the rules presented
in Figure 4-7.
Rule (16.20) allows fluents to be encoded as facts ifluent(p) which facili-
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p ∈ F ⇔ ifluent(p). (16.20)
e ∈ E ⇔ event(e). (16.21)
e ∈ Eex ⇔ evtype(e, obs). (16.22)
e ∈ Eact ⇔ evtype(e, act). (16.23)
e ∈ Eviol ⇔ evtype(e, viol). (16.24)
e ∈ E+ ⇔ evtype(e, cr). (16.25)
C↑(φ, e) = P ⇔ ∀p ∈ P · initiated(p, I) :− occurred(e, I), (16.26)
EX(φ, I).
C↓(φ, e) = P ⇔ ∀p ∈ P · terminated(p, I) :− occurred(e, I), (16.27)
EX(φ, I).
G(φ, e) = E ⇔ ∀g ∈ E · occurred(g, I) :− occurred(e, I), (16.28)
holdsat(pow(e), I), EX(φ, I).
p ∈ ∆ ⇔ holdsat(p, i0). (16.29)
Figure 4-7: Translation Rules for Π∗I
tates grounding in the AnsProlog program. Rules (16.21) - (16.24) deals with
events such that each event e ∈ E in the institution generates two facts - a fact
event(e)which denotes an event (rule 16.21), and a fact evtype(e,X) which
denotes the event type X ∈ obs, act, viol, cr (rules 16.22 - 16.25) repre-
senting observable events, institutional actions, violation and creation events
(see Section 3.6.2). The rules for consequence generation are provided for by
rules (16.26) and (16.27). These rules are responsible for ensuring that whenever
a fluent needs to be initiated or terminated a rule will be created appropri-
ately. The structure of this rule is such that the initiation/termination atom is
in the head of the rule (initiated(p,I)/terminated(p,I)) while the occur-
rence of the responsible event (occurred(e,I)) and the conditions on the state
(EX(X,I) form the body of the rule. Rule 16.28 handles the event generation
and for each event generated, the produced rule contains the occurrence of the
responsible event (occurred(e,I)) together with the power to execute this event
(holdsat(pow(e),I)) and the conditional rules (EX(X,I) in the body. The oc-
currence of the generated event (occurred(g,I)) is presented as the head of the
rule. Lastly, rule 16.29 encodes the initial state ∆ of the institution in which each
fluent p ∈ ∆ is translated into a fact holdsat(p, i0).
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4.5.2 Summary of the Translations
We have so far presented the translations for the three components Π∗I , Π
n, and
Πbase which together make up the answer set program Π
base(n)
I corresponding to an
institutional specification I = 〈E ,F ,G,∆〉. In Table 4.3 we present a summary of
the semantics for translation of an institution I into a corresponding Ansprolog
program Π
base(n)
I . With this, we are able to generate an answer set program that
is capable of providing all ordered traces of length n for the institution I. Where
necessary, we can also add additional rules to the program that would restrict the
answer sets to those which fulfil certain desired properties being investigated. In
the next section, we present a high-level action language InstAL through which

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.6 The Action Language InstAL
In the last section we show that the formal model of an institution can be trans-
lated to AnsProlog program such that the solutions of the program, known as
answer sets of the program, defined through the answer set semantics (Baral,
2003) correspond to the traces of the institutional framework. However this
translation would require an appreciable knowledge of AnsProlog formalization
and syntax. Therefore in order to make this translation easier, a layer of ab-
straction on top of AnsProlog was provided in Cliffe et al. (2006) through the
domain-specific action language called InstAL. This language InstAL describes
the various components of the institution using a semi-natural language. In this
section we present the features of this language as we apply it to various aspects
of our models. Figure 4-8 gives an overview of the components and the process
of instAL translation process. An InstAL reasoning task consists of the following
components:
i.) An InstAL institution specification which describes an institution that should
be processed.
ii.) A domain definition that contains grounding information for aspects of the
institution description. This provides the domains for types and any static
properties referenced in the institution definition.
iii.) A trace program which defines the set traces of exogenous events that should
be investigated.
iv.) A query program which describes the desired property which should be val-
idated by the InstAL reasoning tool.
4.6.1 Specifying Institutions in InstAL
While we do not intend to present the details of InstAL here since this can be
found in Cliffe (2007) we, for completeness, describe the features of InstAL that
are useful for our security requirements specification and how the various institu-
























Figure 4-8: Overview of InstAL translation process (Cliffe, 2007)
Domain Specification
The domain definition consist of statements of the form:
type-identifier:type-value(s)
where type-identifier denotes the variable declared as type in the associated
institutional specification while type-value(s) is the list of atoms (constants)
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separated by spaces, needed for the grounding of the variables.






specifies the content of our domain file for an exams scenario. For example
the variables ExamOffice and Head of the underlying institution specification
would be grounded with the values examOfficer and hod respectively. A domain
description file should contain complete information necessary for each of the
variables that should be grounded. This separation of domain information from
the model description allows us to make changes to the values without having to
change the institutional specifications.
Institutional Specification
The institutional specification is made up of declarations (type, events, and flu-
ents), rule descriptions (causal, generation, and initiation rules). We shall explain
how these declarations and rules may be specified in InstAL here.
Type Declarations: The InstAL type declaration takes the form:
type identifier;






As presented earlier, a domain file specifies the acceptable values for each declared
type in the form type-identifier:type-value(s) with the values separated by
spaces. An example of such a specification of grounding values in the domain file
for our description is Agent: eo hod. InstAL will then substitute those values
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(eo and hod) whenever the respective type Agent is specified for the events and
fluents.
InstAL translation tool automatically generates three internally-defined types
using the specification being processed in addition to the user-defined types.
These types are Fluent which is defined as a set of all grounded fluent literals that
occur in the specifications being processed, Event is the set of all event literals,
and Inst which is the unique name of the institution being processed.
Event Declarations: InstAL allows us to specify zero or more event signa-
tures, each of which describes the event’s status (exogenous, institutional or vi-
olation), its (unique) name and the types of any parameters associated with the
event in form of
event− type event event− name(parameters);
Following Section 3.6.2 on page 59, event types include; exogenous which declares
external (observable) events, inst for internal institutional events, violation




As seen in these examples, we parametrise event signatures using the types de-
scribed in the institution such that each event signature describes one or more
event literals which are derived from the domains of the types of the event’s pa-
rameters. The set of all event literals for a particular event type is described as
the domain of that event. Where an event does not have parameters, the do-
main of the event declaration contains a single event with the same name as the
declaration.
Fluent Declarations: Fluent declarations define institutional properties which
may change over time. These are categorised into institutional (normative) flu-
ents and domain specific fluents (see Section 3.6.2 on page 60). A fluent dec-
laration consists of a fluent name and zero or more fluent parameters. The
InstAL implementation we are using in this work called pyinstal, allows us to
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define three types of fluents. These are inertial fluents, noninertial fluents,
and obligation fluents.
Domain specific fluents are declared differently depending on the type. inertial
fluents take the following form:
fluent-type fluent− name(parameters);
For instance the following declarations:
fluent hasPaper(Head);
fluent setToTake(Student,Paper);
define fluents with names hasPaper with one parameter and setToTake with two
parameters which range over the types Head, Student and Paper respectively.
Each fluent declaration corresponds to a set of possible domain fluents which
may be used in the institution, the full set of fluents described by a given flu-
ent declaration is dependent on the types of the parameters of that fluent. For
example if the type Head is defined by the values hodPhysics, hodMaths, and
hodChemistry then the fluents hasPaper(hodPhysics), hasPaper(hodMaths)
and hasPaper(hodChemistry) are considered to be valid fluents in the institu-
tion. The set of all literals corresponding to a particular fluent is referred to as
the domain of the fluent.
The declaration of noninertial fluents take the form:
noninertial fluent fluent− name(parameter...);
This declares a fluent that is non-inertial. This is a fluent that is not automatically
persistent between states but only come about as a result of the presence or
absence of some specified fluents.
Obligations are treated as fluents and are declared as follows:
obligation fluent obl(e, d, v);
Similar to events, where a fluent has no parameters the domain of the fluent dec-
laration will contain only a single literal corresponding to the fluent name.
In addition to the domain fluents declared in a specification the following institu-
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tional fluents are implicitly defined. These are the permission fluent perm(Event)
and power fluent pow(Event)
Rules Declarations: Each InstAL specification may contain zero or more
rules. Three types of rules which can be declared are;
(i) Consequence rules which describe when fluents change in response to the
occurrence of events. A causal rule consists of:
(a) a trigger event which denotes the event which (may) activate the rule.
(b) an operation which indicates whether the rule initiates or terminates
the fluents in the rule body.
(c) a set of fluents which are initiated or terminated by the rule.
(d) a (possibly empty) condition consisting of an expression describing flu-
ents which must be true in order for the rule to have an effect.
Fluent initiation rules are declared as:
triggerEvent initiates institutionalF luent [condition];
which corresponds to the definition of the set C↑ in the underlying formal
institutional model.
Similarly, rules that terminate fluents are declared as:
triggerEvent terminates institutionalF luent [condition];
which also correspond to the definition of C↓ in the formal institutional
specification.




This rules specifies that every time the institution recognises the occurrence
of the event iprepare(Lecturer,Paper) in which the Lecturer prepares
a Paper, the event initiates power and permissions for the lecturer to send
paper to the head and for the event to be recognised by the institution as a
valid event. It also initiates the fluent hasPaper which indicates the state of
the Head with respect to the institution which persists from the next time
instant except terminated by another event.
(ii) Generation rules: corresponding to the definition of the event generation
relation G described in Section 3.6.2, the generation rules describe when
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events may be generated. In InstAL, a generation rule description consists
of a triggerevent which may activate the rule, a set of generatedevents
which result from the occurrence of the trigger event specified in the rule,
and a possibly empty condition describing fluents that are required to be
true for the rule to be effective. This rule therefore takes the general form
of:
triggerEvent generates generatedEvents [condition];
The generation function G in the formal model referenced maps a condition
expression and a single event to a set of generated event literals. Hence for
a given generation rule as described, the formal model is represented by the
following components: The trigger event in the rule represents the event
literal E in G. The conditions of the rule correspond to fluent expressions
X in the G relation for the given trigger event. The generated event literals
described by the rule correspond to set of events in the range of the G
relation for the given trigger event E and condition X .
An example follows from our scenario specification thus;
prepare(Lecturer,Paper) generates iprepare(Lecturer,Paper);
In this example, the condition is empty, however the rule is still valid. This
rule caused the prepare event to generate the iprepare event.
(iii) Initial rules: These rules correspond to the definition of the set of initial
fluents ∆ in our formal model of institutions. The rules describe the initial
state of the institution whenever the institution is created. Therefore for
any institution being modelled, every fluent literal in an expanded initially
rule corresponds to a member of the set ∆. The declaration is achieved
using the keyword initially followed by one or more fluent expressions
i.e.;
initially fluentExpression(s) [condition];





which states all the fluents that would be true when the institution is cre-
ated.
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We have given brief overview of the features of InstAL as they would be used in








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.7 Summary of Chapter
In this chapter we presented the Answer Set Programming (ASP) paradigm along
with the semantics of AnsProlog. ASP is a logic programming language which
allows for non-monotonic reasoning. Its handling of negation as negation as fail-
ure and constraint-based negation makes reasoning about incomplete information
possible. We compared ASP with other logic reasoning paradigms including sat-
isfiability solving (SAT) and Prolog. We noted the advantage that AnsProlog
has over these other computational reasoning approaches which is the fact that
it allows for the specification of both the problem as well as the query for the
answer set as a single executable program which results in a more straight for-
ward verification and validation task. The syntax and semantics of ASP were
also presented. Furthermore we presented the translation of our institutional
framework into ASP and introduced the actions language InstAL. InstAL is a
language which was developed for the purpose of specification of institutions. It




CVF: The Computational Verification Frame-
work for Security Requirements
5.1 Introduction
We pointed out in Chapter 2 the lack of a computational means for the verification
of elicited security requirements associated with the approaches reviewed. The
approaches are not centred on the human factor aspect of information security
in which human interactions (considered as social in this context) constitute
possible sources of security breaches. Also, since these approaches are driven
through manual processes it is very difficult for the validation and analysis of the
elicited requirements. In order to complement these approaches, we are providing
a computational approach to the verification and validation of elicited security
requirements. To do this, we are using the institutional framework which we have
presented in chapters 3 and 4.
In this Chapter we present our computational verification framework (CVF) for
the analysis of security requirements and properties.
5.2 CVF: Computational Verification Framework
Our framework CVF is based on an institutional framework which provides a
means for us to capture and reason about what is correct and incorrect. In the
context of organisational information security management which is the focus of
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our work, correct behaviour would be the behaviour that preserves the security of
information assets, or behaviour that complies with security rules and regulations
while an incorrect behaviour will be such a behaviour that causes a violation of
the security of the information assets whether maliciously or not. The overview of






Figure 5-1: An Overview of the Computational Verification Framework
of two parts: the user part and the system part.
Our framework starts with a UML design of a scenario. By designing scenarios
in UML we take advantage of the standard symbolic notations of UML. UML
tools are also commonly used and understood in practice. Therefore it comes
readily as the choice of tool for our scenarios. Although there is no unified formal
semantics for UML activity dagrams, we have developed formal semantics for our
translation based on some related earlier works on formalisation of semantics of
UML activity diagrams (van der Aalst and van Hee, 2004; Bouabana-Tebibel and
Belmesk, 2007; Xu et al., 2008) which is presented in Section 6.2.1. The XML
representation of the UML scenario is passed to the XML2InstAL tool which
we developed for the extraction of relevant information needed for the InstAL
specification of the model. The detailed description of the XML2InstAL tool is
presented in Chapter 6 where we present the tools developed in the course of this
work.
Next, the InstAL model generated from the XML representation of the scenario
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is then translated to the computational logic program model in AnsProlog as
described in Chapter 4 on page 63 using the existing pyinstal tool. The domain
specification which specifies variables for the purpose of grounding is also sup-
plied to pyisntal which produces a grounded logic program. InstAL is already
an abstraction from ASP suitable for modelling institutions, hence it makes more
sense to us to translate our XML representation to InstAL instead of ASP di-
rectly.
Verification is carried out by specifying queries just as one would query a database
for information. Our queries are written in pyinstql, a translation tool which
takes queries specified in a semi-high-level form and translates it to an equivalent
AnsProlog query specification. The pyinstql tool is described in Chapter 6.
Through the use of the existing ASP system clingo, the logic program produced
by pyinstal is solved along with the query specification to produce answer sets.
However the answer sets produced are in text form and usually complicated to
understand. We therefore developed the pyviz tool which visualises the answer
set in a graphical and easy to read form. We also present this tool and illustrations
of its usage in Chapter 6.
Having given an overview of our methodology, in the next section we present
a case study through which we walk through the process in a general sense.
Using misuse case analysis for the initial elicitation of security requirements, our
solution provides a means for a rigorous test of the security requirements elicited.
The combination of our approach with already established misuse case approach
provides a tool that would be more useful for effectively determining a system’s
security requirements at design time.
5.3 Case Study: Patient Referral Management
The publicly available iTrust Medical Records System documentation (Williams
et al., 2011) provides ample choice of use-cases for the purpose of illustration.
After consideration of the use-cases we chose one that we found most suitable
for illustrating the institutional framework approach. The criteria for the choice
of use-case is that the scenario should consist of more than one actor and a
well defined process in which the actors interact in order to achieve a certain
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goal or sub-goal of the system. This is necessary in order for us to be able to
express the interactions as events, while the actors are taken as agents, with
the aim of generating the traces of events which could be investigated for some
desired security properties. The use case is described in Table 5.1. The use
case descriptions as presented here are based on popular templates proposed in
the literature (Cockburn, 2001; Kroll and Kruchten, 2003; Kulak and Guiney,
2004). Templates guide authors in writing a clear and simple flow of events when
describing use cases. Also templates prompt authors to consider adding certain
information about a use case that might otherwise be overlooked. The use of
templates is therefore encouraged in practice since they result in higher quality
use cases in comparison to use cases developed without the use of templates
(Achour et al., 1999; El-Attar, 2012b).
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UC33: Manage Patient Referrals Use Case
33.1 Preconditions:
A patient and two HCPs are registered users of the iTrust Medical Records system (UC2). The iTrust user has been
authenticated in the iTrust Medical Records system.
33.2 Main Flow:
A sending HCP refers the patient to another receiving HCP [S1]. A receiving HCP views a list of received referrals
[S2]. A sending HCP views a list of previously sent patient referrals [S3]. A patient views the details of his/her
referrals [S4]. A sending HCP edits a previously sent patient referral [S5]. A sending HCP cancels a previously sent
patient referral [S6]. All events are logged.
33.3 Sub-flows:
• [S1] An HCP chooses to refer a patient to another receiving HCP through the referral feature on a patient’s office
visit page. The sending HCP must select a receiving HCP by either entering the HCP’s MID and confirming
the selection, or by searching for the HCP by name. The sending HCP is also presented with a text box to
include notes about the referral. The sending HCP then chooses a priority from 1-3 (1 is most important, 3 is
least important) for the referral. The HCP may send the referral, cancel the referral [E1], or edit the referral
[E2]. Upon sending a referral, the patient, sending HCP, and receiving HCP receive a message summarizing the
newly created referral information (sending HCP name & speciality, receiving HCP name & speciality, patient
name, referral notes, and referral creation time-stamp); additionally, the sending and receiving HCP messages
include the referral priority.
• [S2] An HCP chooses to view received referrals. The receiving HCP is presented with a list of referrals sorted
by priority (from most important to least important). The receiving HCP then selects a referral to view details
and is presented with the name and speciality of the sending HCP, the patient’s name, the referral notes, the
referral priority, the office visit date with a link to the office visit, and the time the referral was created.
• [S3] A sending HCP views a list of previously sent patient referrals. The HCP may sort the list of referrals by
patient name, receiving HCP name, time generated, and/or priority. The HCP chooses a specific referral from
the list to view complete details about the referral: patient name, receiving HCP name and speciality, time
generated, priority, office visit date, and notes.
• [S4] A patient views a list of his/her referrals. The patient may sort the list of referrals by receiving HCP name,
time generated, and/or priority. The patient chooses a specific referral from the list to view complete details
about the referral: sending HCP name and speciality, receiving HCP name and speciality, time generated,
priority, office visit date, and notes. The patient is also provided with the option to send a message to the
receiving HCP to request that an appointment be scheduled.
• [S5] A sending HCP edits a previously created patient referral as long as the referral has not been viewed by the
receiving HCP. The sending HCP may edit the priority of the referral and/or the referral notes. The sending
HCP then chooses to save the edits, cancel the edits, or re-enter the data [E2].
• [S6] A sending HCP cancels a previously sent patient referral by visiting the office visit page, viewing the details
of a previously sent patient referral [S3], and choosing cancel. The HCP is asked to confirm the decision to
cancel the referral. The patient and receiving HCP receive a message indicating that the referral was cancelled.
33.4 Alternative Flows:
• [E1] The receiving HCP chosen is not the desired HCP. The sending HCP does not confirm the selection and
is prompted to try again.
• [E2] The patient, receiving HCP, referral notes, and/or referral priority are invalid, and the HCP is prompted
to enter this information again.
Table 5.1: Managing Patients Referrals Use Case (Williams et al., 2011)
111
5.3.1 The “Making Referrals” Scenario
This scenario consist of two healthcare professionals (designated here as sHCP and
rHCP) and a patient. The process involves the sHCP referring a patient to rHCP. The
sHCP initiates the process by login to the system, prepares the referral document, and
sends the referral document to rHCP, the patient and him/herself. While the sHCP
and rHCP receive similar copies of the referral document, the patient receives a slightly
different version.
This scenario was first analysed for possible security threats using the misuse case ap-
proach illustrated in Figure 5-2. The classes of threats identified include impersonation,
escalation of privileges, and information tampering. We consider these attacks as being
the kind of attacks that could be carried out by insider attackers (escalation of privi-
leges) and external attackers (impersonation and tampering). The original misuse-case
in Sindre and Opdahl (2005) was modified to include the security goals under threat at
each stage of the process. This is a simplified version of the one proposed in Okubo et al.
(2009). The reasoning behind the modification is that security threats are primarily
aimed at breaching security goals with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and accountability. Inclusion of these in the use/misuse case diagram would make it
easier to see the type of threat/attack an attacker would consider. It also helps in
determining the appropriate countermeasure to apply for the attacks or threats. The
security goals relevant in each scenario is drawn from the analysis of the most relevant
assets associated with the scenario. Hence the approach is consistent with Okubo et al.
(2009).
The detail interactions for this use/misuse case description is illustrated in Figure 5-
3. This is the mal-activity diagram, based on Fernandez et al. (2006); Okubo et al.
(2011), showing the users, sequence of events, the attackers, attack points, threats, and
countermeasures. The mal-activity diagram describes the expected order and sequence
of events which include the user initiated events and the attacker/misuser events. It
also shows the countermeasures to the identified security threats and the points at
which the countermeasures are expected to be applied in order to mitigate appropri-
ately the threats. At this point, the misuse case security requirements elicitation and
analysis phase ends. Usually the process may be repeated, depending on whether the
countermeasures introduce new threats to the system or not. However, i) the level of
refinement is totally based on the expertise and experience of the security analyst, and
ii) the misuse case approach lacks the means of verifying and validating the behaviour
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Figure 5-2: The Make Referrals Misuse Case Diagram
Figure 5-3: Mal-activity Diagram for Make Referral Scenario
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1 institution patientRef;





Figure 5-4: Type declaration for the Make Referral scenario.
of the system when the identified countermeasures are applied. We therefore introduce
the event-based institutional framework, implemented using the Institutional Action
Language (InstAL) . This provides the needed reasoning mechanism for the purpose of
verification and validation of the misuse case analysis.
5.3.2 Misuse Case Implementation using InstAL
In carrying out the verification and validation of the misuse case description in Figure
5-2, we made use of the mal-activity diagram in Figure 5-3. Since we are doing a
static analysis here, we simply assume that attacker events could always happen at
any time. We are therefore concerned with the users’ events and the countermeasures.
The mal-activity diagram provides the necessary sequence of activities which would be
represented as events in the institution specification. The complete implementation in
InstAL consist of a set of declarations which we shall be describing here.
The InstAL institution specification begins with the declaration of the institution name
and types (See Figure 5-4). The types here represent the various actors (agents) that
would be interacting in the system. Notice that there is no representation of the
attacker or misuser here. This is because the activities of the misuser/attacker is not
explicitly modelled in this system.
Next is the declaration of events (Figure 5-5). This consist of four kinds of event
declarations;
• Exogenous events consist of all observable real world events as described in Sec-
tion 3.6.2. These events would consequently generate institutional events and
cause changes to the institutional state. The creation event is responsible for the
creation of the institution.
• Institution events consist of the various events that would be generated in the
institution framework as a result of the occurrence of exogenous events. These
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7 % Exogenous events
8 exogenous event login(HCP);
9 exogenous event loginChal(System,HCP);
10 exogenous event selectAction(HCP);
11 exogenous event makeRef(HCP);
12 exogenous event checkRef(Checker);
13 exogenous event signRef(System);
14 exogenous event encryptRef(System);
15 exogenous event sendRef(HCP);
16 exogenous event logindl;
17 exogenous event checkRefdl;
18 exogenous event receiveRefwP(HCP);
19 exogenous event enforcePolicy(System);
20
21 % creation event
22 create event create_patientRef;
23
24 % Institutional events
25 inst event ilogin(HCP);
26 inst event iloginChal(System,HCP);
27 inst event iselectAction(HCP);
28 inst event imakeRef(HCP);
29 inst event icheckRef(Checker);
30 inst event isignRef(System);
31 inst event iencryptRef(System);
32 inst event isendRef(HCP);
33 inst event ilogindl;
34 inst event icheckRefdl;
35 inst event ireceiveRefwP(HCP);
36 inst event iapplyPolicy(HCP);
37
38 % violation events
39 violation event loginChalCompromised;
40 violation event refUnchecked;
Figure 5-5: Events declaration for the Make Referral scenario.
events may initiate new facts in the institution, thereby resulting in a change in
the institutional state.
• Violation events declare events that would occur whenever there is a violation
in the system, such as failure of obligations.
Following the events declaration is the declaration of fluents (Figure 5-6). Fluents de-
note facts that may be present in the system state that can be added or deleted as a re-














Figure 5-6: Fluents declaration for the Make Referral use-case.
in line 53 are used to capture boolean relationships over several fluents.
We now describe the generation and consequence relations of the model in three phases
for simplicity and ease of understanding. The three phases are login, create referral,
send referral.
The login Phase
The sequence of events starts off with the login event. The login phase specifies the
occurrence of the login event and the rules that apply in order to counter the expected
attack at the login phase. From Figure 5-3, it is assumed that an external attacker
can impersonate after possibly acquiring a user’s login information. We are not con-
cerned about how the attacker acquires the login information here. Since this attack
is assumed to happen at any time, we therefore specify the countermeasure, which in
this case is a challenge-response event initiated by the system the moment there is an
initial login event. We are not concerned about the detailed implementation of this
countermeasure (which could be a series of events), but rather we treat it as a single
event which we expect to happen at and within some time interval. The challenge-
response event loginChal(System,HCP) is specified as an obligation (Figure 5-7, line
60) which must happen before a deadline event happens, else it triggers a violation
event loginChalCompromised.
The challenge-response event is expected to be triggered just once and by the deadline,
the countermeasure is either successful or fail and the institution state is set accordingly.
The next exogenous event in the system’s sequence of events can only take place when
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53 % trigger challenge-response upon initial login
54 login(HCP) generates ilogin(HCP);
55 logindl generates ilogindl;
56 loginChal(System,HCP) generates iloginChal(System,HCP);
57 ilogin(HCP) initiates perm(loginChal(System,HCP)),
58 perm(iloginChal(System,HCP)), pow(iloginChal(System,HCP)),




62 %%challenge response triggered once
63 iloginChal(System,HCP) terminates perm(loginChal(System,HCP)),
64 perm(iloginChal(System,HCP)), pow(iloginChal(System,HCP));
65
66 %% challenge-response sets a state of success or failure
67 iloginChal(System,HCP) initiates chalSuccess;
68 iloginChal(System,HCP) initiates chalFail;
69 iselectAction(HCP) terminates chalFail;
70
71 %% institutional state is set to indicate an attack at login when
challenge fails
72 always loginAttacked when chalFail;
73
74 %% the institutional state is set to indicate a compromise when
obligation fails
75 loginChalCompromised initiates loginCompromised;
76
77 %%challenge response is triggered again whenever the obligation
fails
78 loginChalCompromised initiates perm(loginChal(System,HCP)),
79 perm(iloginChal(System,HCP)), pow(iloginChal(System,HCP)) if
loginCompromised;
Figure 5-7: Generation and Consequence relations for the login phase of Make Referral model.
there is no violation at this stage.
Create Referral Phase
In this phase, we specify the rules and the conditions for the creation of the referral.
The security threats to the system which falls within this phase include escalation
of privileges (an authorized user misusing his privileges), man-in-the-middle attack,
and illegal access to information. Since it is equally assumed that any or all of these




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The escalation of privileges threat is expected to be mitigated by initiating a check on
the created patient referral for correctness. This is specified as a checkRef(Checker)
event which must happen within a certain time span, else a violation event refUnchecked
is triggered (Figure 5-8, line 99). The completion of this countermeasure event will set
the institution state at this point to either goodRef indicating the referral was good
and hence satisfying the condition for the next event to happen, or badRef, indicating
that the referral was bad, in which case the referral would have to be corrected (Figure
5-8, line 107).
The man-in-the-middle attack is mitigated by applying some form of digital signature
on the prepared and proofed referral such that any form of tampering could be detected.
This is specified in the model as an event signRef(System) which will be permitted to
happen only if the referral has been checked and it is good (Figure 5-8, lines 11-118).
It is also expected that the signature would be applied only once, hence the power and
permission for this event is terminated once it has happened.
Encryption is taken as the countermeasure for illegal access of information. This is
specified in the model as an event encryptRef(System) which would happen after the
signature event has happened.
The Send Referral Phase
This is the final phase of the process we are considering. In this phase, we still see
escalation of privileges as a possible threat to the confidentiality of the patient’s vital
information which could be contained in the referral information. The receiving health
care professional (rHCP) to whom the patient has been referred could send out the
information to a third party. There is therefore the need to institute appropriate rules
or policies that would prevent the rHCP from carrying out such activities. This is
specified in the model as an event whose permission would be initiated when the rHCP
receives the referral information. The permission remains through the life time of the
institution.
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130 %%send referral once after encryption
131 sendRef(HCP) generates isendRef(HCP);
132 receiveRefwP(HCP) generates ireceiveRefwP(HCP);
133 enforcePolicy(System) generates iapplyPolicy(HCP) if
hasRefwP(HCP);
134 iencryptRef(System) initiates refEncrypted, perm(sendRef(HCP)),
135 pow(isendRef(HCP)), perm(isendRef(HCP));







142 %%set states to indicate the presence of referrals
143 isendRef(HCP) initiates hasRef(Patient),hasRefwP(HCP),
144 perm(iapplyPolicy(HCP)), pow(iapplyPolicy(HCP));
145 %%security policies should be applied by the HCP upon receiving
referrals
146 iapplyPolicy(HCP) initiates policyApplied(HCP) if hasRefwP(rHCP);
Figure 5-9: Generation and Consequence relations for the send referral phase of Make Referral
model.
Initialisation
Finally, we declare the initial state of the institution. This represent the events that are








Some of these initial states may be terminated in the course of the evolution of the
institution. For example iloginChal(System,HCP) terminates perm(loginChal(System,
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HCP)), perm(iloginChal(System,HCP)), pow(iloginChal(System,HCP)) (lines
63-64 Figure 5-7) deletes the corresponding fluents from the institutional state at
the next time instant after the event loginChal(System, HCP) has occurred.
Domain Specification
So far, we have given the complete specification of our Make Referral scenario.
However, there is also a need to specify the domain information which would
be used for grounding (described in Section 4.2 on page 63) some aspects of
the institution when translating the InstAL institution to AnsProlog. This is
specified, providing arguments for each of the declared types in the institutional
specification as presented in Figure 5-10.




Figure 5-10: Domain Specification for the Make Referral model.
5.4 Results: Trace and Query
In Section 4.3 we introduced the concept of a trace program which allows us
to model (as answer sets) of one or all possible traces of the institution when
combined with an institution program Π
base(n)
I .
The result (answer set, in the language of ASP) provides a rich database of infor-
mation in form of ordered traces of events. The use of queries, as the experience
from databases would suggest, provides a means of examining the traces for any
system behaviours that might be of interest. The properties being investigated
could be expressed as facts and/or rules. The results can then be interpreted and
decisions or actions taken appropriately.
Query formulation and trace construction are intimately tied up. However, before
traces can be generated, the program must be grounded, which means being
explicit about the meaning of variables and time instants, defining precisely how
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many there are, which in turn determines the length of the trace. For time
instants ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we define the following three rules: instant(ti), next(ti,
ti+1) and final(tn), denoting each ground instant of time, relative order and final
time instant, respectively. The grounding variables are provided in a domain file
which is passed to the ASP translator along with the instAL description file.
The general trace program generates the answer sets containing all possible com-
binations of n exogenous events, but by the addition of constraints, the answer
sets can be limited to those containing desired traces. This is expressed in the
form of a query specification. For example, Figure 5-11 shows how the answer














Figure 5-11: Verifying the expected sequence of observed events for the Make Referral model.
The result, as listed in Figure 5-12 on the following page verifies the correctness
of the model, in that first of all, events occurred in the expected sequence, subject
to the flag #show occurred(E, I), which is read as “show event E occurring
at instant I”.









Figure 5-12: Output of the model verification query for the Make Referral model.
This way we are able to test the correctness of the model in the sense that observed
events occur at the right time instants. With this, the model can be used to
investigate any behaviour of interest which in this case could be verification of
occurrence of violation events, effects of such violations, and perhaps the security
state of the system after or before the occurrence of certain events.
In this scenario, the criteria for a successful and secure process would be that the
countermeasure events were successfully observed at the proper time instants.
We can therefore examine the states of the institution at the final instant to see
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The security designer can also know the consequences of a violation event oc-






ordering of the events
so that events at
instant I0 occur after
the event at I has
occurred.instant(I),event(E).
Figure 5-13: Consequences of violation - Query.
Answer: 1
canHappen(viol(sendRef(sHCP)),i10)
These are the events
that would occur as a










Figure 5-14: Consequences of violation - Result.
5.5 Generalization of case study
So far, we have used our case study to illustrate how validation and verification
of security requirements can be effectively carried out at design time. We give a
few illustrative examples here to show from where a designer might embark on
a more comprehensive analysis. In Chapter 7 we demonstrate how our approach
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can be used for analysing confidentiality and integrity requirements. Although
a lot of work has been done on using misuse case approach to eliciting security
requirements (Sindre and Opdahl, 2000; Sindre, 2007; Braz et al., 2008; Okubo
et al., 2009; Fernandez et al., 2006), none of these has provided a computational
means of verifying the security requirements elicited. This problem also applies
to other approaches for security requirements elicitation. Since our idea captures
the system specification with security requirements, it enables both system and
security designers to capture the system-to-be in terms of actors or roles, events,
and rules through the use of permissions, powers, and obligations.
5.5.1 Usability/Scalability
ASP is conceived as a tool for working with problems in the NP-complete domain
and while nothing can be done to escape this fact, as is often the case, the
practical situation of interest can often be sufficiently tightly specified to make
the task computationally tractable. ASP has therefore been successfully applied
in practical application domains. Some of these applications include decision
support systems (Nogueira et al., 2001; Beierle et al., 2005), combinatorial search
problems involving substantial amount of data such as planning (Gebser et al.,
2012; Tu et al., 2011; Lifschitz, 2002), bio-informatics (Bodenreider et al., 2008;
Erdem and Yeniterzi, 2009; Erdem et al., 2011), security analysis (Delgrande
et al., 2009), product configuration (Soininen and Niemela¨, 1999; Tiihonen et al.,
2003), diagnosis (Eiter et al., 1999; Balduccini and Gelfond, 2003; Eiter et al.,
2009) and multi-agent systems (De Vos et al., 2006; Son et al., 2009; Baral et al.,
2010; Sakama, 2011; Pontelli et al., 2012) to mention a few. In addition to these
evidences found in the literature, we summarise some important points from
Section 4.3 to explain some of the issues that border on the scalability of our
approach.
i.) Size of an answer set
One factor affecting the size of an answer set is the number of observable
(exogenous) events. The general trace program Π
all(n)
I generates the answer
sets containing all possible combinations of n exogenous events. The answer
set generated can be quite large since it also includes all fluents and facts
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provided. However, the addition of constraints as part of the answer set
querying limits the size of the answer set to those containing only desired
traces. For example, in the query presented in Figure 5-11 on page 122,
#hide and #show occurred(E,I) ensure that only occurrences of exogenous
events are contained in the resulting answer set as seen in Figure 5-12.
ii.) Number of answer sets
The number of answer sets generated is determined by the permutation of
the number of exogenous events up to the time steps x specified for running
the model. For n observable events, the required time steps is x = n+1 and
the number of answer sets will be nx. If the model is run for a time step less
than x it would result in an incomplete answer set because some observable
events would have been ignored. Running the model for time steps greater
than x on the other hand would result in repetition of the process thereby
generating more answer sets and longer traces than necessary.
Another way to curtail the explosion in the number of answer sets is by
constraining the order of events. Even if the right time-steps are specified
and the order of events is not constrained, it will still lead to a very large
number of answer sets. This is can be limited by specifying the order of
events in the answer set query. For example, with reference to our foregoing







The completeness of an answer set is based on the fact that given a model pro-
duced by an ordered trace of events in an institution, the set of ASP atoms
corresponding to the events and fluents in the model are all supported by the
rules in the translation. The correctness of the translation is established by the
fact that given an institution and its corresponding translation in ASP, each atom
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contained in an answer set of the ASP translation is supported by a correspond-
ing fluent status or event occurrence in the model of the formal institution for
that ordered trace (Cliffe, 2007). The correctness of the model can be verified by
running a query which constrains the traces to specific observed events occurring
in a specifically expected order and the presence or absence of certain fluents
in the system state. When the result returns SATISFIABLE, it means that an
answer set of the model satisfies the query. With this the model can be used to
investigate any behaviour of interest which could be verification of occurrence of
violation events, effects of such violations, and perhaps the security state of the
system after or before the occurrence of certain events. Using few examples, we
illustrate the verification of some properties in Section 5.4.
5.5.3 Validation of the framework
Our framework presents a computational means for reasoning about security re-
quirements with focus on human behaviours. In real world security requirements
which are aimed at regulating human behaviours with respect to preserving the
security of information systems are presented as policies or rules. Our approach
enables us to model scenarios in which the regulations are to be applied (that
is the business process, for instance) along with the rules specified. The rules
determine the permissions, empowerments and the obligations declared in our
model. We treat confidentiality (secrecy) requirement issues as permission issues
while integrity requirements are treated as obligations. The traces produced by
the model are tantamount to a set of all possible interactions between the var-
ious participants with respect to the rules specified. The security analyst can
therefore computationally investigate certain security properties. We note the
following limitations;
• We have limited our focus to confidentiality and integrity properties, hence
the approach cannot necessarily be readily applicable to other classes of
security properties such as availability and accountability.
• The predictions we make are based on what the effect of a breach could
be on the system rather than exploration of the possible security breaches.
Also, if there is a security breach, we can predict the sequence of events
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that could have possibly caused such a breach. In the real world, such
information provides the security analyst with forehand knowledge of how
the security requirements would perform with respect to a proposed system
design.
• The reliability of the predictions depends on the correctness of the model.
In our models, we assume that a system is vulnerable to attack at any point in
a process. By this assumption we mean that an attacker event can occur at any
time in the life time of a process. This is a valid assumption in the real world
because information security begins and ends with the participants in a system
and the people that interact with the system externally either intentionally or
otherwise (Whitman and Mattord, 2012, pp. 32) since their behaviours may
or may not constitute a security risk and hence breach of the system security
requirements. As a result, we did not focus on modelling the attacker events
which can be many. We model a process as a normal work flow and then explore
the possible states of the system whenever an attack occurs.
The model we present here has a practical value applicable to security evalua-
tion and risk management for information systems. The ability of the model to
present a rich database of traces gives the risk assessor the opportunity to explore
the database adequately for possible security properties. Also formal methods
have played an important role in the analysis of security in information technol-
ogy environments, notably are Z (Spivey, 1992) and BAN logic (Burrows et al.,
1990) which are also based on logic. However these approaches do not focus on
the social aspects of information security which requires emphasis on human fac-
tors and the need to model information flows and the interplay between various
participants in the information system. The importance of an approach such
as presented in this thesis which focuses on the human factors in the security
of information systems is evident in studies by Whitman (2003) and CSI/FBI
(Power, 2002) which ranks act of human error or failure (including accidents and
employee mistakes) among the top threats identified for information systems.
Security experts Peikari and Fogie (2003) state that “For a policy to show any
return on investment, it must become integrated into the processes and procedures
of a business, along with the support of the people who are expected to follow it.
128
Without this type of attention and support, a security policy will be worthless.”
Our model integrates security requirements into the processes and procedures
and provide the mechanism for investigating security properties through query-
ing. The results obtained may then be useful in determining the sufficiency of
the security requirements thereby leading to a secure system design.
5.6 Summary of Chapter
This Chapter introduced the computational verification framework (CVF) for
security requirements. The framework is inspired by the lack of computational
means for verifying security requirements in the approaches for security require-
ments elicitation reviewed. CVF addresses this gap by providing a means of
reasoning about security requirements through a computational model. In order
to make it easier for modelling scenarios in InstAL, which abstracts the under-
lying reasoning logic AnsProlog, CVF takes scenario modelled in UML activity
diagrams and gives equivalent translation in InstAL. The details of how this
translation is made possible is presented in the next chapter. However, using a
scenario from a medical application, this chapter presents an overview of how one
can reason about a system’s security requirements. It starts with the modelling of
the scenario in InstAL to the querying of the model, which is the means by which
the reasoning can be done. The chapter concludes by discussing generalisation
issues which include scalability/usability and validation of the framework. In
the next chapter, we present the tools that further makes the framework usable.
Particularly we address the issue of the semantics of translating UML activity





In the previous chapter we presented an overview of the process we are proposing
for analysing security requirements using the institutional framework. We made
use of a scenario from one of the iTrust Medical Record System’s use cases as
presented in Figure 5-3. The activity diagram is used to capture the work-flow
for achieving the goal of making a patient referral. It is able to give us the
kind of model required for us to work with, that is, one that has identifiable
actions, actors, and a defined sequence of actors and systems interactions. This
was then translated into the InstAL model based on the institutional framework.
This is then translated into the computational model in ASP which produces
the database of traces (answer sets) suitable for analysis. While these tools are
existing tools which have been in use already, we realise that their use will require
some technical knowledge (syntax and semantics) of these tools to be able to use
them for tasks such as the translation of models into InstAL, production of query
files in AnsProlog for analysis, and the understanding of the resulting answer
sets. We have therefore built and extended some tools which will make the entire
process more readily usable without necessitating learning much of the tools’
technical details. We shall be presenting the tools and their extension in this
chapter.
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6.2 XML2InstAL: Activity diagram to InstAL Transla-
tor
The example InstAL models examined so far have been entirely written by hand.
There is no tool through which system model specifications could be either totally
or partially translated automatically into an InstAL specification. This implies
that the usage of the tool has some cost overhead, that is a user has to learn
the syntax and semantics of InstAL before the user can use it to model the
desired system. In view of this barrier to adoption, the XML2InstAL translator
was developed to ease the translation of mal-activity diagrams drawn in UML
to InstAL specifications. Our translator makes use of an XML parser to parse












Figure 6-1: XML to InstAL Translation
XML2InstAL translator is developed in the Python programming language and
uses the ElementTree XML API of the language to implement the parsing task.
6.2.1 Semantics of UML Activity Diagrams
We present here the notion of UML Activity Diagrams (ADs) (OMG, 2011) and
describe the semantics needed for our translation of UML models to InstAL
models.
Activity diagram is a directed graph of nodes and edges as in Table 6.1. The nodes
are categorised intoActivityNodes, ControlNodes andObjectNodes. ActivityNodes
are further categorised into actionNode, sendNode and receiveNode. There are
two distinguished ControlNodes namely initialNode and finalNode which are
unique for each activity diagram. Each node is a member of some activity region
of the AD called a Partition (also known as swim lane). Partitions provide a
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Table 6.1: UML symbols used
way to group activities performed by the same actor on an activity diagram. It
also groups activities in a single thread. For instance activity partition P may be
an entity of the system responsible for executing some set of actions. Partitions
are identified by partitionNames. Nodes are linked to each other within and
between activity partitions by directed edges. Each activity diagram starts with
a single initialNode and ends with a single finalNode, each of which may be in
any of the activity partitions.
ADs are intended for modelling workflows. The suitability of using UML 2.0 ADs
for modelling business processes has been investigated and presented in Russell
et al. (2006); Wohed et al. (2006); Dumas and Hofstede (2001). Some of the
points identified in support of UML 2.0 ADs with respect to alternative workflow
modelling systems include the fact that they; i) offer comprehensive support for
control-flow and data perspectives, ii) support signal sending and receiving at
the conceptual level, and iii) provide a seamless mechanism for decomposing an
activity specification into sub-activities. The combination of this decomposition
capability with signal sending yields a powerful approach for handling activity
interruptions. These features make UML activity diagrams suitable for use as
a notation for graphical modelling of our workflow scenarios. Since our work is
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not focused on UML modelling processes or workflows, we do not intend to dwell
on the issues of which notation is better for modelling workflows and business
processes among the currently researched and used notations which include UML
Activity Diagrams (OMG, 2011; Russell et al., 2006), the Business Process Mod-
elling Notation (BPMN) (OMG, 2011; Wohed et al., 2006), Event-driven Process
Chains (EPCs)(van der Aalst, 1999; Scheer et al., 2005), Workflow nets (van der
Aalst, 1998; Karniel and Reich, 2011), and the Business Process Execution Lan-
guage (BPEL) (Farahbod et al., 2004).
As suitable as UML activity diagrams may be for modelling computational and
business/organisational processes (Wohed et al., 2006), it lacks a formal seman-
tics for analysis. This lack of formal semantics has inspired a number of re-
search works (such as Eshuis and Wieringa (2001); Lam (2007); Knieke and Goltz
(2010); Bouabana-Tebibel and Belmesk (2007); Guelfi and Mammar (2005); Yi-
zhi et al. (2004); Sto¨rrle (2004); Vitolins and Kalnins (2005); Xu et al. (2008))
aimed at formalising the semantics of UML activity diagrams for various purposes
based on the informal semantics provided by the Object Management Group
(OMG)(OMG, 2011). In the current version of UML 2.0 the informal semantics
of activities is based on Petri nets, therefore the attempts at formalizing the se-
mantics focus on token movement. We are more interested however in actors, the
events associated with actors, and the transition of events in a use case, which
the reviewed literature on AD semantics formalisation does not directly address.
Hence we do not find these formalisations entirely useful for our work. However,
we found the works in Bouabana-Tebibel and Belmesk (2007) and Xu et al. (2008)
more helpful in the sense that they both present formal definitions for the basic
notations of activity diagrams and make attempts at grouping activities into par-
titions even though this was not formalised. We therefore adapt the definitions
in these references and present a formal semantics of activity diagrams starting
with definition of our notations.
We adopt UML 2.0 as a pragmatic choice in that the notation is widely under-
stood, even if it lacks an agreed semantics and because at least the intention
expressed in a specification is broadly accessible.
In order to formally define our activity diagram, we define the components (see
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Table 6.1) that make up our activity diagram as follows;
Definition 17 (Components of an activity diagram). We denote the components
as follows;
I - initial node
F - final node
A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} - finite set of action nodes
O = {o1, o2, . . . , om} - finite set of object nodes
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm} - finite set of send nodes
R = {r1, r2, . . . , rm} - finite set of receive nodes
E = {e1, e2, . . . , em} - finite set of edges
where A ∩O ∩ S ∩R ∩ E = ∅ and the value of m is different in each case.
From these components we define the following compositions;
• V = A ∪ S ∪R is the set of activity nodes
• C = {I, F} is a set of control nodes
• N = V ∪ C ∪O is the set of all nodes
Since these components are members of some activity regions of the activity
diagram called a partition, we define the activity diagram in terms of partitions
as follows;
Definition 18 (Activity Diagram). An activity diagram is a set of activity par-
titions P = {pi . . . pm}. Each partition is a tuple pi = 〈Xi, Ei, pname〉 where
Xi ⊆ N and Xi ∩ Xj = ∅, for i, j ∈ [1, . . . ,m], i 6= j. pname is an attribute of
the partition which specifies the name of the partition.
In activity diagrams, edges provide the means of transition between nodes within
a partition and also between partitions. We would want to be able to identify
which edges go into which nodes and which edges come out of which nodes. In
this way we can relate actors to actions. Definition 19 presents the categorisation
of edges;
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Definition 19 (Categorisation of edges). We define the out-going edge of a node
by the function eout : N → E such that for any node n ∈ N and edge e ∈ E,
we have eout(n) = e where n 6= F . Similarly, we define the in-coming edge
of a node by the function ein : N → E such that ein(n) = e where n 6= I.
ein(I) = eout(F ) = ∅.
Each activity diagram consists of a single initial node I and a single final node F
which indicate the starting and the ending points of the scenario being modelled.
Therefore the initial node does not have an in-coming edge and the final node
does not have an out-going edge.
Definition 19 relates edges and nodes. However we also want to be able to relate
partitions, since partitions are groups of events that an actor enacts. We need
to be able to identify the transition from one partition to another. We there-
fore define functions on edges and partitions that describes this relationship as
follows;
Definition 20 (Source and Target partitions). For any edge e ∈ E, let pt, ps ∈ P
denote target partition and source partition respectively. For any partition p ∈ P
and node n ∈ N we define the functions TarP : E×N → P and SrcP : E×N →
P such that;
• TarP (e, n1) = pt s.t. eout(n1) = ein(n2) = e, n1 ∈ p, n2 ∈ pt defines the
target partition of an out-going edge e from a node n1 and
• SrcP (e, n2) = ps s.t. ein(n2) = eout(n1) = e, n1 ∈ ps, n2 ∈ p defines the
source partition of an in-coming edge e into a node n2.
In the next section we make use of these definitions to formalise the translation
of our UML models to InstAL.
6.2.2 Soundness of activity diagrams
According to the UML specification (OMG, 2011), activities have Petri net-like
semantics which is based on token flow. This implies that when an activity is
executed, the initial node creates a token which is then routed through the activity
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workflow and finally consumed by the final node of the workflow. The token here
corresponds to the case that is being handled by the workflow which starts at
the initial node and terminates at the final node. We discuss the soundness of
activity diagrams based on the soundness properties of workflows as described
by van der Aalst (van der Aalst, 1997; van der Aalst and van Hee, 2004) and
van Hee (van Hee et al., 2003). They state that every workflow should fulfil the
following basic requirements:
R1: The workflow should have well-defined pre and postconditions.
R2: The workflow should not contain any useless elements.
R3: If the end condition is reached, no more tasks should be processed.
R4: The end condition should finally be reached.
We establish a correspondence betwen these generic workflow requirements and
activity diagrams as follows:
AD1: The activity must have exactly one initial node and final node
AD2: Every activity node must be associated with a partition
AD3: The last node of a transition sequence must be the final node
AD4: A transition sequence from any activity node should lead to the final node.
Taking into account these requirements, we define the soundness property of
Activity Diagrams as follows;
Given an activity diagram with a set of nodes n1, . . . , nm ∈ N , an initial node I,
final node F , and edges e1, . . . , ek ∈ E we define the following notations;
• n1 ei−→ n2 is a transition from a node n1 to node n2 by the edge ei
• A node nm is reachable from I denoted as I ∗−→ nm if and only if there
is a transition by the sequence of edges 〈e1, . . . , em−1〉, ei ∈ E such that
I
e1−→ n1 e2−→ . . . em−→ nm.
Based on van der Aalst and van Hee (2004, p. 270) and following the corre-
spondence AD1 - AD4 we formally define the soundness property of an activity
diagram as follows;
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Definition 21 (Soundness). A scenario modelled by an activity diagram AD
as defined in Definition 18 and having one initial node I and one final node F ,
is sound if and only if:
For every activity node v ∈ V reachable from node I, there exist transition
steps leading from node v to final node F . Formally:
∀v ∈ V : I ∗−→ v ∗−→ F
6.2.3 Translation of UML Activity Diagram to InstAL
We use the UML diagram tool called Visual Paradigm for UML1. This tool rep-
resents details of the features used in a diagram in XML format. The ability for
us to identify activity partitions (swim lanes) is particularly important for us.
We use the UML symbols in Table 6.1 from the Activity Diagram function of the
program.
In this section we outline the process for translating UML activity diagrams to
InstAL specifications. An InstAL specification consist of declarations for type,
events, fluents, and rules as specified in Section 4.6.1. In order to be able to
derive expressions for these InstAL features, we make the following associations
between the UML diagram symbols and InstAL:
i) Partition: each partition translates to a type in InstAL. Types, which are
declared as type identifier in InstAL, establish finite value sets of disjoint
monomorphic types2 whose instances are specified in a domain file. An
example of a domain file is given in Figure 5-10 on page 121. The types in
the domain file are specified as type−identifier : type−instance(s) with the
instances being separated by spaces. For example HCP: sHCP rHCP (Figure
5-10, line 1). The Answer Set Solver will then substitute those values (e.g.
sHCP and rHCP) whenever the type HCP is specified for the events and fluents.
We associate the partition name partitionname with the identifier. There-
1Visual Paradigm for UML is a commercial tool but there is a free community edi-
tion for non-commercial use which is what we used. Available here: http://www.visual-
paradigm.com/download/vpuml.jsp?edition=ce
2Every expression has exactly one type
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fore our translation is of the form type partitionname.
ii) Activity nodes (action, send, receive nodes): each of these translates
to an InstAL event declaration of the form exogenous event eventname(type+)
for physical world events, for example exogenous event loginChal(System,
HCP) in Figure 5-5, line 9. Similarly, institutional events are declared as inst
event ieventname(type+) for example inst event iloginChal(System,HCP)
in Figure 5-5, line 26. In our translation we associate activity nodes with
eventname and partition name with type resulting in the expression activitynode-
(partitionname+) which we use for translating exogenous and institutional
events.
iii) Object node: the occurrence of events in a system brings about changes
in the state of the system. The facts that may be brought about in the
system state are known as inertial fluents and are declared in InstAL in the
form fluent fluentname(type), for example fluent policyApplied(HCP)
in Figure 5-6, line 52. In our translation, object node corresponds to fluentname
hence we express inertial fluents from object nodes of the activity diagram
as objectnode(partitionname).
iv) Directed edges: these do not have an explicit representation in InstAL but
they are only used in the translation process to express relations between par-
titions in situations where the enactment of an event involves correspondence
between two partitions.
v) Control nodes (initial and final nodes): Like directed edges, these only
provide information for determining the beginning and the end of a transi-
tion. They do not have an explicit representations in InstAL.
6.2.3.1 Translation Semantics
Following our definitions in Section 6.2.1, we proceed by setting out the basis for
translation of our UML based models to InstAL specifications which we illustrate
in Section 6.2.3.2. We present the various translation notations that we use for
our translations as follows;




This translates the activity diagram name into the name of the InstAL institution
model.
For each partition p ∈ P the following translations hold:
i) The partition name translates to the type declaration of the InstAL insti-
tution as follows;
Tr(pname)→ type pname;
ii) An activity node v ∈ V translates as;
Tr(v)→ v(pname)
iii) For every send node s ∈ S and receive node r ∈ R the following translations
hold:
Tr(s)→ s(piname, pjname), i < j
Tr(r)→ r(pjname, piname), i < j
This is to say that every send node and every receive node is represented as
an InstAL specification of the form eventname(type, type).
Items ii and iii represent translations for declaring events as described in
Section 6.2.3 item ii. For instance for each activity node v ∈ V in each
partition, exogenous events are declared as follows;
exogenous event Tr(v);
Similarly, institution events are declared as follows;
inst event iT r(v); In order to differentiate institution events from exoge-
nous events, we prefix the translation of the activity nodes with i.
iv) Every object node o ∈ O translates to the following;
Tr(o)→ o(pname)
This translation is used in the declaration of fluents as described in Section
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6.2.3 item iii. Therefore for each object node o ∈ O we generate fluent
declarations as:
fluent Tr(o);
Rule Definitions: In order to be able to explore the state space of a model
as obtained in Petri Nets (Lakos and Petrucci, 2007; Kristensen, 2010; Camilli,
2012), InstAL specification provides a number of rules that realise the execu-
tion mechanism needed to make state exploration possible. The rules which are
described in detail in Section 4.6.1 are consequence rules, generation rules, and
initiate rules. These rules establish the presence of physical world events and the
dynamics of how institutional events and fluents are brought about. We present
here how the declarations for these rules can be achieved from our translations
as follows;
(a) Generation rules: Events in the real world generate corresponding events
in the institutional framework which in turn result in the changing of insti-
tutional fluents. A Generation rule, represented as triggerEvent generates
institutionalEvent [condition], describes when institutional events may be
generated subject to an optional condition. We derive events from activity
nodes v, hence generation rules are translated as;
Tr(v) generates iT r(v);
(b) Consequence rules: Consequence rules, which describe when fluents change
in response to the occurrence of events, are declared as triggerEvent initiates
institutionalF luent [condition]. The condition which is optional describes
the fluents which may be true in order for the rule to have an effect. For
example the rule icheckRef(Checker) initiates goodRef(HCP) in Figure
5-8 line 106 adds the fluent goodRef(HCP) to the institutional framework.
Since we derive fluents from object nodes, if the target node of an out-going
edge from an activity node v ∈ V is an object node o ∈ O a consequence rule
is generated as;
iT r(v) initiates Tr(o);
(c) Initiate rules: These describe the state of the institution whenever the in-
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stitution is created. Using the translations for permission and empowerment,
we generate the initial rules as follows;
initially perm(Tr(v)), perm(iT r(v)), pow(iT r(v));
Soundness and Completeness of translation: We present the soundness
and completeness of our translation mechanisms as follows;
Definition 22. Soundness of translation: For every activity diagram AD, the
translation is sound if and only if:
(i) For every partition p ∈ P there is a translation; ∀ p ∈ P ∃ q s.t. T r(p) = q
(ii) There must be a translation for every activity and object nodes i.e. ∀ x ∈
V ∪O ∃ t s.t. T r(x) = t
In our framework the completeness property ensures that each UML activity sym-
bol defined can be mapped to an InstAL specification. Our translation process
is complete since in Section 6.2.3.1 we have defined a rule for each element of an
activity diagram used in our model. Table 6.2 presents a summary of the trans-
lation of UML activity diagrams (AD) into InstAL elements and how they may
be used in the InstAL specification. In the next section we present illustration




InstAL Element Example Usage in InstAL Structure
AD name (ADname) ADname institution ADname;
Partition name (pname) pname type pname;
Activity node (v) v(pname)
exogenous event v(pname);
inst event iv(pname);
Send node (s) s(piname, pjname), i < j
exogenous event s(piname, pjname);
inst event is(piname, pjname);
Receive node (r) r(pjname, piname), i < j
exogenous event r(pjname, piname);
inst event ir(pjname, piname);
Object node (o) o(pname) fluent o(pname);
Table 6.2: Summary of UML-InstAL Translation
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6.2.3.2 Example using an Examination Paper Scenario
We illustrate how the activity diagram translates into an InstAL specification

















Figure 6-2: A simple example of an Activity Diagram
This activity diagram captures a simple scenario where two actors Agent1 and
Agent2 are interacting with another component of the system Server to produce
printed copies of an examination paper. To keep it simple for the purpose of
illustration, we are not presenting the complete process here. In this excerpt,
Agent1 uploads the paper to the Server. Agent2 downloads the paper from the
Server, prints the paper, and deletes the file from its own computer.
Notice here that we did not represent the attacker or the attacker activities
here. This is in view of our earlier stated assumption in Section 5.3.2 that an
attack could happen from any point of vulnerability in the scenario. We are
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therefore not explicitly modelling the attack scenarios but the user actions and
interactions.
Following the InstAL specification generation semantics presented in Section
6.2.3.1, we illustrate how the InstAL specifications can be generated.
Type declarations: The type declarations for the institutional model is gener-
ation from each of the activity partitions labelled Agent1, Server, and Agent2
as follows;




Events declarations: Events declarations are generated from each of the ac-
tivity nodes.
From translation (ii) in Section 6.2.3.1 we have the following translations of each





The send and receive nodes in this partition are translated based on item (iii)







Declarations for exogenous and institutional events are generated as follows;
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exogenous event uploadPaper(Agent1);
exogenous event receivePaper(Server, Agent1);





inst event ireceivePaper(Server, Agent1);




Fluent declarations: Fluents are translated from the object nodes in the UML
model. Based on item (iv) in Section 6.2.3.1 the object nodes in each of the












Permission and empowerment: Based on the translation of events from activ-
ity nodes, permissions are declared for all events with additional power declara-




















Rules declarations: InstAL specifications also consist of three rules as pre-
sented in Section 4.6.1. These are consequence rules which describe fluent changes
as events occur, generation rules which describe the generation of institutional
events and initial rules which describe the state of the institution at the creation
of the institution. These rules are generated as follows;
(a) Generation rules: The following rules are generated;
uploadPaper(Agent1) generates iuploadPaper(Agent1);
receivePaper(Server, Agent1) generates ireceivePaper(Server, Agent1);










The equivalent InstAL specification for the model in Figure 6-2 consists of the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The translator is able to give us a description of the model of the system with the
intended users interacting with the aim of achieving a particular goal. We are
not assuming any particular attacker in our approach, although the focus is on
insider attacks which are due to the interaction of actors and the environment. As
a result, the model generated initially grants permission to all exogenous events.
Also associated institutional events are also permitted and empowered initially.
This is to grant a form of autonomy of actions to the actors. With this, it would
allow us to investigate on the kind of security vulnerabilities that could arise as
the actors interact in the life-cycle of the scenario.
With the addition of the automatic InstAL specification generator, we now mod-
ify the InstAL translation process (Figure 4-8 on page 98) originally proposed in















Figure 6-4: Modification of InstAL Translation Process by addition of the InstAL specification
generator.
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We would also like to note that at this point of writing this thesis, there is no
unified schema for UML to XML translation. As a result, no two UML diagram
tools would generate the same XML files. This implies that our translator would
only work without any modification if the XML source file is generated by the
same UML diagram tool we used (Visual Paradigm for UML). In the future, we
aim at standardizing this tool so that it can accept any standard XML file.
6.3 pyinstql: Semi-automatic Query Translator
Institutional frameworks make it possible to monitor the permissions, empower-
ment and obligations of participants and to indicate violations when regulations
(security requirements in our case) are not followed or when security properties
are not satisfied. The change of the state over time as a result of actors’ ac-
tions provides traces from which an institution designer can query and verify
properties, their effects and expected outcomes in an institution. Institutions
are useful when particular properties can be verified as satisfying all possible
scenarios.
One of the major goals of this thesis to be able to perform verification and analy-
sis of security properties by querying the “database” of traces produced from the
institutional model. InstAL, an action language for modelling institutions, pro-
vides an institution designer with a useful abstraction away from the underlying
AnsProlog specification. This level of abstraction is however lost when it comes
to specifying queries about an institution. Since querying is a vital part of the
modelling process through which desired models (answer sets) may be generated,
queries have to be written directly in AnsProlog. It means that the designer or
user is required to know the semantics of InstAL to AnsProlog translation in
order to write queries for the InstAL specification. This is undesirable for effec-
tive use of the tool by domain experts. Particularly in our case, while we model
system work-flows and processes in InstAL through the activity/mal-activity di-
agrams, we analyse the security state of the system by querying the institution
based on the security properties that we are investigating. There is therefore a
need for a way of expressing the queries in a more natural language for effective
querying of the institution. By this we further modify the current InstAL devel-
opment process (Figure 4-8 on page 98) by the addition of a layer which produces
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the query program. This is illustrated in Figure 6-5 where the additional features














Figure 6-5: Modification of InstAL Translation Process by addition of the Query Translator.
6.3.1 Query Components
We aim at providing a query language that is usable to a user who has little or
no knowledge of the AnsProlog syntax. Our query file consist of the following
components;
• Facts: These express the facts that we want to sustain in the traces. Im-
portantly we would like to limit our traces to those which concern specific
exogenous events occurring at specific instants. Our query file will therefore
express the fact observed(event,instant).
• Rules: Rules express the conditions and constraints which describes the
properties we are investigating.
• Flags: Answer sets usually consists of many information for every trace
produced. These would include fluents, events, and other trace information.
The flags #hide is used to hide all the traces in an answer set while the flag
#show artefact serves like a filter which displays only the traces specified
as the artefact. For example #show holdsat(F,I) will only display fluents
F which hold at each instant I of the trace.
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There has been a previous attempt at developing a query language for InstAL
called InstQL by Hopton et al. (2010). However we did not find InstQL too
useful for a number of reasons. Some of these include;
i.) It handles only simple predicates with single argument. However we are
dealing with predicates involving multiple arguments.
ii.) It cannot produce complete query specification that meets our requirements
as described earlier. By this we mean facts such as “observed(event,instant).”
This rule is necessary particularly for the purpose of validation. It limits
traces only to those which concern the stated observed exogenous events.
Also there is no provision for the flags “#hide” and “#show artefact”.
iii.) It cannot handle queries expressed as multiple disjunctions or conjunctions
of events or fluents.
iv.) InstQL had problems with handling time instants for the query fact after(instant1,
instant2) which interprets as the time instant instant1 precedes instant2
for any associated event or fluent.
Based on these reasons, we could not use InstQL and therefore had to develop
our query translator - pyinstql - in a language (Python) that would make it easy
to maintain and improved upon with time.
6.3.2 pyinstql Syntax
In this work we aim at analysing security properties from users’ perspective. We
are therefore concerned with the occurrence of events and the effects of users’
interactions (modelled as events) in terms of the state of the system with respect
with the fluents that hold at specific instants. It is also important for us to know
what violations occur and the instant at which they occur. This information
will give the domain experts insight into how effective the security requirements
would be.
Based on these, the pyinstql queries are formed based on the following predi-
cates:
happens(Event,Instant) is used for querying the occurrence of an event. If a
specific instant is specified, we would be querying the occurrence of the specified
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event at the specified instant else all instants would be considered. For example:
happens(sendPaper(lecturer,hod),2) would query for the occurrence of the
event sendPaper(lecturer,hod) at time instant 2. This predicate can be used
on its own or can be used as a condition for determining other properties.
holds(Fluent,Instant) is used in a similar way with happens but it handles
fluents. It will query for the existence of fluents at specified instants.
violates(Event,Instant) handles the occurrence of violation events.
It is possible to specify these predicates without specifying the instants. In this
case it means the event should occur and the fluent would be true respectively at
some point in the life time of the institution. This is expressed as follows:
<predicate> ::= happens( <identifier> ) | holds(<identifier>) |
violates(<identifier>)
<identifier> ::= <name> | <name><param_list>
where identifier corresponds to an event, a fluent, or an instant.
The unary operator not provides negation (as failure) expressed as follows:
<literal> ::= not <predicate> | <predicate>
Sub-queries (sub-conditions) are also supported by pyinstql. For instance we
can define a condition say this cond specifying some desired property. This
sub-condition can then be joined to some other criteria, for example “this cond
and holds(f)”. We reference sub-conditions within rules as condition literals as
follows:
<condition_literal> ::= not <identifier> | <identifier> |
<identifier> ( <identifier> , <identifier> )
Query conditions are built of terms expressed as:
<term> ::= <after_expr> | <condition_literal>
The after expression allows for construction of <while expr> as:
<after_expr> ::= <while_expr> | <while_expr> after <after_expr>
and the while expression further allows for simpler constructs of <literal>:
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<while_expr> ::= <literal> | <literal> while <while_expr>
The connectives and and or provide logical conjunction and disjunction which
may be used to group terms:
<conjunction> ::= <term> and <conjunction> | <term>
<disjunction> ::= <term> or <disjunction> | <term>
In order for us to be able to create arbitrary combinations of predicates and
named conditions together with the logical operators and, or, not, we need to
make conditions declaration constructed in this form:
<condition_decl> ::= condition <identifier> : <disjunction>
| condition <identifier> : <conjunction>;
This allows us to use the condition name as a condition literal.
Constraints specify the properties of the trace that must be true. We can also
specify constraint properties in pyinstql as follows:
<constraint> ::= constraint <disjunction> | <conjunction> ;
In order to be able to specify the particular events for which verification is being
carried out and to constrain the answer sets to show specific results, we also
provide expressions for observe and show as follows:
<observe> ::= observe <param_list>;
<show> ::= show <param_list>;
Table 6.3 on the next page shows a summary of the pyinstql syntax.
6.3.3 pyinstql Semantics
A pyinstql query is composed of semi high-level language statements and the se-
mantics is defined by the translation function Trans which translates the pyinstql
query statements into AnsProlog query specifications consisting of AnsProlog
rules. This is typically a singleton set i.e each statement generates only one rule
except expressions involving disjunctions.
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Expression Definition
< variable > ::= [A− Z][a− zA− Z0− 9]∗
< variable list > ::= < variable >,< variable list > | < variable >
< name > ::= [A− Z][a− zA− Z0− 9]∗
< param list > ::= (< variable list >)
< identifier > ::= < name >< param list > | < name >
< predicate > ::= happens(< identifier >)|holds(< identifier >)
< literal > ::= not < predicate > | < predicate >
< while literal > ::= < literal > | < condition literal >
< while expr > ::= < while literal > while < while expr > |
< while literal >
< after > ::= after(< integer >)|after
< after expr > ::= < while expr >< after >< after expr > |
< while expr >
< condition literal > ::= not < identifier > | < identifier >
< term > ::= < after expr > | < condition literal >
< conjunction > ::= < term > and < conjunction > | < term >
< disjunction > ::= < term > or < disjunction > | < term >
< conditiondecl > ::= condition < identifier >:< disjunction >; |
condition < identifier >:< conjunction >;
< constraint > ::= constraint < disjunction >; |
constraint < conjunction >;
< observe > ::= observe < param list >;
< show > ::= show < param list >;
Table 6.3: Summary of pyinstql Syntax
The semantics of predicates are defined by the following translations:
Trans(happens(e)) = occurred(e, I), event(e), instant(I) (22.1)
Trans(holds(fluent)) = holdsat(f, I), ifluent(f), instant(I) (22.2)
Trans(violates(e)) = occurred(viol(e, I)), event(e), instant(I) (22.3)
Literals of the form not P where P is a predicate have the following seman-
tics:
Trans(not P ) = not Trans(P)
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Conjunction of terms takes the form:
Trans(c1 and c2 and . . . and cn) = Trans(c1), T rans(c2), . . . , T rans(cn)
while a disjunction which translates to more than one rule takes the following
semantics depending on whether it is part of a condition declaration or a con-
straint:
Trans(condition conditionName : c1 or c2 or . . . or cn; ) =
{conditionName← Trans(ci).|1 ≤ i ≤ n}
Trans(constraint c1 or c2 or . . . or cn; ) =
{newName← Trans(ci).|1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪
{⊥← not newName.}
The term newName denotes any uniqueAnsProlog identifier within theAnsProlog
program that is the combination of the query and the action program. This atom
becomes true if one of the sub-queries in the disjunction becomes true. Also each
time instant I generated in the translation of a predicate a name for a unique
time instant in the pyinstql query.
The semantics for while expression is:
Trans(L1 while L2 while . . . while Ln) = Trans(L1), T rans(L2), . . . , T rans(Ln),
instant(I)
and the binary operator after(n) takes the form
Trans(Wi after(n)W3) = Trans(Wi), T rans(Wj), after(ti, tj, n)
with ti and tj being the time instants generated by Wi and Wj respectively and
n > 0.
Semantics for observed expression is defined as:
Trans(observe e) = observed(e, I).
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This translates an e ∈ Eex to a fact expressed as a predicate with the event e and
time instant I as arguments.
In the case of a conjunction, events are separated by a comma and each event
is translated in a new line. Time instants are also automatically allocated in
increasing order beginning with 0 for the first event.





The show expression takes parameters which are events, states, and violations.
Trans(events) = occurred(e, I)
Trans(states) = holdsat(f, I)
Trans(violations) = occurred(viol(e, I))
For every parameter p, the show expression translation takes the form:
Trans(show p) =
#hide.#show Trans(p).
In the next section we present some of the kind of reasoning tasks that we can
perform using this query language.
6.3.4 Reasoning Tasks and Guidelines for Querying
The aim of our security requirements/policy analysis framework is to provide
the system designer with the means of checking that the system model satisfies
a set of desired security properties. The designer might also wish to use the
analysis process to obtain information regarding the effect of non-compliance
to a set of security requirements on the state of the system. These objectives
suggest that, in broad terms, our framework must support three types of query
namely: validation, verification, and review queries. Having given a description
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of pyisntql, we illustrate here how it can be used for these reasoning tasks through
query specifications. We categorise review tasks into two, namely: prediction and
post-diction (Sergot, 2005) and are briefly described as follows:
Consider a transition system consisting of a set of all possible states S, a set of
all possible events/actions A, a sequence of events/actions A = a1, . . . , an, and
an initial state:
Prediction: Given that the transition system is in state s ∈ S and a sequence
of events/actions A = a1, . . . , an have occurred, the prediction task (s, A) is
the problem of deciding the set of states {S ′ ⊆ S} which may result from the
transition system. This can be expressed in pyinstql as:
condition X: A after(1) s;
constraint not X;
This query limits traces to those in which at some point s holds after which the
events of A occur in sequence. The answer sets that satisfy this query will then
contain the states {S ′ ⊆ S}.
Post-diction: This is the converse of prediction such that if the system is in
state s′ and the events/actions A = a1, . . . , an have occurred, then post-diction
problem (A, s′) is the task of deciding the set of states {S ⊆ S} that could have
held before A. This implies that s′ is required to hold in the next time instant
following the final event of A. Post-diction can be expressed in pyinstql as:
condition X: s’ after(1) A;
constraint not X;
Table 6.4 presents a guide on the types of query that may be used in investi-
gating security properties from the model. In the next section we are presenting
some concrete examples of how the pyisntql generates a query file from query
statements.
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Type of Query Aim of Query Example of Query
Validation This query is for validating the
model. Events need to occur
in the sequence specified and all
events and fluents in the speci-
fication must be represented in
the answer set. This is achieved
using observe eventslist in the
query where eventslist is a list













Verification This query verifies that the
model satisfies the security prop-
erties being investigated. This
is achieved by formulating the
security property in form of a
query.
The requirement: “The head
shall not be in possession of the
paper after sending it to the







Prediction This query enables the designer
to investigate what the state of
the system would be after a spec-






Post-diction Post-diction queries enable the
verification of how a particular






Table 6.4: Summary of Query types
6.3.5 Example Queries
We illustrate how we may use pyinstql to form queries by recalling some queries
used in the MakeReferral scenario presented in Section 5.4.













Figure 6-6: Query for observed events
do this by querying for traces that are generated as a result of the exogenous
(observable) events occurring in an order that conforms to the original work
flow. The trace can be filtered by defining each exogenous event expected in
the resulting answer set using the fact observed(event,instant) in the query
specification. For example, following from the model of the misuse case presented
in Section 5.3.2, the query in Figure 6-6 specifies the sequence of exogenous events
that we are interested in. In pyinstql this query is expressed as:
observe login(sHCP), logindl, selectAction(sHCP), makeRef(sHCP),
checkRef(cHCP), checkRefdl, signRef(sys), encryptRef(sys),
sendRef(sHCP), receiveRefwP(rHCP), enforcePolicy(sys);
Notice that the sequence of events are expressed as a list separated by comma in
an order that the events are expected to occur. Each event is then translated into
equivalent fact in ASP as shown in Figure 6-6. The result of this query would give
so much information than may be required. We therefore use the show expression
to filter the result specific information we are verifying. For example, we may
want to verify the correctness of sequence of events. We do this in pyinstql using
the statement:
show events;




















Figure 6-7: The result of model verification
This query simply hides all other results and only shows events occurrences and
the time instant in which each event occurred. This is a very useful query which
we shall be using to filter our answer sets to specific target results we are interested
in seeing.
With these query specifications now, we can validate our model for correctness
and completeness. Correctness requires that events and fluents occur in the order
of sequence specified while completeness requires that all events and fluents are
represented in the answer set. It is easy to validate for correctness because the
result is expected to show an answer set that does not contain violations. Figure
6-7 presents the result of the validation query in Figure 5-11 on page 122 for events
occurrences. This result validates the computational model for completeness
and correctness since there is no violation in the result and all observed events
specified in the query appear in the resulting answer set. The term SATISFIABLE
in the result also means that there are models which satisfy the query.
It is important to note here that we can only validate the computational model as
specified by the institution designer. Whether the institutional model in InstAL
correctly captures the target system or work flow or not is beyond the scope of
the work presented in this thesis. Therefore our validation here is subject to the
correctness of the institutional model which yields the computational model we
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are using for analysis as is the case with any abstraction.
Once we have validated the computational model, we can now use it to perform
other analysis through the various reasoning tasks discussed in Section 6.3.4. This
translator was used to generate the queries presented in Section 5.4.
6.4 pyviz - The answer set visualiser
Another issue with the use of the answer set program has to do with the nature
of the answer sets produced. The answer sets produced from the output of the
clingo solver for a translated institution program and query are expressed as a set
of unordered atoms. It is difficult to see exactly what the trace and corresponding
model described by the answer set means when examined in their original form.
This is especially true in the case when many fluent values or generated events
are used (Cliffe, 2007). In order to assist a designer in understanding the output
of the answer set solver we have used a simple tool that allows the answer sets to
be parsed and then displayed in a format that is easily readable and understood
by users.
The trace visualiser tool pyviz takes a set of answer sets written in the output
format of clingo and produces a graphical visualisation of the traces and models
described by those answer sets. For each answer set specified in the input, the vi-
sualiser extracts the sequence of exogenous events represented by observed(E,T)
atoms in the answer set that represent the trace, the set of generated events rep-
resented by occurred(E, T) derived for this trace and the corresponding fluent
values for each state in the trace. These are then displayed as a sequence allowing
a designer to see what has happened in a given trace.
We illustrate this with some examples:
The following shows an example of an answer set This is visualised as shown in
Figure 6-9 on page 162. This looks like a state transition diagram with annota-
tions on both the arcs and the nodes. The nodes Si represent the states in the
institutions transitions marked by the time instants i in which events occurred
or fluents happened. The arrow lines represent transitions from one state or time














































Figure 6-8: A sample answer set
displayed on top of the arrow lines. Institutional fluents that hold true at each





























































































Figure 6-9: Answer set visualization.
stance at the initial state S0 the exogenous event login(sHCP) has been granted
permission. Also the corresponding institutional actions are both empowered and
permitted at this time instant and state.
It is easy to follow through the transition in terms of how fluents evolve as the
institution transits from one state to the other with new fluents added to each
state indicated by bold characters. For example as the institution transits from
state S0 to state S1 as a result of the institutional action ilogin(sHCP), this
results in the addition of the institutional fluents permitting the exogenous event
selectAction(sHCP) and also empowering and permitting the institutional ac-
tion iselectAction(sHCP). This ability to be able see easily the effect of events
on the state of the institution would be very helpful in spotting out possible vul-
nerability spots in the system interaction. This will then enhance decision on how
security solutions may be applied to mitigate such security vulnerabilities.
Scalability of the visualiser
The sources of complexity for the visualiser are the number of instants, number
of events, and the number of fluents in an answer set passed to the visualiser.
Since the tool visualises all these components, it will certainly produce a very
large diagram. For instance Figure 6-9 which visualises the answer set in Figure
6-8 illustrates how complex it can get. However, in the query based approach we
present in this work, it is not likely that answer sets would contain a large number
of these components, else the purpose of analysis using this approach would be
defeated. The power in the use of the flags #hide and #show, introduced in
Section 6.3.1 on page 149, in a query is that an answer set can be filtered to
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produce traces that satisfy the query. The visualiser can also lay traces out in
rows of a given length and can selectively display particular states required, and
this ability helps with the scalability of the visualiser. We note that even if the
unfiltered answer set is visualised (in which case the visualisation would be large
depending on the number of time instants), the benefits lie in the fact that it is
very much easier to read the result in a visualised form because the reader is able
to quickly see what state changes at each time instant and what events occurred
in between time instants.
6.5 Summary of Chapter
In this chapter, we presented the additional tools we have used in order to make
our approach usable with minimal technical knowledge of the underlying tech-
nologies. First is the XML2InstAL translation. This tool was non-existing so
we had to develop it from scratch taking advantage of the fact that UML dia-
grams can be represented in XML form. With the help of an appropriate XML
parser, we are able to build the translator which translates models built in UML
diagrams to InstAL model. The major limitation to this tool is the fact the a
particular UML diagram tool has to be used in order to effective use our trans-
lator. Since this seems to us like a tool which will greatly make the institutional
action language InsAL more user friendly, we shall be working on making it
compatible with other UML design tools in the future. We have also developed
the semantics needed for us to translate the UML Activity Diagrams to InstAL
specifications.
Secondly we presented the pyinstql translator which allows us to write query
descriptions in a form of human language which is then translator to an equivalent
query specification file in AnsProlog. Our translator allows us to generate what
we consider a complete query specification file with facts, rules, and flags.
Lastly, the pyviz tool presents our resultant models (answer sets) in a way that is
significantly easier to read. This means that users are able to make meaning out of
the results generated easily than the original text presentation of the result.
In the next chapter we shall be using these tools as we present query-based
analysis of some security properties using our approach.
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Chapter 7
Query-based Verification of Security Prop-
erties
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we presented the institutional framework, action lan-
guage InstAL and the AnsProlog program in which the computational model is
expressed and made available for analysis through the use of answer set solvers.
We have also presented how these tools may be used in the general sense of insti-
tutional modelling and specifically in the security domain for analysis of security
requirements.
In this chapter we are going to be focusing mainly on performing analysis within
the security domain.
7.2 Confidentiality scenario - Examination Paper process
Confidentiality scenarios are concerned with all security incidents and vector at-
tacks that could be exploited to gain access to internal information and disclosing
it to unauthorized people. We present a scenario involving the way examination
papers are prepared and produced to be taken by students in a school. In this
scenario, the asset to be secured is the examination question paper which needs
to be protected from unauthorised actors. The risk involved is that the exami-
nation would loose its creditability if the question paper is exposed to students
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Figure 7-1: Examination Paper Process
before they are due to take the examination. Therefore the primary security goal
in this scenario is confidentiality of the examination paper.
The model represents a segment of the process of preparing examination papers
presented in the activity diagram (Figure 7-1). The model consists of the roles:
Lecturer, head of department (Head), examination officer (ExOffice), and Stu-
dent. The resource here is the examination question paper (Paper). The process
starts with the lecturer preparing the question paper and sending it to the head
of department (Head) who handles the moderation of the paper (this process is
not included in our scenario). Assuming the paper has been moderated, the head
sends the moderated paper to the examinations office which handles the printing
of the paper and setting it to be taken by the student. The process ends with
the student taking the paper.
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In order to ensure that the confidentiality of the paper is preserved, the following
security requirements are set:
R1: The paper shall not be disclosed to any other person before it is taken by
the student
R2: The lecturer shall not be in possession of the paper after sending it to the
head
R3: The head shall not be in possession of the paper after sending it to the
exam office
With these candidate security requirements, it means that violation of any of
these requirements would put the exam paper at risk and the paper would be
considered insecure and unfit to be administered to the student. We shall be
analysing these requirements using our framework for possible sources of confi-
dentiality breaches.
Requirement R1 will require us to introduce another actor misuser such that
any interaction with this actor would be suspicious. For instance, if any of the
actors performs a "send" action to misuser, this would be expected to trigger
a violation. The requirements R2 and R3 would demand actions that would
dispossess the actors of the assets at the specified time instants. An action such






6 Actors: hod misuser eo student lecturer
Figure 7-2: The Domain file Examination Paper Process Model.
We modelled the scenario in InstAL as shown in Figure 7-3 with the associated
domain file in Figure 7-2. In modelling the scenario, we initially permit the
lecturer to prepare the paper perm(prepare(lecturer, paper)). This assumes
the state of the institution from its start. Also the corresponding institutional
actions are empowered and permitted. Other exogenous events are permitted at





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model Validation: The first thing we need to consider is whether our com-
putational model represents the system we are analysing. In order to do this





The query specifies the order in which exogenous (observed) events ought to occur.
It also specifies that we want to see specifically the state of the process at various
time instants as the institution evolves with occurrences of events. What we expect to
see is a single answer set that shows the occurrence of the events stated in the query
without any violation event. With respect to ordering of events being tested here,
violation events will result with the occurrence of an event at the time instant that it
is not permitted to occur. This will be interpreted to mean existence of a flaw in the
computational model. Also the fluents declared in lines 27–31 of the model in Figure
7-3 are expected to hold at certain time instants, showing the state of the system in
terms of the progression of the work flow at those time instants. Another important
consideration to be noted is the number of time steps required to run the model in
order to produce the required model. This is determined by the number of exogenous
events specified in the query as follows:
Timesteps = numberofobservedevents+ 1
The implication of running the model for a time instant less than the required number
of time instants is that not all the observed events specified would be processed, as
such the answer set would be incomplete. On the other hand if the time instant is
greater than the required number, the process gets repeated, thereby producing longer
traces and answer sets. Violations would usually occur in such cases due to the fact


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7-4 shows the visualisation of the produced answer set. The time instants
are represented by the nodes Sn, the arrows show the direction of transition of the
model from one state to the other. The occurred events (exogenous, institutional, and
violation) which trigger the transition from one state to the other appear as labels on the
appropriate transition arrows. The state of the system at each time instant (generally
expressed as fluents) appear under the appropriate state nodes. Fluents are added and
removed according to the model design as the institution evolves. Our visualisation
does not show the removed fluents since we do not consider them as useful information.
However, it is important to be able to see easily what new fluents are added to the
states as the institution evolves. These are coloured in blue to differentiate them from
the existing fluents which still hold at previous instants and still hold at the current
instant.
Running our model for seven(7) time steps (since we have six observed events) pro-
duces the visualised answer set which shows that there is no occurrence of violation
events and it contains all the specified observed events. The answer set also shows
that the fluents hold at time instants as expected from the model. For instance,we ex-
pect that fluent hasPaper(lecturer) to hold at the next time instant after the event
iprepare(lecturer, paper) has occurred (Figure 7-3 on page 167, line 42). The
visualised answer set shows that this fluent holds as expected. Similarly, line 50 of the
model specifies that the fluent hasModPaper(Actors) holds at the next time instant
after the event isendModPaper(hod,eo) (following definitions of Head and ExOffice
in the domain file - Figure 7-2) must have occurred. This is correctly shown in the
answer set visualisation with the fluent holding for each of the actors defined in the
domain file. With the model validated, we can now use it to analyse the requirements
specified earlier.
Analysis of the Model: For a security requirements designer who has the goal of
preserving the confidentiality of the target assets, the interest would be in knowing the
points at which the assets would be vulnerable to security breaches. This information
would be fundamental for designing the appropriate confidentiality security requirement
that would mitigate the vulnerability at those points. Therefore the question that would
be of interest here is:
What would be the confidentiality state of the asset Y associated with event X after the
event X has occurred?
This is clearly a prediction problem. Here we would like to see the state of the system
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after a certain event has occurred. Using our scenario for example, the occurrence of
the event sendPaper(lecturer,hod) at time instant 1 means that institutionally, the
lecturer is permitted to send the prepared paper to the hod from that time instant.
However looking at the problem from human factor perspective, since the lecturer
has possession of the paper and the power1 to send out the paper, it means that the
lecturer can also send the paper to other actors other than the hod who is the only
recipient permitted by the institution, either intentionally or otherwise. Whatever
the case, the action would compromise the confidentiality of the paper. We would
verify this by querying for the state of the institution from the time instant after the
sendPaper(lecturer,hod) event has occurred.
Using the following query:
condition compromised(hasPaper(X)): happens(sendPaper(lecturer,hod))
after holds(hasPaper(X)) and X not hod;
show compromised(hasPaper(X));
This considers the possession of the paper by any actor X at any time instant J to be a
compromised where J is a time instant after instant I and X is not hod. The resultant





























































The result visualised (Figure 7-5) shows that from the time instant 2 after the paper
has been sent to the hod, other actors could be in possession of the paper. This is
possible from the fact that the paper could be leaked to these other actors from that
time instant. The result also shows that this state of the paper could persist to the end
of the process. What this means is that there is a potential for the confidentiality of
1All exogenous events are empowered by default since they are outside the institution, hence
cannot be controlled by the institution.
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the paper to be compromised from the moment the lecturer sends the paper to the
hod.
The implication of this information in terms of designing the security requirement is
that there would be a need for requirements that restrict the lecturer from sending
the paper to any other actor other than the intended recipient. This may also include
requirements that have to do with the form of storage (digital or physical).
The result shown in Figure 7-4 on page 169 indicates that similar vulnerabilities could
arise at other time instants too as the paper is being processed. These are useful
information for designing the appropriate requirements to mitigate these vulnerabili-
ties.
7.3 Integrity scenario - Patient referral management
We revisit the patient referral management scenario from the iTrust Medical Records
System presented in Section 5.3. This scenario involves actors interacting with a vital
information - the patient’s referral document. The integrity of this document is of
utmost importance than confidentiality, although confidentiality could also be seen as
a security goal for this asset. Alteration of the referral details for instance could lead
to either delay in progression of the treatment or administration of a different line of
treatment other than what it ought to be. Either of this could be critical to the patient.
It is therefore important to make the preservation of integrity a priority here.
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Figure 7-6: The Basic Activities of the ’Make Referral’ Scenario
The basic activity flow for the Make Referral scenario is presented in Figure 7-6. The
corresponding instAL model is presented in Figure 7-7.
The model captures the scenario in its simplest form. This is intended to make it simple
enough to understand how we use the tool to analyse the integrity requirement for the
target asset. As we did in the previous section, the model validates the UML model
to the model shown in Figure 7-8 on page 175. As the process evolves, new fluents (in
blue colour) are added to the states of the institution. Notice that even though the
events (shown on the transition lines) do not have any violation events occurring, the
fluents in the states from S1 show permissions for events triggered by both sHCP and
rHCP. Since the permissions are not terminated (a situation in which no controls are
applied), they persist till the end of the process.
This result clearly shows the various possible points at which the process and the
referral document could be vulnerable to integrity breaches. From this scenario, valid
referral document can only be prepared and sent by sHCP, therefore any other actor




3 %% types declaration with domain file specification as comments
4 type HCP; %sHCP rHCP
5 type Patient; %patient
6 type System; %sys
7
8 % Exogenous events
9 exogenous event login(HCP,System);
10 exogenous event selectMakeRef(HCP);
11 exogenous event prepareRef(HCP);
12 exogenous event sendRef(HCP);
13
14 % Institutional events
15 inst event ilogin(HCP,System);
16 inst event iselectMakeRef(HCP);
17 inst event iprepareRef(HCP);






24 % conventional generation
25 login(HCP,System) generates ilogin(HCP,System);
26 selectMakeRef(HCP) generates iselectMakeRef(HCP);
27 prepareRef(HCP) generates iprepareRef(HCP);
28 sendRef(HCP) generates isendRef(HCP);
29
30 ilogin(HCP,sys) initiates perm(selectMakeRef(HCP)), pow(iselectMakeRef(HCP)),
perm(iselectMakeRef(HCP));
31
32 iselectMakeRef(HCP) initiates perm(prepareRef(HCP)), pow(iprepareRef(HCP)),
perm(iprepareRef(HCP));
33
34 iprepareRef(HCP) initiates perm(sendRef(HCP)), pow(isendRef(HCP)),
35 perm(isendRef(HCP));
36




41 perm(login(sHCP,sys)), pow(ilogin(sHCP,sys)), perm(ilogin(sHCP,sys));
Figure 7-7: The The InstAL model for the Make Referral Scenario.
to the integrity of the process and the final referral document sent and received. We
summarise the possible vulnerability points as follows;
• Assuming that rHCP got the login details to the system and successfully login, it
means that from S1 this actor can initiate the process of preparing the referral
document. If this is allowed to happen, the integrity of the final referral docu-
ment prepared and sent would be questionable. Therefore this is one point of
mitigation that would be worth considering when designing the integrity require-




























































































































Figure 7-8: The ’Make Referral’ Model Validation
counter check of the actor’s identity using an appropriate mechanism such as a
challenge-response mechanism.
• From state S2 we can deduce a vulnerability that has to do with the preparation
of the referral document. Assume that the sHCP started preparing the document
but could not finish it for some reason and saved it. A misuser (rHCP in this
case) who obtained access to the system could alter the details such that sHCP
may not notice it. This also calls for consideration when designing the integrity
requirements for the process.
• The vulnerability that we can deduce from state S3 stems from the vulnerabil-
ity in state S2. A misuser who prepares a wrong referral document is able to
send such to the recipients. Notice that the recipients are going to be receiving
different versions of the same document. The patient receives an ordinary re-
ferral document, while rHCP receives the referral document which contains extra
information such as the priority level of the referral. These extra information are
also at risk of being altered and sent. There has to be a consideration of these
possibilities when designing the integrity requirements.
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7.4 Verification of Security Requirement Compliance
The formulation and specification of security requirements is usually done at different
levels of abstraction and guided by the security objectives of the organisation. These
are reflected in various control documentations such as standards, regulations, legis-
lation, directives, and mission statements. These documents such as the UK Data
Protection Act 1998, the USA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) 1996, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (commonly named SOX), enacted in 2002
in the USA all describe mandates and requirements for the protection of vital infor-
mation and resources in their various domains of application. In addition to these, the
ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management defines the standards particularly
for security management. These documents therefore form the basis on which organisa-
tions engineer security requirements. It is important to note that security requirements
are high level specifications of the kinds of security expected in the organisation with
respect to the organisation’s assets and security goals of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability without stating the mechanisms to bring about the expected security.
Since the focus of this thesis is not on the specification of security requirements but
rather the analysis of the specified requirements, this section is dealing with the analysis
of the security requirements particularly the verification of the requirements compli-
ance. Verifying the compliance of systems and employees with security requirements is
an important issue to be addressed if the security goals of the organisation are to be
achieved.
Requirements generally consist of the following;
• triggering actor
• the keyword shall
• the action to be triggered
• conditions under which the actions can be triggered.
One form of expressing requirements is:
The System shall [do something] [optional conditions]
We shall be looking at analysing the compliance of security requirements expressed
in this form. For example we use the following authentication requirement state-
ment;
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Figure 7-9: The requirement R1
R1. The system shall verify the identity of all of its users before allowing them to
update their user information.
Applying the Institutional Framework
The implication of the requirement R1 in terms of compliance is that the user can only
perform an update action on their information subject to the actor system performing
the action verify on the user’s identity. The institutional framework allow us to
express requirements like R1 using the notion of obligation introduced in Section 3.6.1.2
on page 54. With this we may verify the compliance of this requirement by checking that
in any process that requires compliance of this requirement, the obligations triggered
by the requirements are fulfilled.
We present the requirement R1 as a sequence of activities in Figure 7-9 which describe
what may be seen as a compliant behaviour.
The requirement R1 may be expressed as;
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obl(verify, update, violation)
which means that whenever the obligation holds, the event verify must occur before
the event update occurs, else the violation event would be triggered.
We see the problem of verifying compliance of the system to the requirement as a
reasoning problem in the action theory. We therefore use the InstAL action language
to model the scenario presented in Figure 7-9. This will generate the computational
model for us in ASP from which we can do verification by querying the answer sets for
compliance or lack of it.
In providing the specification of the model in InstAL, we define the descriptions
presented in Figure 7-10. We define three types of interacting components Agent,
System, and Info. How these components relate with each other is defined by three
exogenous (observable) events login(Agent,System), verify(System, Agent), and
update(Agent, Info) respectively. We also define a violation event
violAuthentication(System)
which is included in the definition of the compliance obligation and would be triggered
whenever the obligation is not fulfilled. The obligation is defined as obl(verify(System,
Agent), update(Agent,Info), violAuthentication(System)).
Model Validation: In order to validate the computational model, we shall check
to see that if the events occur at the correct sequence as described in the sequence
diagram, we should have only one answer set as our result. Also importantly, the
result should not have any violations due to occurrence of non-permitted events, and
there should not be any occurrence of the violation event as a result of the lack of
fulfilment of the obligation.
















7 % exogenous events
8 exogenous event login(Agent,System);
9 exogenous event verify(System, Agent);
10 exogenous event update(Agent, Info);
11
12 % institutional events
13 inst event ilogin(Agent,System);
14 inst event iverify(System, Agent);
15 inst event iupdate(Agent, Info);
16
17 % violation event







25 % obligation fluent
26 obligation fluent obl(verify(System, Agent), update(Agent,Info),
violAuthentication(System));
27
28 % generates rules
29 login(Agent,System) generates ilogin(Agent,System);
30 verify(System, Agent) generates iverify(System, Agent);
31 update(Agent, Info) generates iupdate(Agent, Info);
32
33 %%% consequence rules
34 ilogin(Agent,System) initiates perm(verify(System, Agent)), pow(iverify(System,
Agent)), perm(iverify(System, Agent)), obl(verify(System, Agent),
update(Agent,Info), violAuthentication(System)), loggedIn(Agent,System);
35
36 iverify(System, Agent) initiates perm(update(Agent, Info)), perm(iupdate(Agent,
Info)), pow(iupdate(Agent, Info)), verified(System,Agent);
37






Figure 7-10: InstAL model of the compliance scenario.
The resultant model (answer set) shows the three observable events occurring in the
expected sequence without the occurrence of violations. Another thing we are interested
in checking is the instances in which the fluents hold. A valid model would be one in
which in addition to the events occurring in an order which does not result in violations
occurring, every fluent should hold at the appropriate instants as defined. In Figure 7-11


















































































Figure 7-11: The result of computational model validation for R1
defined by S1, the obligation fluent holds as well as the fluent loggedIn(employee,sys)
indicating that the employee has logged in to the system at this instant. Similar
deductions can be made from the other time instants. These satisfy our validation
criteria, and we can therefore begin to analyse the model for compliance issues.
Analysing Non-compliance: Having validated the model, we will be showing how
non-compliance may affect the system. This analysis would give the requirements
engineer insight into what non-compliance would look like and from there, give insight
into how to better design the requirement.
First we would like to show a case of simple non-compliance: Assuming the requirement
that user be verified before granting update permission is not complied with by ignoring
it. In essence, the user logged in, and went straight to perform update, bypassing the
verification procedure.
We check this by using the following query:
1 observe
login(employee,sys),update(employee,infor);
2 show events, holds;
This query results in a number of answer sets presented in Figure 7-12 which reveal
different information to the designer. For instance, Figure 7-12a shows an attempt to
update information by employee after time instant S1. This attempt flags the action as
a violation viol(update(employee, infor)). At this period also, since the obligation
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is not fulfilled, the violation event violAuthentication(sys) was also triggered. It
can be observed also that the fluent associated with the update event did not hold as
expected. However, since the employee is still logged in, another attempt at update
after the time instant S2 only flagged the event as a violation but no violation event is
triggered here. The implication of this is that the employee could get away with this
update activity if there is nothing in place to check the status of each event as it occurs
in real time. One of the strategies organisations employ towards achieving compliance
is the retrospective reporting where audits are conducted for after-the-fact detection
by analysis of the log data whenever something goes wrong due to non-compliance or
some other security breach.
We can also observe from the results presented in Figure 7-12b that despite the fact
that the update event flagged a violation and a violation event been triggered due to
the non-fulfilment of the obligation at time instant S1, the event verify still occurred
after instant S2 which results in the associated fluent verified(sys,employee) to
hold at instant S3. What this means is that there is the tendency for a cover-up event
to occur such that the non-compliant behaviour may look like a compliant behaviour
when the audit log is viewed without taking note of the instants at which the events
occurred.
Lastly Figure 7-12c shows another possible behaviour of the system whenever there is
non-compliance. This time, after the violation event violAuthentication(sys) has
been triggered, the event login(employee,sys) could be initialised again, in which
case, the obligation fluent is also initiated as seen at instant S3. This attempts to
repeat the process again. While this looks like a self-recovery behaviour by the system,
if allowed this could keep the process going in a loop thereby resulting probably in a
denial of service.
7.5 Summary of Chapter
In this chapter we presented illustrations on how the our computational approach can
be used to verify security properties. Applying the technique of querying, prediction
analysis can be performed on the computational model of a system such that points of
security vulnerabilities can be easily seen. The information derived from the analysis
will guide in the design of the appropriate security requirements that would mitigate
the security threats.













































































































































































Figure 7-12: The effects of non-compliance
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with different security goals, based on the target assets in the scenarios.
We have explained how our approach can be applied to analysing non-compliance of
security requirement with an example. It shows the possible behaviours of the system
whenever there is non-compliance. Being able to see these behaviours at design time





The drive for the security of information in organisations is far from being over. Despite
increased investments in security through implementation of security solutions, security
still remains a concern for organisations as reported by recent surveys on information
security. These challenges are largely due to the human factor element which is regarded
as the “weakest link” in the security chain. Much research in information security has
seen security as a technical problem. However we approached the problem from the fact
that organisations are socio-technical in nature, that is a system consisting of not only
technological components but also human participants who interact with one another
as they go about their duties. Hence in order to address the problem of security in
organisations, the requirements to mitigate security vulnerabilities need to be analysed
in view of the fact that human behaviours could also be a source of information security
breach.
Having presented our research in the previous chapters, we now summarise our con-
tributions in this chapter. We also examine possible extensions and future work from
this point.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarised as follows:
1. In Section 1.2 on page 11 we discussed the relationship between logic and security,
particularly when considering the human factor in information security manage-
ment. We therefore established that we can computationally reason about secu-
rity requirements at design time using the institutional framework which allow
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us to model actions in terms of permissions, obligations, and empowerment.
2. In Chapter 5 Section 5.2 on page 107, we present a computational approach for
the analysis of security requirements using an institutional framework which is
based on logic programming and inspired by deontic logic. We model scenarios
in InstAL, an action language which abstracts from Answer Set Programming
and in Section 5.4 on page 121 we demonstrate how reasoning can be carried out
over the computational model by querying.
3. We develop a tool for generating InstAL specifications from UML Activity Di-
agram models, thereby extending the original InstAL development process. To
achieve this we develop the semantics for translating UML Activity Diagrams to
InstAL based on Petri Net workflow semantics (see Section 6.2.1 on page 131).
In order to allow for expression of queries in a more natural language manner,
we extend an existing query translation tool in Section 6.3 on page 148.
4. In Chapter 7 we demonstrate how our methodology which is based on logic and
institutional frameworks can be applied to the security domain. We use a query
based approach to analyse security properties of confidentiality (Section 7.2 on
page 164) and integrity (Section 7.3 on page 172).
5. Managing information security requirements compliance is also an issue with
security in organisations. Security solutions implemented can only be as success-
ful as the degree of compliance that is achieved. In Section 7.4 on page 176 we
demonstrate how security requirements compliance can be verified at design time
using our framework.
8.2 Future work
We have focused on the verification of non-functional security requirements in this
dissertation. There are a number of extensions and directions for future work:
8.2.1 Run-time verification of security requirements
So far we have done only static analysis of security requirements. A next step would be
to analyse security requirements at run time. This would involve agent-based simulation
(Macal and North, 2005) in which participants in an organisation would modelled as
agents and the behaviours of these agents analysed in terms of the impact of their
compliance or violations to the security requirements.
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8.2.2 Secure process design
Several approaches have been proposed to improve compliance among employees. These
include sanctions and rewards, awareness and training (Bulgurcu et al., 2008; Puhakainen
and Siponen, 2010). These approaches try to tackle the compliance problem from either
deterrence or detection and recovery approaches. However the challenge still remains
that deterrence approaches have not significantly reduced non-compliance (Critchley,
2009). This is largely due to the fact that employees consider the level of convenience
the security requirements afford them for compliance as they strive towards meeting
their personal performance targets at work. We see an opportunity for application
of our methodology here in influencing the business process design. The answer sets
generated from the computational model of a scenario would suggest which of the
models would provide less inconvenience towards compliance by the participants if im-
plemented. The level of convenience can be measured by the amount of violations that
occur, if we assume that the violations signify inconvenience.
8.2.3 Integration of Tools
We have developed tools in order to enhance the modelling, the analysis, and the
understanding of the query results obtained. However, there is still limitation in the
use of some of these tools. For instance the UML2InstAL translator can only work
on a specific UML design tool. This is due to the fact that the different UML tools
available have a different way that they render the XML (or its likeness) representation
which is used to generate the InstAL specifications. There is the opportunity to extend
this tool such that it should be able to work with a number of other UML tools. It is
desirable that the tools be integrated into a common user interface to enhance their
usability.
8.2.4 Security Requirements in complex systems
As the complexity in socio-technical systems increases, so also the challenge of infor-
mation security. Systems composed of information, physical components, and human
behaviours become more sophisticated as boundaries between organisation face dissolu-
tion due to outsourcing, proliferation of mobile devices and service composition. These
trends lead to a significant increase in the number of possible interactions between
the participants in such systems. From security point of view, developments such as
working from home, bring-your-own-device (BYOD), and cloud computing result in
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increasingly complicated information security problems (Pieters et al., 2013). Security
problems such as propagation of access rights in complex attack scenarios is an issue
that needs to be dealt with. Attacks which may include physical access and social engi-
neering may be exploited at different vulnerability levels. An example is the road apple
attack (Stasiukonis, 2006) scenario where an attacker leaves infected dongles around
the organisation’s premises. Access rights are propagated as an employee picks up an
infected dongle and plugs it into the organisation’s computer, malware will send out
all the information it can find. Important questions that come with the possibilities
for such multi-step attacks in increasingly complex systems include how to manage in-
formation security requirements in such complex situations, and how to check whether
the security requirements are adequate. This is an area that we would like to explore
with our methodology.
8.2.5 Conflicts between Organisational Norms and Information Secu-
rity Requirements
Take the following scenario for instance: a department’s security requirements include
a policy that only authorised employees and visitors can enter the premises. A visitor
would need to first get a visitor’s access card at the reception. However, the automated
entrance doors are on a time delay and stay open for a while after an authenticated
person has been granted access and would allow non-registered persons to tailgate
behind some one with an access card. The employees have been told not to let this
happen, but it occurs regularly anyway. There is a conflict here between the policy,
the ethical norm of not treating people as suspicious without a good reason, and the
organisational norm of politeness to visitors. This problem has been identified and
presented in Pieters and Coles-Kemp (2011) but there is no computational solution to
this problem. This is an area that our work can be extended to analyse the relationship
between the possibly conflicting organisational norms and security requirements at
design time in order to guide the formulation of such security requirements.
8.3 Concluding Remarks
This thesis presents an approach to security requirements verification and validation
that makes use of formal reasoning methods. We are motivated by the fact that the
interaction of various participants in a system would potentially create information
security vulnerabilities that would not have been easy to identify at system design time.
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These types of vulnerabilities pose challenges to the preservation of information security
in organisations. Hence while most approaches to security requirements elicitation focus
more on technical aspects of security, we have approached the problem from a socio-
technical perspective in which we consider the behaviour of the participants and the
effect on the system in terms of the security requirements of the system. We have
presented our approach as a tool which can aid system designers and security engineers
for socio-technical systems in the elicitation of security requirements for the system-to-
be.
However, the work presented in this thesis is not without its limitations. We point out
some of these limitations as follows;
1. Security goals which guide the elicitation of security requirements have been
traditionally categorised into Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. We have
only applied our approach to Confidentiality and Integrity scenarios. At this
stage we are not able to model Availability scenarios since the properties for
availability can better be analysed dynamically than statically. We also want to
point out that we have treated these security properties in isolation, that is, we
have not given attention to how these goals affect each other.
2. We have not applied our approach to a real life organisational information se-
curity problem, even though we make an illustration using the iTrust medical
record system. Therefore we expect that some issues may arise when applied to
a real life scenario which we have not put into consideration.
3. So far, we have focused only on single institutions which means that we can only
deal with security requirements that pertain to a single organisational setting. In
order to analyse security requirements across organisational boundaries, it would
require multiple institutions which will also have to handle the issues that would
arise such as conflicts in requirements. Some published work on coordinating
conflicts in interacting institutions (Lupu and Sloman, 1999; Li, 2013; Li et al.,
2013) suggest that this is feasible.
4. There is a lack of a form of integration in which the various tools presented in
this thesis may be used seamlessly. Each tool has to be executed separately. The
provision of an integration platform would enhance the use of the tools.
We hope to be able to address these limitations in future works.
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Listing A.1: XML2InstAL translator Code.
1 from xml.etree import ElementTree as et
2 from collections import OrderedDict as od
3
4
5 # create empty tables
6 actorTable = od()
7 actionTable = od()
8 eventTable = od()
9
10 def insertActor(actorId, actorName):
11 if actorTable.has_key(actorId):
12 print ’error! Actor already in dictionary, refuse to enter
twice.’
13 else:














27 # print actionTable[actionId]
28











40 tree = et.parse(’examsProject2.xml’)
41
42 #populate actorTable
43 for node in tree.getroot().iter(’Model’):
44 if node.attrib.get(’modelType’) == ’ActivityPartition’:
45 actorId = node.attrib.get(’id’)
46 actor = node.attrib.get(’name’)
47 insertActor(actorId, actor)
48
49 for item in actorTable[actorId].keys():
50 if item == ’actionIDs’:
51 for nextnode in node.iter(’ModelRefsProperty’):





57 for node in tree.getroot().iter(’Model’):
58 expectedTypes = [’ActivityAction’,’AcceptEventAction’]
59 if node.attrib.get(’modelType’) in expectedTypes:
60 actionId = node.attrib.get(’id’)




65 for node in tree.getroot().iter(’Model’):
66 if node.attrib.get(’modelType’) == ’ActivityAction’:
218
67 ID = node.attrib.get(’id’)
68 name = node.attrib.get(’name’)
69 insertEvent(ID, name)
70 for nextnode in node.iter(’FromSimpleRelationships’):
71 for c in nextnode.iter(’RelationshipRef’):
72 eventTable[ID][’To’].append(c.attrib.get(’to’))
73 elif node.attrib.get(’modelType’) == ’AcceptEventAction’:
74 ID = node.attrib.get(’id’)
75 name = node.attrib.get(’name’)
76 insertEvent(ID, name)
77 for nextnode in node.iter(’ToSimpleRelationships’):
78 for d in nextnode.iter(’RelationshipRef’):
79 eventTable[ID][’From’].append(d.attrib.get(’from’))
80
81 #build required lists now
82 exogList = []
83 instList = []
84 fluentList = []
85
86 for x in actionTable.keys():
87 for y in actorTable.keys():
88 if x in actorTable[y][’actionIDs’]:
89 for z in eventTable.keys():
90 if x == z:
91 if eventTable[z][’To’] != eventTable[z][’From’]:
92 for k in eventTable[z][’To’]:
93 for l in actorTable.keys():
94 if k in actorTable[l][’actionIDs’]:

































117 for k in eventTable[z][’From’]:
118 for l in actorTable.keys():
119 if k in actorTable[l][’actionIDs’]:


























135 #Writing InstAL specifications
136
137 #get institution name
138 for firstnode in tree.getroot().iter(’Project’):
139 title = firstnode.attrib.get(’name’)




144 print ’% Types\n’
145 for x in actorTable.keys():
146 print ’type ’+actorTable[x][’actorName’]+’;’
147 print
148 # Writing exogenous events
149 print ’% Exogenous events’
150 for event in exogList:
151 print ’exogenous event ’+event+’;’
152 print
153 #Institutional events
154 print ’% Institutional events’
155 for event in instList:
156 print ’inst event ’+event+’;’
157 print
158 #Creation event
159 print ’% Creation event’
160 print ’create event crt_’+title+’;’
161 print
162 #Fluents declaration
163 print ’% Fluents declaration’
164 for fluent in fluentList:
165 print ’fluent ’+fluent+’;’
166 print
167 #Conventional generation
168 print ’% Conventional generation’
221
169 for exEvent,insEvent in zip(exogList,instList):
170 print exEvent + ’ generates ’+insEvent+’;’
171 print
172 #Consequence relations
173 print ’% Consequence relations’
174 for insEvent,fluent in zip(instList,fluentList):
175 print insEvent+’ initiates ’+fluent+’;’
176 print
177 #Initialization
178 print ’%initial states’
179 print ’initially’
180 for exEvent in exogList:
181 print ’perm(’+exEvent+’),’
182 for insEvent in instList:
183 print ’perm(’+insEvent+’), pow(’+insEvent+’),’
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Appendix B
pyinstql Query Translator Code




4 # REVISION HISTORY
5 # add new entries here at the top tagged by date and initials
6 # 20130401 GDB: added a definition of disjunction that allows for
comma
7 # 20130325 GDB: modified the ’show’ option to include ’occurred’
and ’holdsat’
8 # 20130225 GDB: added function to flatten the nested list into a
single flat list
9 # 20130222 GDB: removed the conditionCounter function
10 # 20130220 GDB: added functions for ’observe’ and ’show’
11 # 20130220 GDB: added code to accept input file at command line
using the -i option
12 #------------------------------------------------------------------------
13
14 from __future__ import print_function
15 import re
16 import sys
17 import ply.yacc as yacc




22 if sys.version_info[0] >= 3:
223
23 raw_input = input
24
25 # class instalparserclass():
26
27 instal_output = sys.stdout
28
29 def instql_print(p): print(p,file=instql_output)
30
31 def instql_error(p): print(p,file=sys.stderr)
32
33 def instql_warn(p): print(p,file=sys.stderr)
34
35 #show_debug = False
36 show_debug = True
37
38 def debug(*p):
39 if show_debug: print(p)
40
41 #------------------------------------------------------------------------
42 # LEXER + PARSER for instql
43
44 reserved = {
45 ’and’ : ’AND’,
46 ’not’ : ’NOT’,
47 ’or’ : ’OR’,
48 ’while’ : ’WHILE’,
49 ’after’ : ’AFTER’,
50 ’holds’ : ’HOLDS’,
51 ’happens’ : ’HAPPENS’,
52 ’condition’ : ’CONDITION’,
53 ’constraint’ : ’CONSTRAINT’,
54 ’violates’ : ’VIOLATES’,
55 ’show’ : ’SHOW’,










63 t_SEMI = r’;’
64 t_COMMA = r’,’
65 t_COLON = r’:’
66 t_LPAR = r’\(’















80 # note: numbers are parsed but not converted into integers
81 r’\d+’
82 # t.value = int(t.value)
83 return t
84










95 t.lexer.lineno += t.value.count("\n")
96
97 def t_error(t):




101 # Build the lexer
102 import ply.lex as lex
103 lex.lex()
104
105 ast = []
106
107 def p_instqlExpr(p): #GDB added observe, show
108 """ instqlExpr :
109 instqlExpr : instqlExpr conditionDecl
110 instqlExpr : instqlExpr constraint
111 instqlExpr : instqlExpr observe





117 ast = []
118 p[0] = []
119 else:
120 ast = [p[2]] + p[1]
121 p[0] = ast
122
123 def p_variable_list(p):
124 """ variable_list :
125 variable_list : VARIABLE
126 variable_list : variable_list COMMA VARIABLE
127 """
128 # debug("variable_list:")
129 if len(p)>2: p[0] = p[1] + [p[3]] # general case
130 elif len(p)==2: p[0] = [p[1]] # unary case
131 # nullary case
132
133 def p_identifier(p):
134 # second rule not in grammar, but derives from example
135 #GDB: added the more rules
136 """ identifier : NAME
137 identifier : VARIABLE
138 identifier : INTEGER
139 identifier : NAME LPAR variable_list RPAR
140 identifier : NAME LPAR NAME RPAR





145 p[0] = [p[1],p[3],p[5]]
146 elif len(p)>4:
147 p[0] = [p[1],p[3]]
148 else:
149 p[0] = p[1]
150
151 #GDB: added the second rule
152 def p_happens(p):
153 """ happens : HAPPENS LPAR identifier RPAR




158 p[0] = [’HAPPENS’,p[3],p[5]]
159 else:
160 p[0] = [’HAPPENS’,p[3]]
161
162 def p_violates(p):
163 """ violates : VIOLATES LPAR identifier RPAR




168 p[0] = [’VIOLATES’,p[3],p[5]]
169 else:
170 p[0] = [’VIOLATES’,p[3]]
171
172 def p_holds(p):
173 """ holds : HOLDS LPAR identifier RPAR




178 p[0] = [’HOLDS’,p[3],p[5]]
179 else:
180 # debug("holds:")




184 """ literal : NOT happens
185 literal : NOT holds
186 literal : happens
187 literal : holds




192 p[0] = [’NOT’,p[2]]
193 else:
194 p[0] = p[1]
195
196 def p_whileExpr(p):
197 """ whileExpr : literal




202 p[0] = [’WHILE’,p[1],p[3]]
203 else:
204 p[0] = p[1]
205
206 def p_after(p):
207 """ after : AFTER





213 p[0] = [’AFTER’,p[3]]
214 else:
215 # debug("after:")
216 p[0] = ’AFTER’
217
218 def p_afterExpr(p):
219 """ afterExpr : whileExpr






225 p[0] = [p[2],p[1],p[3]]
226 else:
227 p[0] = [p[2][0],p[2][1],p[1],p[3]]
228 else:
229 p[0] = p[1]
230
231 def p_conditionLiteral(p):
232 """ conditionLiteral : NOT identifier
233 conditionLiteral : identifier





238 p[0] = [’NOT’,p[2]]
239 else:
240 p[0] = p[1]
241
242 def p_term(p):
243 """ term : afterExpr
244 term : conditionLiteral
245 """
246 # debug("term:")
247 p[0] = p[1]
248
249 def p_conjunction(p):
250 """ conjunction : term




255 p[0] = [’AND’,p[1],p[3]]
256 else:
257 p[0] = p[1]
258
259 def p_disjunction(p): #GDB: added a rule that accepts comma
260 """ disjunction : conjunction
261 disjunction : disjunction COMMA conjunction





266 p[0] = [’OR’,p[1],p[3]]
267 else:
268 p[0] = p[1]
269
270 def p_conditionDecl(p):
271 """ conditionDecl : CONDITION term COLON disjunction SEMI
272 """
273 # debug("conditionDecl:")
274 p[0] = [’CONDITION’,p[2],p[4]]
275
276 def p_constraint(p):
277 """ constraint : CONSTRAINT disjunction SEMI
278 """
279 # debug("constraint:")
280 p[0] = [’CONSTRAINT’,p[2]]
281
282 # GDB: functions for observe and show
283 def p_observe(p):
284 """ observe : OBSERVE disjunction SEMI
285 """
286 # debug("observe:")
287 p[0] = [’OBSERVE’,p[2]]
288
289 def p_show(p):
290 """ show : SHOW disjunction SEMI
291 """
292 # debug("show:")




297 debug("Syntax error at ’%s’" % p.value)
298 else:
299 debug("Syntax error at EOF")
300
301 #def term2string(p):
302 # # print "term2string: p = ",p
303 # args = p[1]
304 # r=’’
230
305 # if len(args)==0:
306 # r=p[0]




311 # for x in args[1:]: r=r+’,’+x
312 # r=p[0]+r+’)’








321 #GDB 20130220: code for file input at command line
322 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
323 parser.add_argument("-i","--input-file")
324 args = parser.parse_args()
325
326 inp = open(args.input_file,’r’)
327
328 document = " "
329
330 if args.input_file: document = inp.read(-1)







338 def id2string(p): #GDB: Modified to treat arguments as strings
339 #debug("is2string: p = ",p)
340 if isinstance(p,str): return p
341 args = p[1:]




















361 # debug(’thisInstant =’,instantCounter)
362 return ‘instantCounter‘
363
364 def flatten(L): #GDB: Added this function to flatten out nested
lists




369 elif type(L[0]) == type([]):
370 return flatten(L[0]) + flatten(L[1:])
371 else:
372 return [L[0]] + flatten(L[1:])
373
374 def param(a): #GDB: Added this function to handle parameters











385 instantCounter = int(instantCounter) # GDB: This is somehow
messy
386 newInstant()
387 if t==[]: return ""
388 k=t[0]
389 a=t[1:]
390 if k==’WHILE’: #GDB: modified for handling instants
391 global instantCounter
392 z = instantCounter
393 r = instql_print(a[0])
394 instantCounter = z
395 for x in a[1:]: r += ’,’ + instql_print(x)
396 return r
397 if k==’AFTER’: #GDB: modified and extended to handle instants
properly
398 d = ’’
399 if (len(a)==3):
400 d = a[0]
401 a = a[1:]
402 r = instql_print(a[0])
403 for x in a[1:]:
404 z = thisInstant()




409 r = instql_print(a[0])
410 for x in a[1:]:
411 z = thisInstant()
412 w = instql_print(x)
413 r += ’,’ + w + (’,after({i1},{i2})’
414 .format(i1=’I’+z,i2=’I’+str(instantCounter)))













427 if k==’VIOLATES’: #GDB: Added this option to handle violations









437 c = param(a)
438 if len(a)>1:













452 return [instql_print(x) for x in a]
453 if k==’AND’:
454 r = instql_print(a[0])
455 for x in a[1:]: r += ’,’ + instql_print(x)
456 return r
457 if k==’CONDITION’:
458 r = ’’
459 s = instql_print(a[1])
460 f = flatten(s)
461 # check for string or list
462 if isinstance(f,str):




466 for x in f:
467 r += (’{name} :- {body}.\n’
468 .format(name=id2string(a[0]),body=x))
469 return r
470 if k==’CONSTRAINT’: #GDB: modified and extended to handle list
of constraints and parameters
471 # debug(’constraint’,a)
472 r = ’’
473 s = instql_print(a[0])
474 f = flatten(s)
475 if isinstance(f,str): # check for string or list
476 if (f[0:3] == ’not’):
477 r = (’:- {body}.\n’
478 .format(body=f[3:]))
479 else:
480 r = (’:- not {body}.\n’
481 .format(body=f))
482 else:
483 for x in f:
484 if (x[0:3] == ’not’):
485 r += (’:- {body}.\n’
486 .format(body=x[3:]))
487 else:




492 # GDB: prints the observed events
493 if k==’OBSERVE’:
494 #c = param(a)
495 #debug(’c:’,c)
496 r = ’’
497 s = instql_print(a[0])
498 #debug(’s:’,s)
499 f = flatten(s)
500 #debug(’f:’,f)
501 if isinstance(f,str):
502 instantCounter = 0





507 instantCounter = 0
508 for x in f:





514 # GDB: prints the show conditions
515 if k==’SHOW’:
516 r = ’’
517 r = ’#hide.\n’
518 s = instql_print(a[0])
519 f = flatten(s)
520 if isinstance(f,str):
521 if f == ’events’:
522 r += (’#show {ev}.\n’
523 .format(ev=’occurred(E,I)’))
524 elif f == ’states’:
525 r += (’state(F,I):- instant(I),fluent(F).\n’
526 ’#show {ev}.\n’
527 .format(ev=’state(F,I)’))
528 elif f == ’violations’:
529 r += (’#show {ev}.\n’
530 .format(ev=’occurred(viol(E),I)’))
531 else:
532 r += (’#show {ev}.\n’
533 .format(ev=f))
534 else:
535 for x in f:
536 if x == ’events’:
537 r += (’#show {ev}.\n’
538 .format(ev=’occurred(E,I)’))
539 elif x == ’states’:
540 r += (’state(F,I):- instant(I),fluent(F).\n’
541 ’#show {ev}.\n’
542 .format(ev=’state(F,I)’))
543 elif x == ’violations’:











554 for x in ast: print(instql_print(x))
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Appendix C
pyviz Answer Set Visualiser Code




4 # REVISION HISTORY
5 # add new entries here at the top tagged by date and initials
6 # GDB 201305??: added input file argument and consequent changes
7 # GDB/JAP?????: changed main loop to iterate over occurred not
holdsat
8 # JAP 201305??: first version (approx)
9
10 from __future__ import print_function
11 import re
12 import sys
13 import ply.lex as lex
14 from collections import defaultdict
15 import string
16 from itertools import izip





22 # Build the lexer
23 # def build(self,**kwargs):




27 self.lexer = lex.lex(module=self)
28
29 reserved = { }
30




35 t_COMMA = r’,’
36 t_LPAR = r’\(’








45 # t.value = int(t.value)
46 return t
47










58 t.lexer.lineno += t.value.count("\n")
59
60 def t_error(self,t):







67 observed = defaultdict(list)
68 holdsat = defaultdict(list)
69 initiated = defaultdict(list)
70 terminated = defaultdict(list)
71 occurred = defaultdict(list)
72 state = defaultdict(list)
73 compromised = defaultdict(list)
74
75 def processHoldsat(l):
76 # lots of tacky dead-reckoning :(
77 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
78 holdsat[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever holdsat
79
80 def processState(l):
81 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
82 state[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever state
83
84 def processCompromised(l):
85 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
86 state[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever state
87
88 def processObserved(l):
89 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
90 observed[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever observed
91
92 def processInitiated(l):
93 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
94 initiated[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever initiated
95
96 def processTerminated(l):
97 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
98 terminated[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever terminated
99
100 def processOccurred(l):
101 time = int(l[-2]) # -2 is time instant
240
102 occurred[time].append(string.join(l[2:-3],’’).replace(’_’,’\_’).replace(’,’,’,
’)) # should be whatever terminated
103
104 # command line arguments
105
106 def arb(s): return s
107
108 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
109 parser.add_argument("-a", "--answer-set", type=arb,
110 help="specify answer set (default 1)")
111 # GDB 20130430
112 parser.add_argument("-i", "--answerset-file", type=arb,






119 answer_set = args.answer_set
120 # GDB 20130430
121 if args.answerset_file:
122 f = open(args.answerset_file,’r’)
123
124 document = ""
125
126 if args.answerset_file:
127 document = f #document + f.read(-1)
128 else:




133 for line in document:#sys.stdin:
134 if re.match("Answer: {n}".format(n=answer_set),line): break
135 for line in document:#sys.stdin:
136 # split line into terms so that process can group output about
each
137 # mechanism found
138 found = True
139 for term in re.split(’ ’,line):
140 mylex.lexer.input(term)
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141 l = [tok.value for tok in mylex.lexer]
















158 print("% skipping \"{term}\""
159 .format(term=string.join(l,’’)))
160 break # stop after specified answer set
161 if not found:
162 print("Answer set {n} not found".format(n=answer_set))
163 exit(-1)
164 # output the latex
165 print("\\resizebox{\\textwidth}{!}{\n"
166 "\\begin{tikzpicture}\n"
167 "[\nstart chain=trace going right,")
168 # establish how many states there are
169 event_count=max(len(occurred),len(observed))
170 inst_count=max(len(holdsat),len(initiated),len(terminated),len(state))
171 nstates=event_count+1 if event_count>0 else inst_count
172 # set up state chains
173 for t in range(0,nstates):
174 print("start chain=state{i} going down,".format(i=t))
175 print("node distance=1cm and 5.2cm\n]")
176 for t in range(0,nstates):
177 print("{{{{ [continue chain=trace]\n"





181 # connectors between states labelled with observed and
occurred events





186 + "\\\\\n\\em "








193 print("{{ [continue chain=state{i} going below]\n"
194 "\\node [on chain=state{i},below=of
i{i},rectangle,draw,rounded corners,inner frame
sep=0pt] (s{i}) {{\n"
195 "% instant {i}"
196 .format(i=t))






201 + string.join(["\\sout{"+x+"}\\\\\n" for x in
terminated[t]],’’)
202 + ("\\hline " if len(terminated[t])!=0 else "")
203 + string.join([x+"\\\\\n" if (t>0) and
204 ((x in holdsat[t-1]) or (x in
initiated[t-1])) else
205 "\\textbf{\\textcolor{blue}{"+x+"}}\\\\\n"
# bold new fluents
206 for x in holdsat[t] if x not in
terminated[t]],’’)
207 + string.join([x+"\\\\\n" if (t>0) and




# bold new fluents
210 for x in state[t] if x not in
terminated[t]],’’)
211 + string.join([x+"\\\\\n" if (t>0) and
212 ((x in compromised[t-1]) or (x in
initiated[t-1])) else
213 "\\textbf{\\textcolor{blue}{"+x+"}}\\\\\n"
# bold new fluents
214 for x in compromised[t] if x not in
terminated[t]],’’)
215 + ("\\hline " if len(initiated[t])!=0 else "")
216 +
string.join(["\\textbf{\\textcolor{blue}{"+x+"}}\\\\\n"
for x in initiated[t]],’’)
217 + "\\end{tabular}\n};")
218 print("} % end node and chain")
219 print("\draw (i{i}) -- (s{i});\n"
220 .format(i=t))
221 print("% \pause % uncomment here to animate\n")
222 # provenance of trace
223 print("\\draw(i0)+(-3,0)node[rotate=90]{{Answer set {i}, {f}}};"
224 .format(i=answer_set,




228 if args.answerset_file: f.close()
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